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FOREWORD
One of the fundamental purposes of the North American Agreement on
Labor Cooperation is to reinforce the labor laws of the signatory nations
in the face of increasing pressures of competition due to free interna-
tional trade. Open trade is intended to bring greater business opportu-
nities and more efficient use of resources resulting in more employment
and economic growth. But open trade also intensifies the pressures of
competition. It forces many companies to make major changes in the
way they do business; it causes new businesses to start up and some com-
panies to go out of business. All competitors must make the maximum
use of their resources and investments and obtain the maximum pro-
duction from their workforce.
Labor laws channel the forces of competition away from negative re-
sponses (competitiveness based on exploitation of the workforce) to pos-
itive responses (competitiveness based on the productivity of the work-
force). Labor laws set the floor for fair competition, creating the
standard conditions within which all competitors must operate. Only if
all observe the rules do the rules serve the common good. If it is possible
to circumvent the rules, if some competitors observe the rules and others
do not, then the rules hinder fair competition rather than enhancing it.
Thus, the greater the pressure of competition the more important is
the consistent and effective application of the standards by which all
competitors must operate.
In establishing their Agreement on Labor Cooperation as a comple-
ment to the North American Free Trade Agreement, the governments of
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Canada, the United States and Mexico accepted the fact that each na-
tion had evolved a different system of labor law and administration.
They agreed that those systems should continue to evolve independent-
ly within each sovereign jurisdiction. But they also recognized the
extremely important fact that these three systems were based on under-
lying principles which were held in common and which could be artic-
ulated. These are the 11 Labor Principles of the NAALC.
Each principle defines a sector of labor law, which is given concrete
expression by the statutes and jurisprudence of the different jurisdic-
tions. The parties to the NAALC undertake solemn obligations to en-
sure that their laws in these sectors are effectively enforced. Thus all
competitors in the North American Free Trade area will operate under
the law in regard to labor matters, administered openly and consistent-
ly. Such is a major objective of the NAALC.
The objective of this publication by the Commission for Labor Coop-
eration is to enable the public at large in North America, and not just spe-
cialists in comparative labor law, to know simply and clearly what those dif-
ferent labor law regimes are and how they are administered. The NAALC
relies primarily on the public to draw attention to any deficiencies which
may occur in regard to labor law administration. It is thus imperative that
the public have ready access to the content of the laws and how they are
meant to apply, organized following the schema of the NAALC.
Some may find the language of this publication rather technical at
times; in fact, every effort has been made to produce a document that is
highly accurate yet general, accessible to as many as possible yet suffi-
ciently precise to be useful as an operational guide. The challenge was
much greater than was originally imagined, not to mention the need to
operate in three languages and to reflect the influence of different legal
cultures. The countless hours of work by the staff of the Secretariat
whose names appear in this book testify to this challenge. But the value
of such an overview, we firmly believe, justifies the investment.
John S. McKennirey
Executive Director
Secretariat
Commission for Labor Cooperation
May 1999
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INTRODUCTION
1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THIS VOLUME 
AND SERIES
A. THE COMMISSION FOR LABOR COOPERATION AND THE NORTH
AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON LABOR COOPERATION
The Commission for Labor Cooperation is a new international organi-
zation created by Canada, Mexico, and the United States under the
North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC). Along
with an agreement on environmental cooperation, the NAALC is one of
two supplementary or “side” agreements to the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The NAFTA and the two side agreements
came into force on January 1, 1994. The NAALC is the first interna-
tional labor agreement linked to a trade treaty. It creates an internation-
al discipline on enforcement of domestic labor law, a major innovation
in international labor affairs.
The NAALC sets forth objectives that include promoting 11 basic
Labor Principles, promoting international cooperation in the labor are-
na, improving working conditions and living standards, and ensuring
the effective enforcement and transparent administration of labor laws.
Following these objectives, the NAALC countries agree to a set of six
Obligations that relate specifically to the effective enforcement and
transparent administration of labor law.
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The NAALC’s 11 Labor Principles and six Obligations define the
scope of the agreement. These Principles and Obligations cover nearly
all aspects of labor rights and labor standards.1 The countries commit
themselves to the Obligations and undertake to promote the Principles,
but they have not established common laws or standards. However, the
countries do agree to open themselves up to reviews and consultations
among themselves on all labor matters within the scope of the Agree-
ment.
In addition to review and consultation, the countries’ obligations re-
garding the effective and transparent enforcement of labor law are sub-
ject to an evaluation by an independent committee of experts and, in
certain circumstances, to dispute resolution by an independent arbitral
panel.
The Agreement establishes an organizational structure for implemen-
tation. It creates the Commission for Labor Cooperation, headed by a
Council of Ministers made up of the cabinet level minister or secretary
responsible for labor matters in each nation, and an international Secre-
tariat to support the Council. Each government has also established a
National Administrative Office (NAO) within its department or min-
istry of labor to receive communications from the public in that country,
to provide information, and generally to facilitate participation under
the Agreement.
B. THE ROLE OF THE SECRETARIAT
As the permanent staff organization of the Commission, the Secretariat
has two main responsibilities. First, it assists the Ministerial Council in
carrying out any of the Council’s functions under the agreement, such as
supporting an independent Evaluation Committee of Experts or Arbi-
tral Panel which the Council may establish, or promoting cooperative
16 GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THIS VOLUME AND SERIES
1 The Principles and Obligations cover the following: freedom of association and
protection of the right to organize; the right to bargain collectively; the right to strike;
prohibition of forced labor; labor protections for children and young persons; minimum
employment standards; elimination of employment discrimination; equal pay for
women and men; prevention of occupational injuries and illnesses; compensation in cas-
es of occupational injuries and illnesses; and protection of migrant workers.
activities, including working groups and conferences on labor-related
matters. Second, under Article 14 of the NAALC the Secretariat pre-
pares periodic reports and special studies. Periodic reports cover four
broad areas: (1) labor law and administrative procedures; (2) the imple-
mentation and enforcement of labor law; (3) labor market conditions;
and (4) human resource development issues. In addition, special studies
can be called for at any time on any matter that the Council considers
necessary.
C. COMPARATIVE GUIDE TO LABOR LAW
This volume is the first of a set of comparative guides to labor law in
Canada, the United States, and Mexico. These volumes will describe
how each NAALC member country addresses the six Obligations of the
NAALC with respect to each of the Labor Principles that the NAALC
commits its signatories to promote. They provide a concise description,
for each NAALC member country, of the particular laws, practices, and
administrative procedures which relate to each NAALC obligation. In so
doing, their aim is to promote greater understanding of the legal systems
of each country by providing an accurate picture of how each works and
by facilitating comparisons between them.2
This guide covers basic labor and industrial relations: union organiz-
ing, collective bargaining, and the right to strike as set out in Labor Prin-
ciples 1, 2 and 3 of the NAALC. Subsequent volumes will cover what
the NAALC defines as “technical labor standards,” contained in Labor
Principles 4 to 11.
Labor Principles 1, 2, and 3 and the six NAALC enforcement Oblig-
ations are set out in full at the close of this introduction.
C. COMPARATIVE GUIDE TO LABOR LAW 17
2 The Secretariat is preparing this comparative guide to labor relations law under its
NAALC Article 14(1)(a) mandate to produce background reports on the labor law and
administrative procedures of the three NAALC member states. Accordingly the report
presents a descriptive analysis of the laws, procedures and practices needed to understand
the labor law systems of the three NAALC member countries. This report is not, how-
ever, an analysis of trends and administrative strategies related to the implementation
and enforcement of labor law, topics addressed under article 14(1)(b) rather than
14(1)(a) of the NAALC.
These comparative labor law guides are intended to serve both the
specialized interests of labor law practitioners and the general interests of
nonpractitioners concerned with the social dimension of expanding
trade relations under the North American Free Trade Agreement.
A separate comparative labor market report series, collectively titled
North American Labor Markets: A Comparative Profile, also published by
the Secretariat, addresses labor force characteristics, employment, earn-
ings and income distribution, adjustment and training programs, and
other critical labor market issues in the North American economy. Like
this report, the Profile is intended for both a specialized audience of
economists and labor policy experts as well as the general public.
D. FORMAT
The first part of this volume provides an introductory discussion of the
three Labor Principles which are its focus. The next three parts set out
for Canada, Mexico and the United States, respectively, a narrative
summary of the law, practice and procedure relevant to those principles
and the NAALC Obligations.
Each country part is divided into seven sections. Section 1 presents a
general introduction to the country’s basic labor policy, the domestic le-
gal foundations of labor rights, dividing lines between labor law juris-
dictions, legal background of individual employment contracts, and ex-
clusions from labor law coverage. Sections 2 through 7 describe,
respectively, the law and practice which relate to the Obligations found
in the correspondingly numbered NAALC article. Thus, section 2 deals
with the substantive rights and protections provided by the labor laws of
the country in question. Section 3 describes government enforcement
measures; section 4, private rights of action to enforce labor rights; and
section 5, the due process protections and remedies available to ensure
enforcement. Section 6 outlines practices with respect to publication of
labor laws, procedures and administrative rulings. Section 7 provides a
brief overview of public information available on labor law and enforce-
ment and compliance procedures in the country.
Each section within each country part is divided further into subsec-
tions. Those subsections are organized to present the key components of
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the relevant law and practice. In order to facilitate cross-country com-
parisons, the subsections in each country part closely parallel those of
each other country part.
Thus, a reader who wishes to understand, for example, how workers
in each member country exercise and enforce the right to organize will
find, in each country part, a description of the relevant rights under na-
tional law (in section 2), a description of how those rights may be en-
forced (in sections 3 and 4), and a description of what remedies are avail-
able to ensure their enforcement (in section 5). The reader will also be
able to quickly compare the law and practice of different countries by
turning to the corresponding sections and subsections of other country
parts. In addition, on many topics the text includes brief comparative
summaries of key differences between the countries. These are placed at
the end of each section or subsection and are printed in bold type.
Paragraphs in bold type highlight key comparisons between coun-
tries. The reader can see at a glance, without having to review another
country section, a summary of how one country’s law and practice
resembles or differs from that of the other countries. Box insets provide
legal detail, statistics, practical examples, and other background infor-
mation. These items are intended to bring life to the often unavoidable
technicalities and generalities of labor law discussion. The Secretariat
wants its reports and profiles to be “reader friendly” as well as technical-
ly accurate, for use in workshops, seminars, trade union and employer
training programs, classrooms, community organizations and other
v e n u e s .
E. SCOPE OF THE GUIDE
As a supplemental agreement to the NAFTA, the NAALC is most di-
rectly concerned with labor rights in sectors engaged in trade among the
three countries. Accordingly, this initial guide focuses on the main labor
law systems for the three countries’ private sector employers and employ-
ees. Each country has separate, highly developed legal regimes for public
sector labor relations. Further, they often have special provisions for cer-
tain private or mixed public-private enterprises, or for limited special
categories of workers. However, except for the U.S. Railway Labor Act
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(which is discussed because of the importance of the railway and airline
industries to trade), those distinct labor law regimes are not treated here.
Even within the main body of private sector labor law, this guide can-
not delve into every area of labor law and practice. The treatment or
omission of treatment of any employment sector or any aspect of labor
law in this volume in no way reflects an interpretation of the scope of the
North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation.
Box 1.1
Labor Principles 1, 2, and 3 of the NAALC
1: Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize
The right of workers exercised freely and without impediment to establish and
join organizations of their own choosing to further and defend their interests.
2: The Right to Bargain Collectively
The protection of the right of organized workers to freely engage in collective
bargaining on matters concerning the terms and conditions of employment.
3: The Right to Strike
The protection of the right of workers to strike in order to defend their collec-
tive interests.
Box 1.2
NAALC Part 2: Obligations
Article 2: Levels of Protection
Affirming full respect for each Party’s constitution, and recognizing the
right of each Party to establish its own domestic labor standards, and to
adopt or modify accordingly its labor laws and regulations, each Party
shall ensure that its labor laws and regulations provide for high labor stan-
dards, consistent with high quality and productivity workplaces, and
shall continue to strive to improve those standards in that light.
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Article 3: Government Enforcement Action
1. Each Party shall promote compliance with and effectively enforce its
labor law through appropriate government action, subject to Article 42,
such as:
a. appointing and training inspectors;
b. monitoring compliance and investigating suspected violations, in-
cluding through on-site inspections;
c. seeking assurances of voluntary compliance;
d. requiring record keeping and reporting;
e. encouraging the establishment of worker-management committees
to address labor regulation of the workplace;
f. providing or encouraging mediation, conciliation and arbitration
services; or
g. initiating, in a timely manner, proceedings to seek appropriate
sanctions or remedies for violations of its labor law.
2. Each Party shall ensure that its competent authorities give due con-
sideration in accordance with its law to any request by an employer, em-
ployee or their representatives, or other interested person, for an investi-
gation of an alleged violation of the Party’s labor law.
Article 4: Private Action
1. Each Party shall ensure that persons with a legally recognized interest
under its law in a particular matter have appropriate access to adminis-
trative, quasi-judicial, judicial or labor tribunals for the enforcement of
the Party’s labor law.
2. Each Party’s law shall ensure that such persons may have recourse
to, as appropriate, procedures by which rights arising under:
a. its labor law, including in respect of occupational safety and health,
employment standards, industrial relations and migrant workers,
and
b. collective agreements, can be enforced.
Article 5: Procedural Guarantees
1. Each Party shall ensure that its administrative, quasi-judicial, judicial and
labor tribunal proceedings for the enforcement of its labor law are fair, eq-
uitable and transparent and, to this end, each Party shall provide that:
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a. such proceedings comply with due process of law;
b. any hearings in such proceedings are open to the public, except
where the administration of justice otherwise requires;
c. the parties to such proceedings are entitled to support or defend
their respective positions and to present information or evidence;
and
d. such proceedings are not unnecessarily complicated and do not en-
tail unreasonable charges or time limits or unwarranted delays.
2. Each Party shall provide that final decisions on the merits of the
case in such proceedings are:
a. in writing and preferably state the reasons on which the decisions
are based;
b. made available without undue delay to the parties to the proceed-
ings and, consistent with its law, to the public; and
c. based on information or evidence in respect of which the parties
were offered the opportunity to be heard.
3. Each Party shall provide, as appropriate, that parties to such pro-
ceedings have the right, in accordance with its law, to seek review and,
where warranted, correction of final decisions issued in such proceedings.
4. Each Party shall ensure that tribunals that conduct or review such
proceedings are impartial and independent and do not have any substan-
tial interest in the outcome of the matter.
5. Each Party shall provide that the parties to administrative, quasi-ju-
dicial, judicial or labor tribunal proceedings may seek remedies to ensure
the enforcement of their labor rights. Such remedies may include, as ap-
propriate, orders, compliance agreements, fines, penalties, imprison-
ment, injunctions or emergency workplace closures.
6. Each Party may, as appropriate, adopt or maintain labor defense of-
fices to represent or advise workers or their organizations.
7. Nothing in this Article shall be construed to require a Party to es-
tablish, or to prevent a Party from establishing, a judicial system for the
enforcement of its labor law distinct from its system for the enforcement
of laws in general.
8. For greater certainty, decisions by each Party’s administrative, qua-
si-judicial, judicial or labor tribunals, or pending decisions, as well as re-
lated proceedings shall not be subject to revision or reopened under the
provisions of this Agreement.
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Article 6: Publication
1. Each Party shall ensure that its laws, regulations, procedures and ad-
ministrative rulings of general application respecting any matter covered
by this Agreement are promptly published or otherwise made available in
such a manner as to enable interested persons and Parties to become ac-
quainted with them.
2. When so established by its law, each Party shall:
a. publish in advance any such measure that it proposes to adopt; and
b. provide interested persons a reasonable opportunity to comment
on such proposed measures.
Article 7: Public Information and Awareness
1. Each Party shall promote public awareness of its labor law, including
by:
a. ensuring that public information is available related to its labor law
and enforcement and compliance procedures; and
b. promoting public education regarding its labor law.
2. INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS ON NAALC 
LABOR PRINCIPLES 1, 2 AND 3
A. LABOR PRINCIPLE 1: FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND PROTECTION
OF THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE
The right of workers exercised freely and without impediment to establish
and join organizations of their own choosing to further and defend their
interests.
Freedom of association is the bedrock workers’ right on which all other
labor rights rest. It stems from a basic human need for society, commu-
nity, and shared purpose in a freely chosen common enterprise.
Freedom of association is enshrined in every major international hu-
man rights instrument: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the
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International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Econom-
ic, Social and Cultural Rights; and the human rights charters of Europe,
Africa and the Americas.
The consensus of the world community reflected in those instru-
ments is that freedom of association is a fundamental right that must not
be derogated for any ulterior motive, including economic development.
The NAALC partners have made freedom of association and protection
of the right to organize the first of the Labor Principles to which they
commit themselves.
Freedom of association is not only important for workers. It reaches
all forms of organization in civil society: political, religious, social, cul-
tural and more. Independent, nongovernmental organizations such
a s trade unions and federations, business enterprises and employers’
federations, churches, community organizations and other associations
o f many kinds play a vital role in the societies of all three NAALC
c o u n t r i e s .
In the workplace, freedom of association is manifested above all in the
right of workers to organize themselves to promote and defend their in-
terests in employment. There is a key distinction, however, between
freedom of association and protection of the right to organize. In human
rights discourse, freedom of association is often referred to as a “negative
right.” This means that for the right to be enjoyed by workers, the State
should do nothing — place no “impediment” in their way, nor cause
them to suffer any disadvantage for attempting to associate, as long as
their activity is lawful. (The phrase “negative right” seems contradictory,
but it is the terminology employed in human rights theory to distinguish
it from “positive rights” such as those described below.)
Protection of the right to organize is a “positive right.” For the right
to be enjoyed, the State must act affirmatively, or positively, to protect
the right. Governments do this by enacting laws which enable workers
to establish and administer autonomous organizations, laws which give
those organizations the legal capacity to act on the collective decisions of
their members, and laws which prohibit both interference with those or-
ganizations and discrimination or other forms of retaliation against
workers or their leaders who seek to organize. To be fully effective, these
laws must provide both remedies for workers and unions harmed by
such discrimination and also sanctions against violators.
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The United States, Mexico and Canada, each in its own way and con-
sistent with its own history, culture and values, have incorporated the
principles of freedom of association and protection of the right to or-
ganize in their constitutions, charters, laws and national practices. All
three countries have laws that forbid discrimination against workers who
seek to form trade unions and that provide remedies for victims of such
discrimination.
In the United States, the First Amendment of the Constitution pro-
tects rights of assembly and speech and the right to petition the govern-
ment for redress of grievances. In Mexico, Article 9 of the Constitution
protects the general right of association, and Article 123 establishes the
right of workers and employers to defend their respective interests by
forming trade unions and professional associations. In Canada, Section
2(d) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees freedom of associ-
ation. The courts of all three countries safeguard these basic constitu-
tional rights.
Each country has adopted laws and regulations protecting the right to
organize: the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) in the United States,
the Mexican Federal Labor Law (FLL), and Canada’s provincial labor re-
lations acts or codes and the federal Canada Labour Code.
These laws require vigilance for their effective application. Laws pro-
tecting freedom of association and the right to organize are precondi-
tions to effective exercise of these rights, but these laws are not sufficient
in themselves. With the dramatic economic changes of the late 20th
century and the forthcoming challenges of the 21st century, the effective
enforcement of these rights is critical to achieve the objectives set forth
in the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation.
B. LABOR PRINCIPLE 2: THE RIGHT TO BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY
The protection of the right of organized workers to freely engage in collective
bargaining on matters concerning the terms and conditions of employment.
The right to organize does not exist in a vacuum. Workers exercise
their freedom of association for a purpose: to obtain just and favorable
terms and conditions of employment when they have freely decided that
collective representation is preferable to individual bargaining. Protect-
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ing the right to bargain collectively guarantees workers a unified voice to
engage their employer in an exchange of information, proposals and di-
alogue to establish wages, benefits, and other terms and conditions of
employment.
Protecting the right to bargain collectively requires employers to en-
ter into relationships with trade unions. Because protecting the right to
bargain implicates the rights of employers in a profound fashion, its
place in labor rights discourse is more complex than that of workers’
freedom of association and protection of their right to organize. Differ-
ent countries have developed a variety of methods for collective bargain-
ing, based on their own history and culture of labor relations.
In some countries the law creates an affirmative duty to bargain in
good faith. Such laws compel employers whose workers have chosen col-
lective representation to bargain with their union, whether or not the
employer voluntarily consents. Other countries avoid the imposition of
involuntary bargaining. They allow the workers’ right to strike or the
prospect of state intervention in bargaining to induce employers to bar-
gain out of practical necessity rather than legal compulsion.
To compel an employer to bargain, some countries require proof that
a majority of workers desire collective representation. Other countries
protect the right of a minority union to bargain with an employer, re-
quiring only a minimum number of union members.
Labor laws in some countries favor a system of craft unionism, where
unions of workers in different occupations bargain separately with an
employer. Others favor industrial unionism, combining workers in dif-
ferent occupations in the same union to bargain as a group with their
employer. Still others permit a combination of craft and industrial
unions in the same workplace.
Some countries grant exclusive representation rights to one union
through a system of union certification. Some of these countries will cer-
tify only a union that the majority of workers have chosen. Others will
certify the most representative union, even without a majority. Other
countries allow multiple unions in a single workplace, even in the same
occupation or “bargaining unit.”
Many countries require employers to consult with employee “works
councils” on decisions affecting workers, whether or not a trade union is
present in the workplace. The European Union (EU) has adopted a Eu-
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ropean Works Council Directive requiring consultation by any firm op-
erating in two or more EU countries with a works council made up of
worker representatives from workplaces in each of the countries where it
operates.
In some countries the law specifies clauses that must be contained in
a collective bargaining agreement or topics that must (or may not) be ne-
gotiated between employers and unions. Others leave the entire process
to the bargaining parties. Certain countries extend the terms of collec-
tive agreements to nonunionized workers and enterprises in the same in-
dustrial sector. Others confine the terms of agreements to the parties
that negotiated them. Many countries require arbitration of collective
bargaining disputes under certain circumstances, while others prefer to
let the free play of bargaining power in a market economy determine the
outcome of disputes.
This is just a sample of the variety of requirements and structures
shaped by different collective bargaining laws. Despite these differences,
however, the right to bargain collectively stems unbroken from the prin-
ciple of freedom of association and the right to organize. It is the pri-
mary means by which those fundamental rights emerge in the real life of
workers and managers as they bargain over terms and conditions in the
workplace and the means by which their agreements endure. In short,
the right to bargain collectively is the “real” implementation in the eco-
nomic and social setting of the “ideal” civil and political rights of associ-
ation and organizing.
The United States, Mexico and Canada share certain key features of
their collective bargaining systems: exclusive representation; government
certification or registration of bargaining representatives; the importance
of majority status; a mix of craft and industrial bargaining structures;
government conciliation and mediation services, and more.
The three countries also have significant differences. For example,
U.S. and Canadian laws impose on employers a “duty to bargain in good
faith” when a majority of their workers have chosen union representa-
tion. This duty is enforced by the definition and prohibition (as unfair
labor practices) of a “refusal to bargain” in the United States and a “fail-
ure to bargain in good faith” in Canada. In contrast, Mexican law pro-
motes collective bargaining by protecting the rights of workers and their
unions to strike and by allowing unions to seek the intervention of Con-
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ciliation and Arbitration Boards to resolve collective bargaining dis-
putes. Mexican law does not use the unfair labor practice concept and
does not impose a formal duty to bargain on employers.
Mexican law provides for “law-contracts” which extend negotiated
terms of employment, on a mandatory basis, to cover all workers and
employers belonging to a specific industrial branch or region provided
that certain thresholds of representation are met. In Canada, only the la-
bor laws of Quebec provide for similar coverage of nonunionized work-
ers and employers by a negotiated contract through the extension of col-
lective agreements by legal decree. The laws of the United States do not
provide for extending contract terms to outside parties.
With all their similarities and differences, the United States, Mexico
and Canada all maintain the right to bargain collectively as an essential
feature of their labor relations systems. As North American economic in-
tegration progresses, the pressures of international competition on the
labor force will intensify. Labor laws provide workers with a means of
coping with these pressures and defending their interests through col-
lective action. These laws will increase in importance as the labor market
forces engendered by international trade and capital movements also in-
crease in intensity. Thus, the success of the North American Agreement
on Labor Cooperation depends on continued effective enforcement of
this basic right.
C. LABOR PRINCIPLE 3: THE RIGHT TO STRIKE
The protection of the right of workers to strike in order to defend their col -
lective interests.
The right to strike concludes the fundamental labor and industrial re-
lations principles of the North American Agreement on Labor Cooper-
ation. Together, these first three NAALC Labor Principles form a foun-
dation for the protection, enhancement and enforcement of workers’
basic rights — a stated purpose not only of the NAALC but also of the
NAFTA. This structure of rights cannot stand if any one of these three
principles is diminished or compromised.
Without the right to strike there cannot be genuine collective bar-
gaining; there can only be collective entreaty. Without genuine collec-
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tive bargaining, freedom of association and the right to organize are de-
void of any value in the real world of employment and labor relations.
Thus, these three rights necessarily form a seamless whole of basic pro-
tection for workers. A strike is generally a mechanism of last resort and
often not a preferred means of resolving disputes. Nonetheless, the pos-
sibility of its use is well recognized as a necessary underpinning to the
collective bargaining process.
New complexities arise in the progression from the freedom of asso-
ciation to the right to strike, however. The right to strike affects legiti-
mate concerns of parties outside the employment relationship. In a com-
mercial setting, vendors, customers, distributors and other entities
engaged in business with a firm whose employees exercise the right to
strike may be affected by the strike. In turn, they may well affect the
strike by continuing or not to do business with the struck firm. Other
workers and unions might support a strike because they see their own
welfare affected by its outcome. They may also support workers who
strike in hopes of raising labor standards generally, or from a sense of sol-
idarity among workers. In the larger social setting, segments of the gen-
eral public might be affected by a strike. Some might oppose the strike,
and some might support it. For these reasons, governments often active-
ly regulate the right to strike, and the international community has rec-
ognized the legitimacy of many such forms of regulation.
Of the three NAALC countries, only Mexico constitutionally guar-
antees the right to strike. Some U.S. courts have identified a right to
strike within constitutional guarantees of freedom of association, but the
question has not been definitively decided by the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court of Canada has decided that the right to strike is not
guaranteed by the freedom of association clause of the Canadian C h a r t e r
of Rights and Freedoms.
Whatever their constitutional doctrine, the NAALC countries recog-
nize that the right to strike is a necessary recourse for workers to promote
and defend their employment interests. Each country’s laws maintain
the basic right of private sector workers to strike for a new collective
agreement after legal requirements have been fulfilled. However, the
United States and Canada have each established limits on the right to
strike, and Mexico has a series of complex mandatory procedural re-
quirements for exercising the right to strike.
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In the United States, for example, a controversial “striker replace-
ment” doctrine permits employers to permanently replace striking
workers with newly hired employees, except where strike action is taken
in response to unfair labor practices by the employer. In Mexico, strikes
may be declared “nonexistent” by a Conciliation and Arbitration Board
if legal requirements are not fulfilled. Such a decision forces workers to
return to work or lose their jobs. In Canada, the law prohibits any strike
during the term of a collective bargaining agreement.
Finding the proper balance between government’s interest in mini-
mizing the harm resulting from industrial conflict and its obligation to
protect workers’ right to strike in defense of their collective interests
presents a challenge to legislators and labor law enforcers. The challenge
is even greater in a rapidly liberalizing international economy, where the
power of capital to freely cross borders contrasts with the relative immo-
bility of workers and their families, who are grounded in their local
communities. Protection of the right to strike is thus vital to the en-
hancement of workers’ basic rights proclaimed as an objective by the
North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation.
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CANADA
1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION
A. BASIC LABOR POLICY
All labor relations regimes in Canada share fundamental features protect-
ing the right to organize, to bargain collectively, and to strike. Each juris-
diction has a labor relations board or, in Quebec, the Office of the Labour
Commissioner General and the Labour Court, to administer, adjudicate
and enforce laws on the rights to organize, to bargain collectively, and to
strike. (For brevity, in this text the term “labor relations board” will include
Quebec’s Office of the Labour Commissioner General and the Labour
Commissioners working under the direction of the Commissioner Gener-
al, except where the context indicates otherwise.) Canada’s various labor re-
lations acts or codes recognize free association and collective bargaining as
the basis for effective industrial relations and generally guarantee the right
to strike to obtain or renew a collective agreement, once detailed procedural
requirements are met. All jurisdictions require that a union have the sup-
port of a majority of any group of employees that it seeks to represent in col-
lective bargaining (such a group is referred to as a “bargaining unit”). Ma-
jority support is certified by the labor relations board, where an employer
does not voluntarily recognize the majority status of a union.1
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1 In Quebec a union may acquire bargaining rights on behalf of a bargaining unit on-
ly through certification by the Office of the Labour Commissioner General.
Within this common framework of labor principles, Canadian juris-
dictions (the 10 provinces and the federal jurisdiction) vary significant-
ly in procedures for certification of union majority support and in the
regulation of strikes. Certain jurisdictions require elections to establish
majority status. The majority rely on signed cards authorizing union
representation. Most jurisdictions require conciliation or mediation by
government authorities prior to any strike. Most also create conditions
for binding arbitration in disputes over the first collective bargaining
agreement of a newly organized union. While all jurisdictions prohibit
permanent replacement of striking workers, temporary replacements are
permitted in most jurisdictions.
In all Canadian jurisdictions, unfair labor practices are defined and
prohibited in order to protect the exercise of labor rights from interfer-
ence. While definitions vary in some respects, all jurisdictions prohibit
any form of reprisal against workers for union organizing activity, as well
as prohibiting bad-faith bargaining tactics.
B. LABOR LAW JURISDICTION
The structure of labor legislation and enforcement in Canada is funda-
mentally different from that in the United States and Mexico. Federal
labor law does not prevail over provincial labor law in Canada. Instead
of being hierarchical, federal and provincial labor relations statutes apply
in parallel across the different jurisdictions. Federal and provincial labor
authorities have equal capacity to decide matters within their respective
jurisdictions. As a result of the structure of Canadian federalism, Cana-
da has 11 distinct labor relations regimes: one in each of the 10
provinces, and that of the federal jurisdiction (which also extends to the
three territories, Yukon, Northwest Territories and Nunavut).
The power to enact labor laws in Canada is derived from the Consti-
tution Act, 1867, Section 91 (federal powers) and Section 92 (provincial
powers, except s. 92(10)), which set out the division of legislative pow-
ers. The Canadian Parliament has the authority to regulate labor rights
for federal government employees and for employees in specific activities
which are of national, international, or interprovincial importance,
identified in Section 91. These include: broadcasting; banks; postal serv-
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ice; airports and air transportation; shipping, navigation and cargo han-
dling; interprovincial road, rail, ferry and pipeline transport; telecom-
munications; and key national industries such as grain handling and ura-
nium mining. Approximately 10 percent of the nation’s workforce is
covered by the federal jurisdiction.
Provincial authority to regulate labor matters is derived from the
power of the provinces to legislate on “property and civil rights” and on
“local works and undertakings” provided in Section 92 of the Constitu-
tion. Labor rights are seen as regulating the civil right of freedom of con-
tract, thereby falling within provincial jurisdiction. The provinces enjoy
nearly complete sovereignty in labor law matters within their jurisdic-
tion, constrained only by constitutional and criminal law considerations
(criminal law is within federal jurisdiction). Approximately 90 percent
of the Canadian workforce is covered by provincial labor laws.
Early attempts by the federal government to regulate labor relations
on a national scale were frustrated by this constitutional division of pow-
ers underpinning the Canadian federation. In a landmark case in 1925,
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the United Kingdom
(Canada’s highest court of appeal at that time) held that provincial leg-
islatures possessed primary legislative authority over labor relations.2
This case remains the legal basis for the Canadian courts’ restrictive in-
terpretation of federal labor law jurisdiction.
The United States generally maintains a single federal system of labor
relations law and enforcement applying throughout the country with
preemptive effect over state laws. Mexico has a single Federal Labor
Law (FLL), which was enacted under authority granted to the federal
government by the states of the Mexican Federation. Enforcement of
the FLL is divided between federal and state authorities generally on
the basis of the type of industry or service in question.
2 Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider, [1925] A.C. 396.
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Box 2.1
Private Sector Federal Labor Law Jurisdiction in Canada
Excerpt from the Canada Labour Code:
Section 2: In this Act,
“federal work, undertaking or business” means any work, undertaking or
business that is within the legislative authority of Parliament, including,
without restricting the generality of the foregoing,
a) a work, undertaking or business operated or carried on for or in
connection with navigation, shipping, whether inland or mar-
itime, including the operation of ships and transportation by ship
anywhere in Canada,
b) a railway, canal, telegraph or other work or undertaking connect-
ing any province with any other province, or extending beyond the
limits of a province,
c) a line of ships connecting a province with any other province, or
extending beyond the limits of a province,
d) a ferry between any province and any other province or between
any province and any country other than Canada,
e) aerodromes, aircraft, or a line of air transportation,
f) a radio broadcasting station,
g) a bank,
h) a work or undertaking that, although wholly situated within a
province, is before or after its execution declared by Parliament to
be for the general advantage of Canada or for the advantage of two
or more of the provinces,
i) a work, undertaking or business outside the legislative authority of
the legislatures of the provinces, and
j) a work, undertaking or activity in respect of which federal laws
within the meaning of the Canadian Laws Offshore Application Act
apply pursuant to that Act and any regulations made under that
Act.
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C. LEGAL SOURCES OF LABOR RIGHTS
Within Canada there are two types of legal system. The province of
Quebec has a civil law system that applies to matters, like contracts and
labor and employment relations, which fall within its provincial juris-
diction. In other Canadian jurisdictions, the legal system is based on the
English common law tradition.
Within the common law tradition, legislative enactments such as
constitutions, statutes, and regulations coexist with judge-made com-
mon law. Legislative enactments can also displace the common law. In
the absence of such enactments, the common law continues to govern
such matters as contractual relations and civil liability for torts such as
negligence, nuisance and trespass. By contrast, Quebec’s civil law sys-
tem provides a legislated Civil Code which governs such matters. In
both systems, legislative enactments form a hierarchy, with the Consti-
tution taking precedence over statutes, and statutes taking precedence
over regulations.
In Canada, the most important aspects of workers’ rights to organize,
associate freely, bargain collectively, and strike are recognized and made
effective through labor relations statutes. In many key areas of labor law,
these statutes do not set out detailed standards. Instead, the law in these
areas develops through case decisions, where administrative tribunals
and courts interpret the law as they apply it to specific cases that come
before them. Case law establishes precedents to guide parties, tribunals
and courts. Decisions of higher courts are considered binding by lower
courts and administrative tribunals within the same jurisdiction. A deci-
sion of the Supreme Court of Canada is treated as a definitive interpre-
tation of the law. Since every case contains different facts and circum-
stances, there is often a shift of nuance and interpretation of the law.
From time to time, as well, tribunals may undertake a basic shift in pol-
icy that reverses the precedent of earlier cases. Similarly, courts may oc-
casionally adopt a different interpretation of the law, reversing their own
earlier decisions or the decisions of lower courts. In the Quebec civil law
tradition, there is greater emphasis on detailed legal prescription.
Nonetheless, many areas of labor law in that province have been left to
develop through case law as well.
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In the United States, labor relations boards and courts also operate
largely by deciding cases that establish precedents to guide future con-
duct. On the other hand, tribunals and courts in Mexico, coming from
a civil law tradition where conduct is guided by detailed legal prescrip-
tion, place more emphasis on codes than on judicial or administrative
tribunal precedents.
1) Constitutional Sources
Canada’s first constitutional instrument, the Constitution Act, 1867, did
not contain express language guaranteeing workers’ collective rights. Af-
ter the patriation of the Canadian Constitution in 1982, freedom of as-
sociation was specifically enshrined as a constitutional guarantee. The
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, incorporated into the amend-
ed Constitution of 1982, contains language explicitly guaranteeing free-
dom of association, freedom of expression and the right of peaceful as-
sembly in Canada. The right to freedom of association for workers in the
trade union context was later interpreted by the Supreme Court of
Canada as “the freedom to work for the establishment of an association,
to belong to an association, to maintain it, and to participate in its law-
ful activity without penalty or reprisal.”3
The Supreme Court declined to interpret the freedom of association
clause of the Charter as including the derivative right of engaging in ac-
tivities essential to the purpose of an association. Moreover, the court
has ruled that the Charter applies only to government action, and thus
does not offer direct protection against the actions of private parties. The
rights of workers to organize, to bargain collectively and to strike rely
mainly on statutory enactments.
The United States Constitution, like that of Canada, does not specifi-
cally address labor rights or labor standards and does not govern the ac-
tions of private parties. In contrast, the Mexican Constitution, particu-
larly its Article 123, provides extensive, detailed guarantees on the right
3 Reference re Public Service Relations Act (Alta.) (1987), 87 C.L.L.C. 14,021
(S.C.C.).
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to organize and the right to strike, as well as a wide range of other rights
and obligations which are intended to protect workers and which are
directly binding upon public and private employers.
2) Statutory Sources
Protection of the right to organize, to bargain collectively and to strike was
secured throughout Canada in the mid-1940s, when the federal govern-
ment and most of the provinces adopted laws defining and prohibiting
unfair labor practices and providing a legal framework for collective bar-
gaining and the enforcement of collective agreements. The federal govern-
ment first adopted collective bargaining legislation during the Second
World War, when it exercised emergency powers to prevent labor unrest.
When the federal emergency legislation was repealed after the war, the
provinces themselves moved to adopt labor relations laws protecting
t h e right to organize and bargain collectively and regulating strike activity.
The federal government maintains the Canada Labour Code and the
Canada Industrial Relations Board (CIRB) for employees in federally
regulated industries such as banking and interprovincial transportation
and telecommunication services. Each province has enacted a labor rela-
tions statute and created an agency to administer it. The titles of each
statute and corresponding agency are as follows:
Alberta: Labour Relations Code… Alberta Labour Relations Board
British Columbia: Labour Relations Code… British Columbia Labour Relations
Board
Manitoba: Labour Relations Act… Manitoba Labour Board
New Brunswick: Industrial Relations Act… New Brunswick Labour and Em-
ployment Board
N e w f o u n d l a n d : Labour Relations Act… Newfoundland Labour Relations Board
Nova Scotia: Trade Union Act… Nova Scotia Labour Relations Board
Ontario: Labour Relations Act, 1995… Ontario Labour Relations Board
Prince Edward Island: Labour Act… Prince Edward Island Labour Relations
Board
Quebec: Labour Code… Office of the Commissioner General of Labour
(Labour Ministry) and, on appeal and in penal matters, the Labour Court
Saskatchewan: Trade Union Act… Saskatchewan Labour Relations Board
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The United States maintains a single National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) to enforce U.S. law on the rights to organize, bargain collec-
tively and strike. The U.S. NLRB operates through 33 regional offices
around the country. Mexico maintains a Federal Conciliation and Ar-
bitration Board (CAB), along with dozens of Federal Special Concilia-
tion Boards located throughout the country to cover industries within
the federal jurisdictions. In addition many local (state and Federal Dis-
trict) CABs operate within their local jurisdictions. In total over 100
CABs operate to enforce the Federal Labor Law within their respective
jurisdictions.
3) Regulations and Rules
Canada’s labor relations boards generally have jurisdiction to interpret
the relevant labor relations statute and to make their own rules of proce-
dure. In exercising rule-making authority, the boards consult with em-
ployer and employee groups and their representatives. Labor board reg-
ulations, which set out among other things the forms and information
requirements for making applications or bringing complaints, are pub-
lished in official provincial gazettes.
D. THE INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP
The legal relationship between an employer and an individual employee
is established by explicit or implicit contract. Where an employee is rep-
resented by a union and that union holds or is negotiating to renew a
collective agreement with his or her employer, the collective agreement
legally supersedes and replaces his or her individual employment con-
tract. However, in other circumstances the individual employee’s con-
tract of employment governs the employment relationship. Outside of
Quebec, the law of employment contracts is inherited from the English
common law. In Quebec, the general rules of contract established by the
Civil Code apply to contracts of employment.
Under a doctrine developed by Canadian courts, employers in Cana-
da must give “reasonable notice” of termination of employment, unless
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the employment relationship is terminated for “just cause.” The just
cause doctrine permits employers to terminate the employment rela-
tionship in cases of sufficiently serious misconduct. Without either just
cause or such notice, employers must provide pay in lieu of notice, usu-
ally equal to about one month’s salary for each year of employment.
Courts treat failure to give notice or to provide pay in lieu of notice as
wrongful dismissal, and in response may award damages equal to pay in
lieu of notice to an affected employee. This implied obligation on the
part of the employer to provide reasonable notice can in some situations
be limited by contract.
In addition to the reasonable notice doctrines developed by Canadi-
an courts, in each jurisdiction employment standards legislation pro-
vides certain basic protections of employee interests, such as a mandato-
ry minimum wage, minimum notice of termination of employment
and the right to vacation time. Various statutes also provide protection
against discrimination in employment by reason of trade union activi-
ty, race, sex, age, religion, disability, and other human rights grounds.
Legislation in the federal jurisdiction, in Quebec and in Nova Scotia
protects all employees with a specified minimum length of service
(one, three and 10 years, respectively) and not covered by a collective
agreement against wrongful dismissal, providing reinstatement as a pos-
sible remedy.
These statutory minimum protections generally cannot be removed
by contract between the employer and employee. Outside of such statu-
tory protections, the parties to an employment contract are free to agree
to any terms and conditions of employment which do not violate public
policies or laws which apply more generally outside of the specific con-
text of employment.
Under Mexican law, most employees are covered by the Federal Labor
Law, which establishes limited and specific just causes for terminating
any individual’s employment, whether or not the individual is covered
by a collective contract. In the United States, most nonunionized em-
ployees are employed “at will,” which means that, subject to statutory
exceptions such as antidiscrimination law and other limited “public
policy” exceptions, their contract of employment can be terminated
without notice or severance pay, at any time, for any reason.
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E. EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE
All Canadian labor relations laws exclude from their coverage managers
and those employed in a confidential capacity in matters relating to la-
bor relations. Some labor relations statutes also exclude specific occupa-
tions such as domestic servants, agricultural workers, or members of
such professions as law or medicine. In much of Canada, low-level su-
pervisors and subcontractors who are in a situation of economic de-
pendence on the party contracted with (often referred to as “dependent
contractors”) are covered.
In addition to managers, agricultural workers and domestic employees,
U.S. labor law generally excludes all supervisors and independent con-
tractors. (U.S. law does not recognize a “dependent contractor” cate-
gory — most dependent contractors covered under Canadian law
would be excluded “independent contractors” under U.S. law.) Mexi-
can labor relations law covers all workers who personally perform sub-
ordinate work for another individual or legal person in return for re-
muneration, except family members employed in a family business.
Confidential workers (mainly managers, general supervisors and work-
ers in a position of trust) may not join the same union as other workers,
and in practice they seldom form unions.
2. LEVELS OF PROTECTION – SUBSTANTIVE LABOR LAWS
A. LABOR PRINCIPLE 1 – FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND
THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE
1) Legal Foundations
As discussed above (see Legal Sources of Labour Rights, section 1C),
Section 2(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides
that “everyone has … freedom of association,” and that freedom was de-
fined by the Supreme Court of Canada as “the freedom to work for the
establishment of an association, to belong to an association, to maintain
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it, and to participate in its lawful activity without penalty or reprisal.”4
This includes the right to establish, belong to, and maintain a union.
The Charter protects this right of individuals to organize collectively
against any interference by government — federal, provincial, or mu-
nicipal — regardless of whether the interference takes the form of legis-
lation, regulation or public actions. Government actions that restrict the
exercise of freedom of association are unconstitutional unless, as with all
limits to constitutional rights, under Section 1 of the Charter they can
be shown to be “such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” Quebec enact-
ed its own human rights code in 1975, the Charter of Human Rights and
Freedoms. Although it is not a constitutional document, it prevails over
any other Quebec legislation. This instrument guarantees freedom of as-
sociation and the right to exercise this freedom without discrimination,
and it applies to the private sector as well as the public sector.
As noted above, however, in Canada constitutional rights protect on-
ly against government action. Practically speaking, the most important
protections of workers’ freedom of association and rights to organize are
found in labor relations statutes that regulate the conduct of private enti-
t i e s . Modeled largely on the U.S. Wagner Act of 1935, Canadian labor
law statutes were crafted in the 1940s. Most have been extensively revised
since then. These statutes recognize the freedom of workers to associate
and their right to organize unions to defend their interests. They protect
those rights against interference, most significantly by defining and pro-
hibiting a set of unfair labor practices. Canadian labor laws also provide a
legal framework within which workers can define and act upon common
objectives, by enabling unions to act as self-financing and self-governing
organizations. The key statutes are listed in section 1C, above.
2) The Formation and Dissolution of Unions
Canadian labor relations statutes protect the right of employees to form
unions. No prior authorization, registration or other official act is re-
quired to form a union. Labor relations boards will generally treat an or-
4 Reference re Public Service Relations Act (Alta.) (1987), 87 C.L.L.C 14,021 (S.C.C.).
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ganization as having trade union status, giving it legal standing under la-
bor relations legislation, provided that its purposes include the regula-
tion of relations between employers and employees, and provided that it
has a constitution adopted in accordance with any procedural require-
ments established by law. Most labor relations statutes have been inter-
preted as requiring that a union demonstrate that it is a viable entity for
the purposes of collective bargaining, by democratically adopting a
working organizational structure, in order to be treated as a union for
the purposes of labor law. Some jurisdictions require that a union have a
written constitution, rules or bylaws. Others require that an organiza-
tion be local or provincial. In some jurisdictions an organization that is
influenced or dominated by an employer cannot be a trade union. In
others it can be; but in all jurisdictions such an organization is barred
from being certified as exclusive collective bargaining representative for
a group of employees (referred to as a “bargaining unit,” see below). An
organization that ceases to meet the requirements for trade union status
may be treated by labor relations boards as without that status and thus
without the rights which labor relations statutes grant to trade unions.
Once a union is formed, it may hold meetings, publicize its views and
exercise many legal rights (see Legal Status of Unions, below). However,
another step is required if a union is to achieve its main purpose — to
bargain collectively on behalf of its members. In order to do this, a
union must acquire bargaining rights (see Acquisition of Bargaining
Rights, section 2B.2, below).
A trade union can be dissolved if: (1) an event occurs which the union
constitution states will result in dissolution; (2) its members agree in a con-
stitutionally valid vote that it can be dissolved; or (3) the foundation upon
which the organization was based is lost or has been fundamentally altered.5
3) Legal Status of Unions
Historically, the common law treated unions as voluntary associations,
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5 In Quebec  a union may be dissolved if it is found by the Labour Court to have par-
ticipated in an employer’s interference with an employee’s association (Article 149 of the
Quebec Labour Code).
which do not have legal personality. Legal personality enables individu-
als or organizations to act legally, that is, to exercise legal rights including
owning property, entering into contracts, or suing to enforce rights.
Canadian labor legislation now grants unions the legal capacity to exer-
cise, defend and enforce the rights granted under labor law, which in-
clude freedom of association and the rights to bargain collectively and to
strike. Unions may also be called upon to respond to complaints under
labor law. The question of whether unions in Canada have acquired
more complete legal personality, including rights to sue and be sued, to
own property, and to enter into contracts in their own name, is a subject
of debate among Canadian jurists and would be answered somewhat dif-
ferently in each jurisdiction. In Quebec the Code of Civil Procedure
allows unions to institue legal proceedings in their own name. Many
unions effectively acquire and sell property and carry out commercial
transactions by designating union officers as trustees, who contract in
their own names, or by establishing a not-for-profit holding company to
buy and sell assets on behalf of the union.
Legal personality is not the same thing as bargaining rights, which en-
able a union to meet its main objective by requiring an employer to rec-
ognize and deal with it as the exclusive collective bargaining representa-
tive of a group of employees (see Acquisition of Bargaining Rights,
section 2B.2, below).
4) Union Self-Governance
Unions in Canada are governed by the terms of their own constitutions,
which they have the power to create and amend. Provided that they
comply with their own constitutions, laws which seek to ensure basic
union democracy (see Freedom of Association within Unions, section
2A.7, and Protections against Interference, section 2D, below), and gen-
eral laws governing economic and political activity, unions are free to
elect officers, hold meetings, set their union dues levels, and generally
determine their own course of legal, political and strategic action.6
6 Manitoba imposes some important restrictions on union political spending deci-
sions. See Union Membership and Dues, below.
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5) Political and Legislative Activities of Unions
Trade union political and legislative action is an exercise of freedom of
association for Canadian workers. Canadian unions support political
parties and candidates for office through financial contributions and
campaign assistance such as telephoning, handbilling and canvassing.
Some unions actively endorse a political party.
Unions participate in the legislative process by seeking to convince
sympathetic legislators to introduce pro-labor bills, meeting with legis-
lators to persuade them to support such bills, and testifying and submit-
ting briefs to legislative committees. They also mobilize members for ral-
lies, marches, demonstrations and other forms of assembly guaranteed
by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
6) Union Membership and Dues
The majority of Canadian labor laws require that, at the request of the
union, the employer deduct and remit to the union the amount of reg-
ular union dues from the wages of each worker who is a member of a
bargaining unit that it represents, whether or not the worker is a union
member. This arrangement is often referred to as the Rand Formula (see
box 2.2). In provinces where compulsory dues payment is a matter for
negotiation between the parties, most unions and employers reach sim-
ilar union security arrangements. Canadian labor laws also permit
unions and employers to agree to collective agreement clauses requiring
membership in the union as a condition of employment. These clauses
are often referred to as “union shop” clauses.
In Mexico the FLL requires employers to deduct from union members’
pay and remit to the union ordinary union dues payments. A worker
who is not a member of a union may not be required to pay union dues.
However, employers and unions may also agree to clauses requiring
membership in the union as a condition of employment and requiring
employers to dismiss workers who lose their membership (“exclusion
clauses”). In the United States, matters of union security, union mem-
bership or compulsory dues or fee payment are left to the bargaining
parties except in 21 “right-to-work” states. These states have exercised
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an option under federal labor law to prohibit negotiation of a union se-
curity clause requiring either membership in a union or the payment of
an amount equal to union dues by those workers in a union’s bargain-
ing unit who choose not to become union members.
Box 2.2
The Rand Formula and Union Political Activities
Named after former Supreme Court of Canada Justice I.C. Rand for his
award in the Ford Motor arbitration case of 1946, the Rand Formula re-
quires all employees in unionized workplaces to pay union dues, but does
not require employees to become members of the trade union. Justice Rand
observed that all employees in a bargaining unit, whether union members or
not, share in improved wages, working conditions and benefits achieved by
the collective action of the employees. He noted that it would be unfair for
employees to benefit from the gains brought by union representation with-
out contributing to the costs of maintaining the union.
The Rand Formula was upheld recently by the Supreme Court of Cana-
da in Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees’ Union.7 Lavigne was not
a union member but was covered by the collective agreement. He argued
that his right to freedom of association, protected by the Canadian C h a r t e r
of Rights and Freedoms, was violated because he was forced to pay dues to a
union to which he did not belong and which he did not support. Lavigne al-
so objected to the union’s contributions to a nuclear disarmament campaign
and a political party. He maintained that his freedom of association includ-
ed as well the freedom from association.
The Court denied Lavigne’s claim and unanimously upheld the Rand
Formula. Three of the seven justices concluded that freedom of associa-
tion does not include freedom from compelled association, and that as a
result, Section 2(d) of the Charter was not infringed. In a separate con-
curring judgment, three justices found that Section 2(d) did include free-
dom from association. However, they ruled that legally required dues
contributions towards collective bargaining were a form of compelled as-
sociation towards a common end, required to further collective social
welfare, which fell within the class of required associations that are a nec-
essary and inevitable part of membership in a democratic community.
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7 [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211.
The justices held that Section 2(d) did not protect against such legally re-
quired association. They also ruled that, for two reasons, permitting
unions to spend such funds on political causes could be justified under
Section 1 of the Charter as a reasonable limit on the Section 2(d) freedom
of association. First, it allows unions to play a role in shaping the social,
political and economic context within which collective agreements and
labor relations disputes are negotiated and resolved. Second, it fosters
union democracy by allowing unions to decide democratically, free of
government interference, which causes to support. The seventh justice as-
sumed without deciding that Section 2(d) protected freedom from com-
pelled association. However, she found no violation of that section in this
case, ruling that simply requiring an individual to pay dues to a union
which later spends a portion of those dues on political causes does not as-
sociate that individual with the ideas and values of the union.
Recent amendments to Manitoba’s Labour Relations Act require
unions to inquire of each bargaining unit member whether he or she
wishes his or her dues to be used for political purposes. If the member
indicates that he or she does not want his or her dues to be spent in this
way, the union must forward the portion of dues proposed to be used for
political purposes to a registered charity designated by the employee.
Manitoba is the only Canadian jurisdiction which imposes such restric-
tions on union spending decisions.
Mexican labor law permits unions to collect dues and make political
spending decisions in accordance with internal union constitutional
rules. In the United States, when a bargaining unit member who pays a
representation fee but is not a member of the union objects to expendi-
tures for purposes other than collective bargaining and contract en-
forcement, the union must reduce his or her fee payment by that por-
tion of dues which is devoted to such expenditures.
7) Freedom of Association within Unions
Labor relations statutes generally limit the effects of union shop clauses
in certain cases, in order to protect workers’ rights to participate in the
union of their choice or to exercise other rights under the statute. An
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employee generally cannot be dismissed, notwithstanding that he or she
has been expelled from a union which is party to a union shop agree-
ment, where his or her expulsion is related to: (1) participation in the af-
fairs of another union; (2) refusal to pay unreasonable dues assessments;
(3) participation in a labor law proceeding; (4) the exercise of other
rights granted to employees under the labor relations statute. (See Pro-
tections against Interference, section 2D, below.)
Unions are required to conduct their elections in accordance with the
rules established under their constitutions. A failure to abide by union
constitutional rules can be remedied by a court on application by an af-
fected party. A court may, among other things, declare an election to be
null and void and stipulate conditions under which a new election must
be held.
Canadian administrative law requires that, where a union member is
subject to expulsion from the union, the expulsion must be authorized
by the rules of the union, the proceedings must take place in accordance
with procedural rules of natural justice, and the tribunal hearing the case
must act in good faith.
Unions are generally required to file with the labor minister or the la-
bor relations board a copy of the union’s constitution and the names and
addresses of the union’s officers. In most jurisdictions unions are also re-
quired to file with the minister a copy of any collective agreement to
which they are a party. These documents are often made available to the
public. Most jurisdictions also require that unions file with the minister
and/or the labor relations board and provide to their members a copy of
the union’s audited financial statements, either automatically at yearly
intervals or on request.
In the United States, the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act includes a comprehensive union member’s “bill of rights” regulat-
ing internal union democracy. The LMRDA protects free speech rights
in union affairs, the right to vote on union dues, the right to run for
union office, the right to obtain the union’s charter, bylaws and a copy
of the collective bargaining agreement, the right to obtain an account-
ing of union finances, and the right to union elections free of intimida-
tion or fraud.
In Mexico a union member may be expelled from a union only by a
two-thirds majority vote of the total union membership, following pro-
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cedures set out in the FLL and any procedures established by the
union’s constitution. The Mexican Constitution protects workers
against dismissal for joining or attempting to form a union. Workers
dismissed pursuant to an “exclusion clause” (see Union Membership
and Dues, above) for joining or supporting another union during its
formation or registration may seek reinstatement or severance pay by
filing a claim with the relevant CAB. In addition, Mexican labor law
provides a mechanism by which the membership can convoke a gener-
al meeting of the union if the board of directors fails to do so and re-
quires that the board of directors provide members every six months
with accounts of the administration of the union’s assets.
B. LABOR PRINCIPLE 2 – THE RIGHT TO BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY
1) Legal Foundations
As noted above (see Legal Sources of Labor Rights, section 1C), Cana-
dian law does not provide constitutional protection of the right to bar-
gain collectively.
Neither Canadian common law nor Quebec’s civil code imposes a
duty on an employer to bargain collectively with a union representing
employees. Before the enactment of statutes protecting the right to bar-
gain collectively, a Canadian employer could legally refuse to recognize
and bargain with a union. Workers had to strike to compel recognition
and bargaining. When the government or the courts intervened, it was
usually to protect employers’ property rights. In most of Canada, with
the exception of Quebec, even a union that achieved a collective bar-
gaining agreement could not have it enforced in the courts, because a
union had no legal status. Employers could break an agreement, and
workers would have to strike anew.
In contrast, Quebec law, influenced by European labor jurisprudence
that concerned itself more with the product of negotiation than with the
process, granted legal status to unions in 1924 and made their collective
agreements enforceable in court. Quebec law did not at that time, however,
compel employers to bargain with unions if employers resisted bargaining.
When workers in most Winnipeg industries went on strike for union
recognition in 1919, the federal government used its immigration and
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criminal powers to deport or imprison strike leaders and used the
Mounted Police and federal troops to force workers back on the job
without recognition of their unions. In 1934, a two-month strike for
recognition and a contract by 4,000 women workers against garment
manufacturers in Montreal ended with various “understandings,” but
employers still refused to recognize and bargain with the union. In
1937, after the U.S. National Labor Relations Act was already in force,
the Premier of Ontario threatened to use the provincial police to break a
recognition strike by workers at the large General Motors plant in Os-
hawa. The strike ended without recognition of the autoworkers’ union
as the bargaining agent.
The modern right to bargain collectively was created by statute dur-
ing World War II. The federal government and the provinces generally
adopted laws modeled on the National Labor Relations Act to facilitate
collective bargaining between employers and trade unions freely desig-
nated by a majority of employees as their bargaining representative. A
process of certification of the bargaining agent was established as the ba-
sic mechanism for establishing bargaining rights, and unions were given
the power to enter into legally binding collective agreements.
These new acts or codes created a legal duty to bargain in good faith
and make every reasonable effort to reach a collective agreement. The
employer is obligated to bargain exclusively with the union representing
the employees and is prohibited from negotiating with another union or
directly with employees in the bargaining unit.
The Canada Labour Code and the provincial acts or codes generally
contain the following key elements:
* certification of unions as bargaining representatives of one or more defined
bargaining units, in a majority of jurisdictions by checking membership
authorization cards;
* exclusive representation of employees in the bargaining unit by the certi-
fied bargaining agent;
* the duty of employers to bargain in good faith with a certified union and
make every reasonable effort to reach a collective agreement;
* the inclusion of certain mandatory clauses in a collective agreement;
* mandatory mechanisms for the resolution of disputes, ranging from gov-
ernment mediation and conciliation to, in some instances, compulsory
arbitration.
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United States collective bargaining laws are similar in many respects.
However, under the National Labor Relations Act there is no certifica-
tion by “card-check”; elections are required in every case where there is
not a voluntary recognition agreement between the parties. U.S. labor
law generally provides for fewer direct interventions in the collective
bargaining process. It does not stipulate mandatory collective bargain-
ing clauses. Under the National Labor Relations Act neither mediation
nor conciliation is required.
Mexican labor law contains the principles of majority status and ex-
clusive representation, but it does not create a duty to bargain collec-
tively. Instead, it creates a context to stimulate bargaining by guaran-
teeing the right to organize and the right to strike. Voting to determine
majority status may take place if one union challenges another for title
to a collective contract. In deciding such challenges, a CAB may super-
vise a vote of the workers, known as a recuento, in order to obtain evi-
dence of union majority support. A recuento will not necessarily be
conducted if other evidence is sufficient to prove majority support.
Mexican law establishes requirements for the content of a collective
contract and makes conciliation mandatory once a union has delivered
notice of its intention to strike.
2) Acquisition of Bargaining Rights
Bargaining rights enable a union to legally require an employer to rec-
ognize and deal with it as the exclusive representative of a group of em-
ployees for the purposes of negotiating a collective agreement. Such a
group of employees is referred to as a “bargaining unit.” A union wish-
ing to exercise bargaining rights must have been chosen by a majority of
employees within the bargaining unit.
A union may acquire bargaining rights either through voluntary
recognition by the employer or, more commonly, by a process of certi-
fication administered by the labor relations board of the relevant juris-
diction upon an application for certification by the union. In Quebec, a
union may acquire bargaining rights only through certification, and cer-
tification procedures are administered by the Office of the Labour Com-
missioner General.
Generally speaking, there are two aspects to obtaining certification:
(1) the union must demonstrate to the labor relations board that it has
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sufficient support among the employees in a bargaining unit, and (2) the
labor relations board must find that bargaining unit to be appropriate
for the purposes of collective bargaining.
In a majority of Canadian jurisdictions, a union can prove sufficient
support through either of two procedures. First, it can file with the labor
relations board a set of authorization cards signed by employees within
an appropriate bargaining unit. If the union presents valid cards signed
by more than half of the employees within such a unit (a 55 percent su-
per-majority is required in British Columbia), the union will be auto-
matically certified. Second, the union can apply for a labor relations
board supervised vote. Such an application usually requires that the
union file with the board a statutory minimum number of signed au-
thorization cards, which generally ranges between 35 and 45 percent of
employees within the bargaining unit proposed by the union. Only em-
ployees within that unit are eligible to vote. If more than half of the
employees who vote in the election choose the union as their bargaining
representative, the union will be certified. In all procedures, names of
employees who support the union are not revealed to the employer.
Where votes on certification are held, they are conducted by secret ballot.
In Alberta, Nova Scotia, Ontario, Newfoundland and Manitoba a
union seeking certification does not have the option of seeking certifica-
tion by presenting the signed authorization cards of bargaining unit
members. Rather, a representation vote must be held. In Newfound-
land, a vote is mandatory unless the employer and the union agree oth-
erwise. Where a vote must be held, legislation typically requires that it be
held very soon after an application for certification is filed. In Ontario
the vote must be held within five days of receipt of the application for
certification, unless the Labour Relations Board directs otherwise. Nova
Scotia’s Trade Union Act contains a similar provision: normally a vote
must be held within five working days of receipt of the application by
the board and three working days after the employer receives notice of
the application. In Alberta, the vote must be held “as soon as possible.”
In Manitoba, the time limit is set at seven days, except in exceptional
circumstances.
In all jurisdictions, labor relations boards (in Quebec, certification
agents and labor commissioners) are given a broad mandate to ensure
that any bargaining unit which a union is certified to represent is appro-
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priate for collective bargaining. In making this determination, labor re-
lations boards typically look to whether a community of interest exists
among the workers in the bargaining unit. They consider such factors as:
collective bargaining history with the employer or in the industry in
question; similarities in skills, interests, duties and working conditions;
the nature of the employer’s organization; and the wishes of the parties.
The bargaining unit need not be the most appropriate one for collective
bargaining; it need only be an appropriate one. Unions are given rea-
sonable latitude in proposing bargaining units for certification. Labor re-
lations boards generally try to make determinations on this matter with
as little delay as possible to the certification process. For example, where
a union can demonstrate sufficient membership support within either of
two possible bargaining unit configurations, the labor relations boards
will certify the union prior to hearings on the final configuration of the
bargaining unit.
In several jurisdictions, where the labor relations board finds an em-
ployer to have committed unfair labor practices which render it unlike-
ly that the true wishes of the employees can be determined by a vote, the
board may certify the union without one. Such an order can be made
whether or not the union was able at any time to prove that it had the
support of a majority of bargaining unit employees.
Canadian labor law generally provides that when a union’s applica-
tion for certification is unsuccessful, that union may be temporarily
barred from making another application for certification for substantial-
ly the same bargaining unit. The length of the bar varies by jurisdiction
but is most often less than one year. In some jurisdictions a bar is im-
posed automatically, while in most jurisdictions the labor relations
board has some discretion not to impose one or to abridge the duration
of the bar.
U.S. labor law provides that no union representation election may take
place within one year of an earlier election in the same bargaining unit.
In Mexico, a registered union can at any time seek support from mem-
bers of another union that holds title to a collective contract and make
an application to the relevant CAB to obtain title to the collective
contract.
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A union may not be certified where it is dominated or influenced by
an employer (see Protections against Interference, section 2D, below).
In addition, in most jurisdictions a union may not be certified where its
constitution discriminates on the basis of grounds such as race, creed,
color, nationality, ancestry, sex, or place of origin.
Under the U.S. National Labor Relations Act, an election is ordinarily
required to serve as the basis for certification of majority support and
the resulting acquisition of bargaining rights. However, the National
Labor Relations Board may order an employer to bargain with a union
without an election if the employer’s unfair labor practices have made a
fair election impossible.
In Mexico a union requires a minimum of 20 members in active
employment in order to obtain registration. “Registration” in Mexico
is not the same as “certification” in the United States and Canada. Reg-
istration gives a union the legal capacity to enter into contracts and act
as a party to legal proceedings. It is obtained through an administrative
procedure which does not require proof that the union represents a ma-
jority of any group of workers. Once registered, a union can demand a
collective contract from an employer, and if the employer refuses to ex-
ecute the contract, give a strike notice to induce bargaining and obtain
conciliation by government authorities.
3) The Collective Bargaining Process
Collective bargaining can be initiated by the union or by the employer
to conclude a first collective agreement or to renew, modify or terminate
an existing agreement. Generally speaking, nothing prevents the parties
from agreeing to bargain collectively over any matter at any time. How-
ever, for legal and practical reasons collective bargaining is normally lim-
ited to the time around the expiry of an existing collective agreement or
following the certification of a union as a new bargaining agent.
(i) Obligation to Bargain
Collective bargaining is normally initiated by one party delivering to the
other a “notice to bargain.” Canada’s labor relations statutes each speci-
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fy a period of time during which notice to bargain can be given if a col-
lective agreement is currently in force. That period is limited to a num-
ber of days (generally between 90 and 30) prior to the expiry of the col-
lective agreement.
Once the union has acquired bargaining rights and given the em-
ployer notice to bargain for a collective agreement, labor relations
statutes in each jurisdiction compel the employer and union to meet,
bargain in good faith, and make every reasonable effort to reach a col-
lective agreement. The requirements of good faith and reasonable efforts
are procedural ones designed to ensure that (1) the employer recognizes
the union as exclusive bargaining agent, and (2) the parties engage in a
“full, free, honest and rational” discussion of their differences. Within
these requirements the parties remain free to bargain hard and to stead-
fastly disagree.
In a majority of jurisdictions, there is generally no continuing duty
to bargain during the term of a collective agreement. In the federal
jurisdiction, British Columbia, Manitoba, New Brunswick, and
Saskatchewan, however, various forms of significant mid-contract
changes can give rise to a duty to bargain. The definition of the types of
change giving rise to the duty varies with each jurisdiction.
Labor relations boards have in their decisions identified a number of
patterns of action which will lead them to find a breach of the duty to
bargain. For example, boards have distinguished between “hard” bar-
gaining, which is permissible, and “surface” bargaining, which is unlaw-
ful, when evaluating whether employers have met their duty to bargain
in good faith. The Ontario Labour Relations Board, in its decision in
the Daily Times case, characterized “surface bargaining” as “going
through the motions, or a preserving of the surface indications of bar-
gaining without the intent of concluding a collective agreement. It con-
stitutes a subtle but effective refusal to recognize the trade union.”8
Similarly, an employer may not in general deal directly with bargain-
ing unit employees with respect to matters that are subject to collective
bargaining, nor convey the message that employees will suffer economi-
cally as long as they are represented by a union. Employers may not at-
tempt to dictate or negotiate the composition of a union’s bargaining
8 [1978] 2 O.L.R.B. Rep. July 446.
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committee, fail to disclose relevant information requested by a union,
refuse to provide a full justification of a bargaining position when asked
to do so, refuse to consider or hear the union’s objections to its bargain-
ing position, refuse to attend or be persistently unavailable for negotia-
tion meetings, or send a negotiator to the table who has no real authori-
ty to negotiate.
U.S. labor laws contain a “good faith bargaining” obligation and create
an equivalent unfair labor practice of “refusal to bargain.” Many of the
indicators of such a refusal are similar to those in Canada. In contrast,
Mexican labor law does not contain the unfair labor practice concept. It
does not declare the right to bargain collectively or impose a duty to
bargain. Instead, by protecting workers’ right to strike, the law seeks to
induce bargaining by giving workers the right to strike if the employer
refuses to conclude a collective contract with their union.
(ii) Disclosure of Information
The duty to bargain includes a duty on both the employer and the union
to disclose information necessary to the other to reach informed deci-
sions in bargaining. Generally speaking, there is no duty to disclose in-
formation in the absence of a request for it. However, in many jurisdic-
tions, labor relations boards have ruled that an employer must disclose
information regarding a decision which it has already made, and which
the union could not have anticipated, which will have a significant im-
pact on terms and conditions of employment, such as a plant closing.
(iii) Changes to Working Conditions during Negotiations
In all Canadian jurisdictions, the labor relations statutes freeze the terms
and conditions of employment of all members of the bargaining unit
once the union gives notice to the employer to bargain for a collective
agreement. It is an unfair labor practice for an employer to violate this
statutory freeze. The freeze does not require that all conditions of work
remain static, but rather that the employer carry on business as before,
without changing terms and conditions of work that would not normal-
ly have been subject to change. The main purpose of the freeze is to pro-
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vide a period of stability during which collective bargaining can take
place. Generally the statutory freeze lasts until the union and the em-
ployer acquire the right to strike or lock out (or exercise it, in Quebec),
or until the union loses the right to represent the employees in the bar-
gaining unit.
Under U.S. labor law an employer is not permitted to change any as-
pect of workers’ wages, hours and working conditions without first bar-
gaining in good faith to the point of impasse with the union. This rule
continues to apply even when a collective bargaining agreement has ex-
pired, except that an employer may at that point refuse to deduct union
dues and participate in the arbitration of grievances.
Under Mexican law an employer may not unilaterally change the
terms of a collective contract or an individual employment contract.
Once filed with the relevant CAB, a collective contract that meets basic
legal requirements for minimum contents is treated as a judicial order
of the CAB itself and is enforceable as such. Collective contracts gener-
ally have an unlimited duration. A union may strike in response to uni-
lateral changes to a collective contract. In cases of economic necessity a
collective contract may be suspended or terminated, subject to CAB ap-
proval, if the employer can prove the existence of one of the legally rec-
ognized grounds for such measures.
(iv) Scope of Bargaining and Contents of Agreement
All Canadian jurisdictions require that certain clauses be included in all
collective agreements. Legally mandatory collective agreement clauses
generally include: clauses forbidding strikes and lockouts during the
term of the agreement, clauses providing for access to binding arbitra-
tion of all differences relating to the interpretation, application or al-
leged violation of the collective agreement,9 and a minimum collective
agreement duration of one year. In a majority of jurisdictions, Rand For-
mula union dues check-off clauses (see Union Membership and Dues,
section 2A.6, above) are effectively mandatory.
Except for those provisions that the law deems to be included in every
collective agreement, all other terms and conditions of employment may
9 Such a clause is legally required in all Canadian jurisdictions except Saskatchewan.
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be negotiated and are subject to the legal duty to bargain. Unlike the
U.S. system of collective bargaining, there is no distinction in Canadian
labor law between mandatory and “permissive” subjects of bargaining.
However, a limited set of issues may not be pressed to the point of im-
passe, and thus may not be the subject of a strike or lockout. These issues
include: demands that the scope of a union’s bargaining unit be nar-
rowed or expanded; a demand for recognition by an uncertified union;
and demands related to a dispute between one union and another over
their respective jurisdictions.
U.S. labor law distinguishes between “mandatory” subjects of collective
bargaining, to which a duty to bargain applies, and “permissive” sub-
jects, to which no duty applies. Mexican labor law, like Canadian labor
law, has no doctrine equivalent to U.S. labor law’s concept of “permis-
sive” subjects of bargaining.
Mexican law stipulates a number of subjects that a collective con-
tract must address, such as wage rates, hours of work, rest days and va-
cation leave. U.S. labor law does not specify any clauses or types of
clause that must be included in a collective bargaining agreement.
(v) Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration of Bargaining Disputes
Compulsory First-Contract Resolution
First-contract arbitration is made available in most jurisdictions.
Generally speaking, a key purpose of first-contract arbitration is to pre-
vent an employer from “stonewalling” a new bargaining agent. The un-
derlying rationale of first-contract arbitration is the facilitation of col-
lective bargaining. A new union runs a risk of being decertified by a
membership that has not yet determined the union’s ability to represent
its interests before the employer.
In deciding whether to grant an application for first-contract arbitra-
tion, labor relations boards generally consider such factors as: the pres-
ence of bad faith or surface bargaining; conduct of an employer which
demonstrates a refusal to recognize the union; a party adopting an un-
compromising position without reasonable justification; a party failing
to make reasonable or expeditious efforts to conclude a collective agree-
ment; unrealistic demands or expectations arising from the intentional
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conduct or inexperience of a party; or the existence of bitter and pro-
tracted negotiations in which it is unlikely that the parties will be able to
reach a settlement by themselves. Some labor boards place much greater
emphasis on the presence or absence of actual bad faith bargaining. Oth-
ers are more likely to grant an application in cases similar to an ordinary
impasse in negotiations. In Quebec, the Minister of Labour may assign
a first-contract dispute to arbitration upon the request of either party to
the dispute. Only Alberta, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince Ed-
ward Island10 provide no access to board-imposed settlements in first-
contract disputes.
U.S. and Mexican labor laws make no distinction between first-con-
tract disputes and other contract disputes. Under U.S. law the issue of
“good faith” in bargaining, raised in a case concerning unfair labor
practices, may be more closely scrutinized by the NLRB and the courts
in a first-contract negotiation where the employer strongly resists
unionization than in negotiations between a union and an employer
with a longstanding bargaining relationship. However, the main reme-
dy available to the NLRB is an order to resume bargaining. Mexican
law applies the same rules in a first-contract negotiation as in the revi-
sion of an already existing contract. However, a first collective contract
may not contain terms less favorable to workers than those contained in
their individual employment contracts.
Conciliation and Mediation
Canadian labor legislation has traditionally been distinguished by a
commitment to government-provided conciliation and mediation serv-
ices. Conciliation is mandatory as a precondition to striking in Ontario,
New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, Newfoundland,
and the federal jurisdiction. In Alberta no strike may take place until the
formal appointment of a mediator. In the other provinces a conciliator
or mediator may be appointed at the request of either party or at the dis-
cretion of the minister or other competent authority.
10 Amendments adding first-contract arbitration provisions to the P.E.I. Labour Act
were assented to on May 19, 1994, but have not yet been proclaimed in force. See
Statutes of P.E.I. 1994, c.32 s. 10.
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The various Canadian jurisdictions provide a range of conciliation
models. Conciliators, special mediators, labor boards, conciliation com-
missioners, special boards, individual fact-finders, and other actors un-
dertake investigations, inquiries and hearings as part of a mediation or
conciliation effort. They normally issue a report and recommendations,
usually followed by acceptance, rejection or a vote on such report or rec-
ommendations. In turn, these are often followed by “cooling-off” peri-
ods and other opportunities for reconsidering each side’s position. These
steps are all designed to avoid the ultimate conflict of a strike or lockout.
In the United States, unions may proceed to a strike upon the expira-
tion of a collective bargaining agreement without mandatory mediation
or conciliation. The U.S. National Labor Relations Act generally limits
government intervention to mediation at the request of both parties.
The U.S. Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service may enter a dis-
pute only if both parties request it, and the FMCS has no procedural re-
quirements for fact-finding, reporting, recommending, or the like. On-
ly a genuine “national emergency” can provoke stronger government
intervention. The Railway Labor Act, however, requires mediation be-
fore any strike in railroad and airline labor disputes. It also provides for
farther-reaching government intervention, even by the President or the
Congress of the United States, in these industries.
In Mexico, the parties together may at any time voluntarily request
conciliation by the labor authorities, or arbitration by a third party.
Conciliation by the relevant CAB is mandatory once a union delivers
notice of its intention to strike. In addition, once a union has filed a
strike notice with the CAB, it has the choice of submitting the dispute
to the CAB for settlement or going forward with the strike.
(vi) Extension of Agreement Coverage
In Quebec, the terms and conditions of a collective bargaining agree-
ment between the major union and the major employers in specified in-
dustrial sectors or occupations are extended by government decree to all
employers and employees in that sector, whether or not they are union-
ized and whether or not they participated in bargaining.11 Extension of
collective agreements does not occur in Canada outside of Quebec.
11 As of May 1999, 27 decrees were in force.
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Extension of collective bargaining agreements does not occur in the
United States. Law-contracts which extend negotiated terms of em-
ployment to cover an entire sector or region are an important feature of
Mexican labor law.
4) Enforcement of Collective Agreements
(i) Binding Effect of Collective Agreements
A collective agreement is legally enforceable by either party (the union or
the employer). Its terms govern relations between the parties unless they
are waived or amended by mutual agreement.
(ii) Enforcement Procedures
The primary means of enforcing collective agreements in Canada is
through private arbitration. Labor relations boards will in some cases
have jurisdiction to enforce collective agreements. In limited circum-
stances, collective agreements may be enforced in court by prosecution
or by injunction.
Arbitration
Collective agreements typically contain a grievance procedure to re-
solve disputes arising out of the application and operation of the agree-
ment. These grievance procedures usually include a multiple-stage
process of discussion between union and employer representatives. The
vast majority of grievances are settled privately by the parties through
this process. If the parties fail to settle a grievance, however, Canadian
laws generally mandate that it be settled through binding arbitration by
a neutral third party. Parties typically agree upon an arbitrator, but rele-
vant acts or codes may enable the labor minister, at the request of either
party, to appoint an arbitrator or an arbitration board.
The individual employee usually has no standing to personally bring
to arbitration a complaint arising out of the collective agreement. Only
the union has status to enforce the terms of a collective agreement, un-
less the agreement specifically grants to individual employees the power
to directly seek enforcement of collective agreement rights.
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If necessary, arbitral awards can generally be enforced through sum-
mary court procedures. The Supreme Court of Canada has held that
courts should generally defer to arbitral decisions and set them aside on-
ly upon such grounds as bias, fraud, breach of fair procedure, or patent
unreasonableness of the decision.
Labor Relations Boards
Unions or employers will sometimes deal with alleged breaches of a
collective agreement which also involve a breach of the labor relations
statute by filing a complaint with the labor relations board. Labor rela-
tions boards will often postpone taking action on such complaints until
the alleged collective agreement breach has been addressed by an arbi-
trator. In such cases, the arbitrator’s decision generally disposes of the
matter. Boards in each jurisdiction have developed their own criteria for
deciding when to defer to arbitration. In general, they will not defer a
matter where the substance of the complaint goes to the heart of the
public policy values embodied in the labor relations statute (e.g., where
the case alleges blatant reprisals against employees who supported a new-
ly certified union).
In a minority of jurisdictions, the labor relations board also has a
more general power to interpret and enforce collective agreements in
certain circumstances, which vary by jurisdiction. For example, in
Saskatchewan the Labour Relations Board must hear and determine any
dispute referred to it pursuant to an agreement between an employer
and a union representing a majority of employees in a bargaining unit.
Courts
From a legal standpoint, a breach of a collective agreement is a viola-
tion of the labor relations statute, which may be prosecuted in provincial
courts as an offence. However, such prosecutions may be undertaken
only with the consent of the proper authority (generally the labor rela-
tions board or the relevant government minister). Consent to prosecute
is seldom granted except in cases of persistent and knowing disregard of
the collective agreement.
The Supreme Court of Canada has ruled that courts have the power
to issue injunctions to restrain breaches of a collective agreement, except
where there is legislation which prevents court actions on a collective
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agreement. Injunctions will generally not be granted, however, where an
equally effective remedy is available through the arbitration process.
5) Successor Employers
Canadian labor law seeks to balance an employer’s right to rearrange its
business affairs with the need to protect employees from sudden changes
in their bargaining rights. When a business or enterprise is sold or trans-
ferred, collective bargaining rights flow through changes in ownership so
long as there is continuation of the same business. This means among
other things that, following the sale or transfer of a business, the em-
ployer taking over the business must honor the terms of any collective
agreement between a union and the predecessor employer. Where no
collective agreement was in force at the time of the sale, the successor
employer is required to bargain in good faith with a view to reaching a
collective agreement with any union representing employees of the pred-
ecessor employer. Generally, a successor employer is also bound by all la-
bor relations law proceedings (such as certification applications) to
which its predecessor was bound.
In determining whether a “business” has been transferred, labor relations
boards look beyond the legal form of business transactions. Each board has
developed its own jurisprudence and legal tests. Generally labor relations
boards will consider such matters as whether substantially the same work is
being performed in relation to substantially the same goods or services, and
whether what was transferred is a functioning organization rather than sim-
ply a collection of assets. The test generally does not turn on whether the
employees of the predecessor enterprise were hired by the successor em-
ployer, though that may be a factor in the determination.
The laws of Mexico likewise require that the terms and conditions of a
collective bargaining agreement carry over to an employer continuing
the business of a previous employer. In the U.S. a successor employer
has only a duty to bargain with the union, and must do so only if the
successor employer hires a majority of the former company’s union-
represented workers. Otherwise there is no duty to bargain. The col-
lective agreement does not carry over to a successor employer.
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6) Obligations of Unions towards Represented Workers
Most Canadian labor statutes impose a duty of fair representation on the
union. The duty requires unions to represent all bargaining unit mem-
bers fairly and not engage in arbitrary, discriminatory or bad faith con-
duct. The acts in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Is-
land do not. However, in those jurisdictions a common law duty of fair
representation can be enforced through the courts. If a union unfairly re-
fuses to process a grievance, an individual employee may file a complaint
or bring a court action against the union (depending on which jurisdic-
tion the employee is in) for an alleged violation of the duty of fair repre-
sentation.
In a number of jurisdictions the statutory duty of fair representation
applies to the union’s role in negotiating as well as in administering the
collective agreement. However, unions are given wide latitude in collec-
tive agreement negotiations and may reach agreements which are more
advantageous to some bargaining unit members than to others. At the
federal level and in Alberta, Manitoba, Newfoundland and Saskatchewan,
the duty applies only to the union’s role in administering the collective
agreement, that is, its role in deciding how employee complaints that the
collective agreement has been violated will be pursued or settled. These
five jurisdictions appear to share a concern that labor relations board su-
pervision of collective bargaining for a new agreement would give rise to
the danger of the board second-guessing the substantive fairness of the
union’s demands.
U.S. law provides for a similar duty of fair representation. The duty re-
quires unions to represent all bargaining unit members without arbi-
trariness, bad faith, or discrimination. It applies to the union’s admin-
istration of rights under the collective bargaining agreement and also
applies to the negotiation of that agreement. In Mexico, Article 375 of
the Federal Labor Law requires unions to represent their members in
defending their individual rights, unless the individual chooses to act
directly and without the assistance of the union.
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7) Termination of Bargaining Rights
Canada’s labor laws create periodic opportunities during which employ-
ees are allowed to change their union representation or to terminate the
bargaining rights of their union if it no longer enjoys the support of a
majority of bargaining unit members. In the interests of labor relations
stability, most jurisdictions have limited the periods within which such
termination can take place. Labor legislation typically gives unions a se-
cure period of one year within which to negotiate a first collective agree-
ment. Where a collective agreement is in place, a union may in general
be decertified only during specified open periods, typically within two
months of the expiry of the collective agreement. Labor relations boards
will take steps to ensure that, if workers signify that they no longer wish
to be represented by a union, they have done so voluntarily and without
employer interference.
The U.S. National Labor Relations Actprovides for similar methods of
decertifying or changing the bargaining representative. Under Mexican
labor law any duly registered union may challenge another union’s title
to a collective contract at any time by filing a claim to that title with the
relevant CAB. If an incumbent union does not prove its majority sup-
port during such proceeding, it will lose title to the collective contract
and thus lose the right to administer and negotiate revisions to it.
C. LABOR PRINCIPLE 3 – THE RIGHT TO STRIKE
1) Legal Foundations
As noted above (see Legal Sources of Labor Rights, section 1C), the right
to strike, although necessary to the pursuit of the objectives of a labor
organization, is not constitutionally protected in Canada.
No express right to strike exists at common law in Canada. In gener-
al, Canadian law followed British rulings, and strikes were outlawed well
into the 19th century as an illegal restraint of trade. Worker protests and
shifts in public sentiment gradually led to laws legalizing trade union ac-
tivity. Following a bitter strike by Toronto typographical workers in
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1872, the federal government passed the Act to Amend the Criminal Law
that decriminalized strikes and peaceful picketing.
Throughout the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the federal gov-
ernment and the provinces continued to develop new laws to channel
industrial conflict toward peaceful solutions, most notably the 1907 fed-
eral Industrial Disputes Investigation Act. These laws shaped the first gov-
ernmental conciliation and mediation machinery and created a general
premise of legitimacy for workers’ right to strike.
With a confluence of pressures that included the need for wartime
production, continued worker mobilizations for trade union rights, and
the example of the U.S. Wagner Act, Canada and its provinces moved
on new legislation in the 1940s that adopted collective bargaining as na-
tional policy and recognized the right to strike as an essential element of
this policy.
Strikes are treated as “lawful union activities” and are thus protected
by provincial and federal labor laws when undertaken in compliance
with procedural requirements. Discrimination against workers for exer-
cising the right to strike is an unfair labor practice.
Canadian labor law seeks to balance the rights of workers against ef-
ficiency concerns and the rights of employers to manage their business.
Though the core right of workers to strike for a new collective agreement
after a previous agreement has expired is generally protected for private
sector workers under Canadian labor laws, the right to strike is nonethe-
less restricted by various legal provisions designed to limit the disruptive
effects of work stoppages.
2) Protected Strike Activity
Canadian labor laws employ a broad definition of the term “strike,”
which typically includes most concerted refusals, cessations or slow-
downs of work and other concerted activities designed to restrict or lim-
it output. Since lawful strike activity is restricted to certain times in the
collective bargaining cycle, disputes over whether specific actions con-
stitute a strike generally arise when a labor board (the Labour Court in
Quebec) is asked to determine whether those actions constitute a strike
during the term of a collective agreement and are therefore unlawful (see
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Regulation of the Right to Strike, below). However, if undertaken at
times when strikes are legally permitted, work slowdowns, work-to-rule
campaigns, and similar measures are fully protected as lawful strike ac-
tivity (except in Quebec).
The U.S. National Labor Relations Act does not include partial or in-
termittent strikes or work slowdowns within the concerted activities
that it protects. Mexican labor law defines protected strike activity as
“the mere act of suspending work,” and thus would not protect work
slowdowns. However, both U.S. and Mexican labor laws allow workers
and unions to strike for purposes other than the settlement of collective
agreement bargaining disputes, in contrast to Canadian labor laws.
3) Regulation of the Right to Strike
(i) No-Strike Clauses
A statutory prohibition on strikes during the term of a collective agree-
ment, which prevails in all Canadian jurisdictions, cannot be altered by
negotiations between the parties. No strike or lockout is permitted while
a collective agreement is in effect. All disputes that arise during the term
of an agreement are subject to the dispute resolution procedures of the
agreement. Labor relations statutes provide for mandatory independent
arbitration of such disputes, which is normally seen as the quid pro quo
for removing the right to strike during the life of the collective agree-
ment (see Scope of Bargaining and Contents of Agreement, in section
2B.3, above).
While no-strike clauses are contained in most collective bargaining
agreements in the United States, they are a matter for negotiation and
are not required by law. Some unions and employers retain the right to
strike or lockout over unresolved grievances during the term of an
agreement. Under Mexican law, there is no prohibition on strikes dur-
ing the term of a collective contract, though by custom Mexican unions
generally restrict industrial action to the time each year when their
wage terms are up for renewal, or every two years when nonwage con-
tract issues are negotiated.
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(ii) Compulsory Conciliation
As discussed above (see Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration of Bar-
gaining Disputes, section 2B.3), conciliation or mediation is a manda-
tory precondition to striking in the majority of Canadian jurisdictions.
(iii) Unlawful Strikes
A strike may be lawful or unlawful. Strikes are lawful only for the pur-
pose of seeking to conclude a collective agreement and only after statu-
tory procedural requirements have been met. Workers are prohibited
under Canadian federal and provincial labor laws from striking for
union recognition. Secondary strikes (see Picketing and Other Support-
ive Action, section 2C.4, below) are generally treated as unlawful by the
Canadian labor boards and courts.
Canadian law generally prohibits a union from calling, counseling,
supporting, or encouraging an unlawful strike or threatening any of
those. Labor relations boards can issue a variety of remedial orders
against unions and employees participating in an unlawful strike. Many
labor boards in Canada have been given the power to issue cease and de-
sist orders which can have the same effect as an injunction if they are reg-
istered in the appropriate superior court.
Employers may also proceed against employees engaging in an un-
lawful strike in the common law courts and by arbitration. Common
law courts have retained power to issue an injunction against unlawful
strikes and strikers, ordering an end to the unlawful activity in question.
But courts will generally not award damages in the case of an unlawful
strike, requiring the employer to pursue damages before an arbitrator.
Such claims for damages may be based on the no-strike clause of the col-
lective agreement.
Unions may also be liable for damages for breach of the collective
agreement or of the labor relations statute. Workers do not cease to be
employees by participating in an unlawful strike. Nonetheless, they may
be subject to discipline, up to and including dismissal, in accordance
with the terms of a collective agreement.
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Canada’s no-strike policy contrasts with U.S. and Mexican law. In the
United States, workers may strike for union recognition, but the union
must petition for a certification election within 30 days. In Mexico,
union recognition does not assume the same importance. Workers have
the right to form a union and to strike to obtain a collective bargaining
agreement. As long as the union formation and the strike are carried
out in accordance with legal requirements, there is no need for recog-
nition of majority support in the U.S. or Canadian sense.
(iv) Essential Services
Some Canadian jurisdictions make special provision for advance notice
of a strike and maintenance of essential services where a strike affects the
public interest. Generally, “essential services” exceptions to the right to
strike are limited to work the interruption of which poses a danger to
public safety and health. For example, in the federal sector, striking
workers must continue work to the extent necessary to prevent an “im-
mediate and serious danger” to the safety or health of the public.
Mexican labor law requires longer advance notice of strikes in public
service sectors and requires that transportation workers and health care
workers complete certain tasks before joining a strike. U.S. law makes
no provision for essential services or equipment maintenance during a
strike, except for a 10-day notice of any strike in a health care facility.
U.S. unions and companies may negotiate over equipment mainte-
nance or other safeguards during a strike, but have no statutory obliga-
tion to do so.
(v) Back-to-Work Legislation
On occasion, Canadian governments have enacted ad hoc back-to-work
legislation in order to bring an end to otherwise lawful strikes, generally
in economically important enterprises. For example, the government of
Canada passed back-to-work legislation in the federal jurisdiction 30
times between 1950 and 1999 in order to end work stoppages such as
railway, postal service, port operations, shipping and grain handling
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strikes.12 Back-to-work legislation typically threatens workers who con-
tinue to strike with substantial fines and often requires mandatory arbi-
tration of outstanding contract negotiation disputes.
(vi) Strike Votes
All Canadian labor relations statutes require a secret ballot strike vote
(usually by all workers represented in the bargaining unit, whether or
not they are union members) before a strike may occur. In some cases, a
majority of the bargaining unit must vote in favor of the strike; in most
cases a majority of those voting is required.
Most Canadian jurisdictions also empower the labor relations board
or the labor minister to require that the employer’s last contract offer be
put to a vote of the union’s members before a strike may begin or, in
some cases, after a strike has begun. An employer in Alberta, British Co-
lumbia, New Brunswick, Manitoba or Ontario may apply to the rele-
vant public authority for a vote on its last offer.
In some cases, the union is allowed to conduct these votes through its
own internal procedures, subject to challenge by union members if the vote
is conducted in violation of secret ballot, eligibility and other requirements.
In other cases, the relevant labor board oversees the voting process.
Canada’s mandatory strike votes or last-offer votes contrast with U.S.
labor law regarding strikes. No U.S. law requires a strike vote or a last-
offer vote by workers before taking strike action or after a strike has be-
gun. As a matter of democratic practice, however, most U.S. unions’
constitutions and bylaws require a strike vote, sometimes with a two-
thirds majority needed to launch a strike. The government has no role
in overseeing such a vote. In Mexico, once a strike has started, employ-
ers, workers, or interested third parties may request that the CAB cer-
tify the legal existence of the strike. This requires the CAB to deter-
mine, among other things, whether a majority of workers support the
strike, for which purpose a strike vote of workers (called a recuento)
may be held in order to determine whether the strike enjoys majority
support. If the strike does not enjoy majority support it will be declared
“nonexistent,” and work must be resumed.
12 Source: Workplace Information Directorate, Human Resources Development
Canada.
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4) Picketing and Other Supportive Action
(i) Picketing
The Supreme Court of Canada has ruled that peaceful picketing de-
signed to communicate information is lawful13 and that, as a means of
free expression, it also carries a measure of constitutional protection.1 4 I n
most jurisdictions, picketing is not directly regulated by the labor rela-
tions act or code. It may, however, give rise to civil law suits for trespass,
nuisance (generally defined as “substantial and unreasonable interfer-
ence with an occupier’s interest in the beneficial use of his or her land”),
or wrongful interference with economic relations. Such lawsuits are
brought in court rather than before the labor relations board. The party
bringing the action will usually seek an injunction restraining further
picketing, along with compensation for economic losses suffered as a re-
sult of the picketing. Claims for such compensation are seldom pursued
once an injunction has been issued. Many commentators have noted
that in such cases courts have often avoided both the spirit and the letter
of the Supreme Court’s ruling declaring peaceful informational picket-
ing to be legal.
In addition to regulating picketing of an employer whose employees
are on strike, the courts have generally held that secondary picketing,
which is directed at a neutral third party to the labor dispute, is not legal.
The labor relations statutes of Alberta, New Brunswick and British Co-
lumbia specifically prohibit secondary picketing. In Ontario, the Labour
Relations Board may issue a cease and desist order against such second-
ary picketing where it finds that such picketing causes or is intended to
cause an unlawful strike or lockout. In British Columbia, the Labour
Relations Board has exclusive jurisdiction to regulate primary and sec-
ondary picketing, except in cases of immediate danger of serious physi-
cal injury or actual obstruction or physical damage to property.
In some jurisdictions the prohibition on secondary picketing covers
not only picketing per se , but also distributing leaflets or handbills to
workers or customers at secondary locations. In other jurisdictions
13 Williams v. Aristocratic Restaurants (1947) Ltd., [1951] 3 D.L.R. 769 (S.C.C.).
14 RWDSU Local 580 v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573.
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leafletting at the site of a secondary employer for the purposes of per-
suading customers not to purchase the products of the primary employ-
er may be permissible so long as it does not prevent the employees of the
secondary employer from working or interfere with other contractual re-
lations of the secondary employer. The dividing line between prohibit-
ed secondary picketing and expressive activity protected by the Charter
of Rights and Freedoms has not been fully clarified through case law.
However, at least one provincial court has stated that expressive activities
such as press releases, letters to affected third parties, television or news-
paper advertisements, or leaflets distributed at support rallies or left on
cars in mall parking lots would not be prohibited as secondary picketing.1 5
Canadian laws regarding picketing are generally similar to those of the
United States. The picketing issue does not arise in the same way in
Mexico, where companies are required to totally close operations dur-
ing a lawful strike, except for necessary equipment maintenance or con-
servation of raw materials, which are the responsibility of the striking
union.
(ii) Secondary Strike Action
Canadian labor laws do not specifically prohibit (as in the United States)
or permit (as in Mexico) a secondary strike by a union at a supplier or
customer of a company whose workers are engaged in a primary strike.
However, since only a strike by a certified union seeking a new collective
bargaining agreement is lawful, secondary strikes are generally found to
be unlawful by Canadian labor boards and courts.
5) Limits on Striker Replacement
The issue of striker replacement is debated in Canada as passionately as
in the United States, but the locus of the debate is different. No Cana-
dian jurisdiction allows the permanent replacement of strikers, as is per-
15 United Food and Commercial Workers, local 1518 v. K Mart Canada Ltd. (1995),
96 C.L.L.C. 210-007 (British Columbia Supreme Court).
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mitted in the United States. In some provinces and in the federal juris-
diction, there is a specific statutory prohibition on permanent replace-
ment or a specific guarantee of the right of a striking worker to return to
his or her job at the conclusion of a strike if the job still exists. In other
provinces, and in the federal sector, the labor boards have found perma-
nent replacement to be a reprisal against workers for the exercise of a
lawful right and thus an unfair labor practice. Moreover, the use of re-
placements for the purpose of destroying the union’s representative ca-
pacity is in general considered an unfair labor practice and is specifically
prohibited in the federal jurisdiction.
In 1977 Quebec became the first Canadian jurisdiction to adopt an
“anti-scab” law prohibiting even temporary replacement workers in a
strike. The prohibition reaches not only new employees, but also the use
of employees from the striking bargaining unit who would be willing to
cross the picket line to return to work and other employees, managers or
supervisors from other plants of the same employer. Only managers and
supervisors employed at the struck facility before the outset of negotia-
tions may be used to perform the work of striking employees.
Quebec has established additional specialized institutional measures
to deal with strikes. The Minister of Labour may name an examiner to
verify whether the employer complies with the prohibitions on use of re-
placement workers. The special examiner has wide powers of investiga-
tion, including the ability to inspect the workplace accompanied by
union and management representatives. At the end of the strike, the fail-
ure to recall an employee may be the subject of mandatory arbitration.
British Columbia is another Canadian province that sharply curtails
the use of replacement workers during a strike. Its policy differs from
that of Quebec only to the extent that it permits members of the bar-
gaining unit to cross picket lines to perform work. As in Quebec, how-
ever, the employer is prohibited from engaging temporary replacement
workers.
Ontario had a similar anti-scab law from 1993-1995, but it was re-
pealed after a change of provincial government, which reverted to the
previous law permitting the employment of new (but temporary) hires
and use of other company managers or supervisors to perform the work
of striking employees.
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Box 2.3
Canada’s Federal Task Force Addresses Striker Replacement
The federal government’s 1996 special task force to review the Canada
Labour Code devoted much of its work to the question of striker replace-
ments. It concluded its review with a recommendation that there should
be no general prohibition on the use of temporary replacement workers,
but that where the use of replacement workers in a dispute is demon-
strated to be for the purpose of undermining the union’s representative
capacity rather than the pursuit of legitimate bargaining objectives, this
should be declared an unfair labor practice and the CIRB should be giv-
en the specific remedial power to prohibit the further use of replacement
workers in the dispute. A minority report argued that the use of replace-
ments inherently undermines the union and should be prohibited out-
right. The majority report formed the basis for recent amendments to the
Canada Labour Code.1 6 The amendments reaffirm the right of employees
who are on strike or locked out to resume employment in preference to
replacement workers.
Mexican law requires a company to cease operations during a strike, ex-
cept as necessary to maintain equipment and preserve raw materials,
tasks which are performed by the members of the unions on strike,
which is responsible for the installations of the company during the
strike. By contrast, U.S. labor law permits the permanent replacement
of striking employees, except where the strike is undertaken in protest
against employer unfair labor practices.
D. PROTECTIONS AGAINST INTERFERENCE
1) Prohibition of Employer Unfair Labor Practices
The various federal and provincial labor relations statutes protect the
right of private sector employees in Canada to associate, organize a
16 Bill C-19, An Act to Amend the Canada Labour Code (Part1) and the Corporations
and Labor Unions Returns Act and to Make Consequential Amendments to other Acts, First
Session 36th Parl., 1997-1998 (assented to June 18, 1998).
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union of their choice, bargain collectively and strike by defining and
prohibiting various unfair labor practices. While the wording of these
prohibitions varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, each statute in-
cludes general prohibitions of the following:
(1) Intimidation, coercion, threats, promises or other forms of inter-
ference with workers’ exercise of labor rights.
Employer actions found to have breached these prohibitions include:
payment by the employer of the legal costs incurred by employees in pe-
titioning for decertification; interrogation of employees about their vot-
ing intentions in a certification election; surveillance of union activities
by spies; prevention of employees from distributing prounion literature
and soliciting support for a union on the employer’s premises during
nonworking hours and outside of work areas; attempting to influence or
dictate who may act as a union official.
All Canadian jurisdictions prohibit employer coercion or intimida-
tion in communications related to union organization or activities. La-
bor relations boards have applied this prohibition relatively stringently.
While factual statements or comments about an employer’s ability to re-
main competitive or about the issue of job security may not in them-
selves constitute illegal communications, Canadian labor relations
boards have tended to view employer references to job security in the
context of a certification campaign with suspicion. In one important
case, the Ontario board stated its concerns as follows:
Views which equate membership or nonmembership in a union to contin-
ued job security, cease to be mere personal views and may become intimida-
tory or coercive if the person expressing them is perceived to be seized of
special knowledge, or position, such that raises the statement from a matter
of opinion to one of probable fact.17
17 Somerville Belkin Industries Ltd., [1981] 1 Can. L.R.B.R. 100, at p. 109.
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Box 2.4
Balancing Employee Freedom 
of Association and Employer Free Speech:
A Decision of the British Columbia Labour Relations Board
In October 1996 the British Columbia Labour Relations Board issued an
important decision clarifying the scope of lawful communication by em-
ployers to employees during union organizing drives.18 The decision
reconsidered two cases, one arising out of an organizing drive at a bus
transportation company, the other out of a unionization drive at an
automobile dealership. The board reconsidered the two cases because the
initial decisions in those cases had arrived at different interpretations of
then-recent amendments to the B.C. Labour Relations Code.
In the bus company case, a supervisor had made a series of statements to
workers, including the following: the attempt to organize was silly because
the employer could easily close its operations and move them to another
location; the owner of the company would not let unionization happen. The
owner himself issued a bulletin to all employees, which included the fol-
lowing statement: “Will Union Membership Guarantee Me Job Security?
No. No one can guarantee you job security. Security depends solely upon
how well you do your job and how successful our business is.”
In the car dealership case the employer convened a series of mandato-
ry meetings of employees. (Such meetings are commonly referred to as
“captive audience” meetings.) Over the course of these meetings the own-
er made a number of statements that directly or indirectly pointed out
the economic dependence of his employees and subtly suggested that
supporting a union would be disloyal to him. In particular, he said that
he was wealthy at a young age and could have retired but instead chose to
start the car dealership; in the first year and a half of the dealership he had
lost a significant amount of money but had never bounced a pay check;
now that he was making money some employees may hold his wealthy
lifestyle against him. He reviewed the terms of a collective agreement at a
competitor dealership, asked all employees to vote, and said that they
should vote their conscience. At one of the meetings a labor relations
consultant hired by the employer also spoke. The consultant stated that
the employer wanted to “keep its relationship with its employees” and
18 Re Cardinal Transportation B.C. Inc.(1996), 34 C.L.R.B.R. (2d) 1.
D. PROTECTIONS AGAINST INTERFERENCE 75
ensure that “walls did not develop between employees and management.”
During the course of the union’s membership drive a manager also told
an employee that a union would not make a difference in wage rates and
that union dues would take up any difference in pay.
The B.C. Labour Relations Board ruled that employer free speech, in-
cluding speech expressly protected by the Labour Relations Code, must be
understood as limited by the prohibitions on coercion set out in the
Code’s unfair labor practice sections. The board examined the nature of
employer coercion in the context of union organizing campaigns. It re-
viewed its own experience, the law in other Canadian jurisdictions, the
legislative history of the current B.C. provisions, and some evidence con-
cerning experience with union certification votes in the United States.
The board said the following about its general approach to the balance
between employee freedom of association and employer free speech:
Underlying the public policy of protecting employees at the initial stage
of the collective bargaining process, is the recognition of the economic
dependence and vulnerability of employees to their employer…
Captive audience meetings will continue to be given a strict level of
scrutiny. Statements that would otherwise be permissible may, in the
context of a captive audience meeting, be impermissible. This is espe-
cially true in the areas of the economic dependence of employees and
union membership requirements.
The longstanding policy of this board and other labour boards in
Canada is that an employer is not entitled to engage in an antiunion
political-style campaign in an effort to prevent the union from certi-
fying. The greatest point of resistance by employers to trade unions is
at the initial point of employees attempting to exercise their statutory
choice in favour of collective bargaining. A statutory choice has been
made to restrict employer speech at this point in favour of ensuring
employees’ freedom of association. An employer’s vigorous presenta-
tion of its antiunion views may be reasonably perceived by most em-
ployees as one that it is not “safe to thwart.” The [United States] ex-
perience seems to verify this.19
19 Ibid., at pp. 43 and 57.
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In the bus company case the board decided that the supervisor’s state-
ments constituted an unfair labor practice and that in the context of those
statements the references in the owner’s bulletin to job security also con-
stituted an unfair labor practice.
In the car dealership case the board found that the statements by the
labor relations consultant and the manager were unfair labor practices.
The board also said that in the context of those statements and of the cap-
tive audience meetings the owner’s statements provided a basis for addi-
tional unfair labor practice findings.
Canadian labor law regulates employer conduct in union organizing
campaigns in a much stricter fashion than U.S. law covering most pri-
vate sector employers. Under the employer “free speech” provision of
the U.S. Taft-Hartley amendments to the National Labor Relations
Act, employers have been allowed to aggressively campaign against
union organization. In one U.S. case, for example, the employer guar-
anteed that if the union came in he would be out of business within a
year and said, “The cancer will eat us up and we will fall by the wayside
… I only know from my mind, from my pocketbook how I stand on
this.” This statement was found unlawful by the National Labor Rela-
tions Board, but the NLRB was overruled by the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals, which held that the statement was “consistent with respectable
economic theory.”2 0 In contrast, under the Railway Labor Act, covering
the rail and airline industries, the National Mediation Board constrains
employers to a more limited role in election campaigns than that of
unions and more closely regulates employer behavior and statements
during such campaigns (see Appendix 4A).
(2) Any form of discrimination or reprisal against workers for exer-
cising their right to organize, or for pursuing legal recourse to
enforce this right.
Canadian labor relations boards generally prohibit employers from act-
ing, even in part, on the basis of antiunion motives, regardless of the
presence of valid business justifications for their actions. Examples of
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20 See NLRB v. Village IX, Inc., 723 F.2d. 1360 (7th Cir.1983), at 1367.
employer actions found to violate the prohibition on antiunion dis-
crimination include: disciplining union officials who criticize the em-
ployer during the course of a labor dispute (this does not protect mali-
cious or knowingly false statements); relocating, transferring or closing
operations, in whole or in part, for reasons which include a desire to
avoid a union or unionization; and changing terms and conditions of
employment or otherwise threatening or penalizing employees for union
activity.
Under the U.S. National Labor Relations Act, an employer’s antiunion
motivation must be a substantial or motivating factor behind an action
before that action will be found to be discriminatory.
(3) Any employer support for or domination of a trade union.
Canadian labor law seeks to ensure the independence of unions. It is an
unfair labor practice for an employer to support a union financially, to
favor one union over another, or to exert control over the internal oper-
ations of a union. Organizations which receive the overt or tacit support
or approval of an employer cannot be certified (see Acquisition of Bar-
gaining Rights, section 2B.2, above). Nor can they become party to a
collective agreement.
(4) Changes to terms and conditions of employment during the peri-
od following an application for certification or delivery to the
employer of notice to bargain.
In all Canadian jurisdictions, the labor relations statute provides addi-
tional protection at these two critical junctures by imposing a temporary
“statutory freeze” on terms and conditions of employment. The freeze
does not require that all conditions of work remain frozen, but rather
that the employer carry on business as before, that is, without changing
terms and conditions of work that would not have been subject to
change in the normal course of business. The main purpose of the freeze
is to provide stability during the sensitive period while the union is seek-
ing certification or to negotiate or renegotiate a collective agreement. In
the case of a certification application, the statutory freeze lasts until the
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union is certified as exclusive bargaining agent or its application for cer-
tification is dismissed. In the case of collective bargaining, the freeze
lasts in general until the parties either reach a collective agreement or
reach a legal strike or lockout position following good faith bargaining.
Finally, the duty to bargain includes implied prohibitions against cer-
tain actions by employers which interfere with the ability of a union to
represent bargaining unit members (see Obligation to Bargain, in sec-
tion 2B.3, above).
2) Prohibition of Union Unfair Labor Practices
Unions, like employers, are prohibited from using coercion or intimida-
tion to influence the decision of an employee to become or not to be-
come a union member, to become a member of another union, or to ex-
ercise other rights of free association. While all jurisdictions permit
clauses in collective bargaining agreements which require union mem-
bership as a condition of employment (see Union Membership and
Dues, section 2A.6, above), labor relations acts and codes generally pro-
hibit unfair use of such clauses by providing that an employee who is ex-
pelled from a union may not be dismissed in certain circumstances.
While the wording of each statute varies, in general an employee cannot
be dismissed, notwithstanding that he or she has been expelled from a
union which is party to a union shop agreement, if his or her expulsion
is related to: (1) participation in the affairs of another union; (2) a refusal
to pay unreasonable dues assessments; (3) participation in a labor law
proceeding; or (4) the exercise of other rights granted to employees un-
der the labor relations statute. This protection is generally not extended
to employees who are expelled for strikebreaking by returning to work
over the objection of fellow workers and the union. Labor relations
statutes generally require that a disciplinary decision to expel a member
not be discriminatory.
3) Civil Rights and Protection
Without civil and political rights there can be no normal exercise of
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trade union rights. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms pro-
vides certain fundamental guarantees to Canadians. Like other Canadi-
an residents, unions and union members enjoy constitutional protection
of their freedom of assembly, provided that the exercise of this freedom
does not pose a significant danger of substantial harm to property or
physical safety. Unionists have the freedom to travel within and outside
the country that is granted to all residents and have the right to attend
national and international trade union meetings with full freedom and
independence. Similarly, unions and employees have the constitutional
right to express their views and opinions publicly and to receive and im-
part information through any media, like other Canadian residents.
Unions and employees engaged in union activity, like all Canadian
residents, have in general a constitutional right to be free from search
and seizure of their property without a judicial warrant issued following
a determination that reasonable and probable cause exists to believe that
evidence for criminal proceedings will be found on the premises. Simi-
larly, unionists enjoy constitutional freedom from arbitrary arrest or de-
tention without a warrant and without charges being brought. Unions
and their members are entitled to full protection of the criminal laws
which prohibit physical assaults and damage to property and to the same
police protection from such harms as other Canadian residents.
3. GOVERNMENT ENFORCEMENT
A. STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONING OF CANADIAN LABOR RELATIONS
BOARDS
Canada’s labor relations statutes each establish a labor relations tribunal,
generally referred to as a Labour Relations Board (in Quebec, the Office
of the Labour Commissioner General) to interpret and administer the
law (see Legal Sources of Labor Rights, section 1C, above, for a list of the
relevant tribunals). Some provinces maintain separate labor boards for
private and public employees; however, most maintain a single board
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for both private and public sector labor relations in order to minimize
administrative costs.
Enforcement is generally complaint-driven. Upon an alleged breach
of a labor relations statute, the aggrieved party may file a complaint with
the board. Most boards have labor relations officers or investigation of-
ficers who investigate and attempt to settle cases prior to hearings. If set-
tlement efforts are unsuccessful, the board holds a single set of hearings
and issues a final decision. The board’s decision is generally not appeal-
able to the courts. Most boards will reconsider such decisions only in un-
usual cases. Board orders can be enforced through government police
powers upon their being filed in the appropriate superior court. Proper-
ty may be seized to satisfy court orders, and refusal to comply with
a court order can be sanctioned through prosecution for contempt of
court, an offence punishable by fine or even imprisonment.
Labor relations statutes can also be enforced through prosecution and
the imposition of penal sanctions, though such procedures are generally
reserved for cases of apparently flagrant and deliberate violations of the
law and generally require the prior consent of either the labor relations
board or the minister of labor. The boards do not prosecute; rather,
charges must be laid by interested parties, or in some cases by the minis-
ter of labor or an inspector appointed by the minister.
The U.S. National Labor Relations Board’s procedures are less stream-
lined than those of Canadian labor relations tribunals. The U.S. NL-
RB’s enforcement procedures can involve several steps: the filing and
investigation of a complaint; the issuance of charges or dismissal of the
complaint; hearings before an administrative law judge; appeal to the
National Labor Relations Board; and court proceedings for enforce-
ment or appeal of the NLRB’s order. Like Canada’s labor relations tri-
bunals, Mexico’s Conciliation and Arbitration Boards are structured to
process cases in a single administrative proceeding. The orders of Mex-
ico’s CABs are judicial orders which are immediately enforceable with-
out further proceedings.
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B. EXAMPLES OF CANADIAN LABOR RELATIONS BOARDS
1) The Alberta Labour Relations Board
The Alberta Labour Relations Board is an independent, tripartite agency
established to oversee three labor relations statutes, including the Alber-
ta Labour Relations Code. The board adjudicates disputes under the
Code and processes applications for certification, supervising represen-
tation votes and determining bargaining units appropriate for certifica-
tion. An order of the board may be filed with the Alberta courts and en-
forced as a court order.
The board comprises a chair, four vice-chairs, and 25 part-time board
members. Board members are appointed by the Alberta government for
their experience and knowledge of labor relations, giving equal repre-
sentation to labor and management. The board has a staff of 26 em-
ployees, including the chair and vice-chairs. The staff includes labor re-
lations officers who investigate and assist the parties in reaching
voluntary settlements of disputes brought to the board. In addition, the
board uses the services of 25 deputy returning officers located through-
out the province, each assisted by several polling clerks, in an effort to
expeditiously conduct votes in response to applications for certification
anywhere in the province.
In addition to making legal determinations, the board makes avail-
able a number of publications under its statutory mandate to educate the
labor relations community and the public of their statutory rights and
obligations. These include information bulletins outlining the board’s
policies and procedures and its Guide to the Labour Relations Code. The
board also has a site on the World Wide Web, which contains board
member and staff profiles, rules, information bulletins, recent decisions
and other publications.
2) The Manitoba Labour Board
The Manitoba Labour Board is an independent and autonomous quasi-
judicial body responsible for adjudicating and administering applica-
tions made to it under the Labour Relations Act and other legislation.
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The board conducts hearings throughout the province and often travels
to rural centers for that purpose. An order of the board can be filed with
the Manitoba courts and enforced directly as a court order. The board
also provides information to the labor relations community to assist it
with the collective bargaining process and in making applications to the
board.
The board comprises a full-time chairperson, three part-time vice-
chairpersons, and 24 board members. There is equal representation of
labor and management views. The board employs a staff to provide field
services and administrative support services. The field services section in-
cludes labor relations officers who investigate the factual basis of appli-
cations to the board by gathering documents and other evidence relevant
to the case and endeavoring to identify all of the major issues involved.
In addition, labor relations officers often assist the parties to reach a set-
tlement of disputes.
The board maintains a small library of texts and journals dealing with
industrial relations and labor law. Since 1985, all arbitration awards and
collective agreements must be filed with the board. Copies of these may
be viewed at the board’s office. The board also produces a number of
publications including a summary of all arbitration awards rendered in
the province and filed with the board during the calendar year, a Guide
to the Labour Relations Act, an index of written reasons for decisions is-
sued by the board, and information bulletins dealing with the board’s
practice and procedure.
3) The Ontario Labour Relations Board
The Ontario Labour Relations Board is the primary provincial agency
for enforcement of rights to organize, to bargain collectively and to
strike in Canada’s most populous province. The board mediates and ad-
judicates a wide variety of labor relations disputes under a number of
employment statutes.
Statutorily independent of the Labour Ministry, the OLRB is com-
posed of a chairperson, an alternate chairperson, 15 vice-chairs, and 10
board members – five each of employer and employee representatives.
Many serve part-time, maintaining separate employment. The chair, al-
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ternate chair, and vice-chairs have usually been experienced lawyers re-
spected by both management and labor.
The board employs 20 labor relations officers as its full-time staff.
Upon receipt of a complaint of an alleged contravention of the Ontario
Labour Relations Act, the board will appoint a staff officer to investigate
the complaint and report to the board. In practice, officers are trained to
encourage the parties to settle the matter and avoid further legal pro-
ceedings. More than three-quarters of cases are resolved without the
need for a hearing. For cases that do not settle, a three-member ad hoc
panel hears the case following the investigation. Where a three-member
panel is established, the chair appoints one representative each from em-
ployer and employee members of the board, as well as a vice-chair to pre-
side over the panel.
If the board finds that there has been a contravention of the Act and
the infringing party fails to comply with the board’s remedial order, the
order may be filed in the Ontario Court (General Division), whereupon
it is immediately enforceable as an order of the court. Failure to comply
is then treated as contempt of court, and the public authority may in-
carcerate the violator and seize assets to satisfy a judgment.
4) The Quebec Commissioners and the Labour Court
While the Quebec Labour Code is like other Canadian labor relations
laws in the way it defines and prohibits unfair labor practices, labor law
enforcement is structured differently. Quebec does not have a labor re-
lations board with comprehensive jurisdiction over labor relations mat-
ters. Rather, Quebec’s enforcement is carried out through two separate
agencies: the Office of the Labour Commissioner General, which makes
determinations and issues restorative remedies, and the Quebec Labour
Court, where appeals and penal remedies are sought.
(i) The Office of the Labour Commissioner General
The Office of the Labour Commissioner General is a bureau of the
Quebec Ministry of Labour. The office is composed of the Labour
Commissioner General, an Assistant Labour Commissioner General,
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labor commissioners, and certification agents who variously determine
appropriate bargaining units and investigate allegations of unfair labor
practices. It is the task of the individual labor commissioner, vested with
all the powers and privileges of investigation accorded public inquiry
commissions, to receive evidence and rule on the conformity of the em-
ployer’s conduct with the Labour Code. A commissioner is empowered
to order an employer to cease and desist from unlawful conduct and to
reinstate with full back pay an employee who has been discharged on the
basis, in whole or in part, of anti-union motives. The decisions of labor
commissioners may be appealed to the Labour Court.
(ii) The Labour Court
The Labour Court is composed of judges chosen from the Court of
Quebec after consultation with the General Counsel of the Quebec Bar
and the Consultative Labour and Employment Council, a labor-man-
agement advisory body created by law.
As part of the judiciary, the court hears appeals from final decisions of
a labor commissioner and can affirm, amend, or substitute its own deci-
sion for any commissioner’s decision. The court’s decision is final. The
Labour Court also has exclusive competence to decide whether to im-
pose penal sanctions for violation of the Labour Code. Except in a case
where the procedures of the Labour Court offend the rules of natural
justice or jurisdictional limits, its decisions are final and binding, with
the same obligatory effect as a decision of the Superior Court. As with
any such decision, noncompliance can be addressed through contempt
of court proceedings.
4. RIGHTS OF PRIVATE ACTION
A. ACCESS TO ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS
Private parties have access to administrative, quasi-judicial or labor tri-
bunals by filing unfair labor practice charges, applications for certifica-
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tion to obtain collective bargaining rights, or other legal orders with the
relevant labor boards or, in Quebec, with the Office of the Labour Com-
missioner General. Individual workers, trade unions or employers who
claim that their rights have been infringed may file charges directly. For
example, an individual worker may bring charges against a union under
the law’s duty of fair representation provision. The labor boards and
commissioners are empowered to investigate complaints, to hear the
parties with respect to the dispute, and to direct a remedy. The parties
are responsible for their legal representation and costs.
In the United States, following a preliminary investigation of charges a
complaint may be issued, and at that point the Office of the General
Counsel of the NLRB prosecutes the case on behalf of the charging par-
ty (worker, union or employer). The board attorney effectively serves as
the charging party’s counsel in proceedings before an administrative
law judge and in any appeal to the full board or the courts. Mexico
maintains an Office of the Labor Public Defender, which provides free
legal representation and advice to workers bringing complaints before
a CAB.
B. ACCESS TO COURTS
The various Canadian labor authorities normally have exclusive juris-
diction to exercise the powers conferred by the appropriate labor acts or
codes and to determine all questions of fact or law in labor relations cas-
es. Disputes arising out of the rights and privileges stipulated in labor
relations statutes are almost completely barred from adjudication by the
general divisions of the courts. Decisions by Canada’s labor boards are
generally final and may not be appealed to the courts. However, they
may be subject to judicial review on constitutional or administrative law
grounds (see Appeals and Judicial Review, section 5B, below). In cases of
flagrant and deliberate violation of the law, private parties may seek to
initiate a prosecution to impose penal sanctions (see Structure and Func-
tioning of Canadian Labor Relations Boards, section 3A, above).
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5. PROCEDURAL GUARANTEES AND REMEDIES 
TO ENSURE ENFORCEMENT
A. DUE PROCESS
Constitutional and administrative law and statutory rules of due process
apply in labor law proceedings in all Canadian jurisdictions.
Canadian administrative law is a body of law which, among other
things, provides a set of procedural due process protections that apply to
actions by administrative tribunals, such as labor relations boards, which
affect a party’s legal rights or interests. Those due process protections are
generally referred to as rules of procedural fairness or natural justice. The
rules of natural justice or fairness are divided into two parts. The first is
the duty to give a person affected by a decision a reasonable opportuni-
ty to present his or her case. The second is the duty to listen fairly to
both sides and reach a decision free of bias.
1) Procedural Protections
Notice of legal proceedings must be afforded to a party with interests af-
fected by the proceedings. Parties have a right to present evidence and
arguments in support of their positions, either orally or in writing. Par-
ties also have the right to know and respond to the evidence and argu-
ments of other parties. Parties to disputes are typically represented by
counsel.
Labor relations boards are empowered to use subpoenas to secure ev-
idence and testimony in a case. In most unfair labor practice cases and
many certification cases, parties have the right to a full hearing of evi-
dence with examination and cross-examination of witnesses, particular-
ly where they do not agree on the facts giving rise to the case and the tri-
bunal must determine whose evidence is more credible.
Hearings are open to the public. Board, commissioner or tribunal de-
cisions are issued in writing and made public. Decisions generally set out
the reasons for conclusions reached, citing relevant facts and analysis of
the relevant law and its application to the facts. One provincial court
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ofappeals has ruled that the failure of a labor relations board to give rea-
sons for its decision when that decision resolves “substantial issues” is a
breach of natural justice.21
In all Canadian jurisdictions, witnesses in any hearing under labor re-
lations acts or codes are protected from dismissal, threat of dismissal, dis-
crimination, intimidation, coercion, or any other form of reprisal by the
employer and from discrimination, intimidation or coercion by the
union for giving evidence at such hearing.
The federal government and British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario,
Quebec, and Prince Edward Island have adopted legislation placing the
onus of proof on the employer to disprove some or all types of allegation
of unfair labor practice. In Nova Scotia the employer bears the burden of
proof in cases where the complainant establishes that it is reasonable to
believe that there may have been a failure by the employer to comply
with the prohibition on antiunion discrimination. The other Canadian
jurisdictions retain the common law principle of placing the burden of
proof on the party alleging an unfair labor practice.
In the United States, the burden is upon the charging party and the
NLRB’s general counsel to make a prima facie case of an unfair labor
practice, whereupon the burden shifts to the employer. Under Mexican
labor law, the burden of proof in cases involving freedom of association
and the right to organize rests with the employer. That is, the employ-
er must prove that any discharge or other adverse action against an em-
ployee meets one of the statutorily defined “just cause” definitions.
2) Independence and Impartiality of Decision Makers
The rules of natural justice in Canadian administrative law require that
tribunals be and appear to be independent at the institutional level. In
2 1 Future Inns Canada Inc. v. Nova Scotia (Labour Relations Board), 97 C.L.L.C. 220-
089 (N.S.C.A). Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was refused on Sep-
tember 25, 1997. However, since the Supreme Court has not ruled definitively on this
issue, earlier contrary rulings may arguably continue to apply in jurisdictions outside of
Nova Scotia.
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particular, tribunal members must have a combination of security of
tenure, security of remuneration, and administrative control sufficient
to ensure the independence of their decision making.22 Lack of inde-
pendence can void the decision of a tribunal. Members of Canadian
labor relations tribunals are generally appointed for terms fixed in the
relevant labor relations statute or established in government practice.
One court of appeals has ruled that a government order arbitrarily
terminating a labor relations board member’s appointment prior to the
expiry of its term is null and void at its inception.23
Canadian administrative law requires that tribunal members be free
from compulsion or pressure which could compromise their ability to de-
cide cases according to their own conscience and opinions. A decision of a
tribunal that has been subject to pressure from persons outside the tribunal,
be they government officials, private organizations or individuals, can be
declared void on judicial review. Procedures for consultation within a tri-
bunal must be carefully designed to ensure that the tribunal members who
hear a particular case remain free to decide that case without pressure or
compulsion to follow the views of other tribunal members.2 4
A tribunal member can be disqualified from serving in the event that
there is a reasonable apprehension of bias on that person’s part. Actual
bias need not be proven. Any pecuniary interest in the subject matter of
proceedings results in a presumption of bias. On tripartite hearing pan-
els, the union or employer representatives may not have a close relation-
ship to the litigants. For example, an employee of one of the litigants
would generally be disqualified from serving on the hearing panel. The
neutral chair presiding over the hearings should not have had any recent
22 Matsqui Indian Band v. Canadian Pacific Ltd. [1995] 1 S.C.R. 3.
23 Hewat v. The Queen in Right of Ontario (1998), 98 C.L.L.C. 220-37 (Ont. C.A.).
In this case the appointments of three board members were terminated prior to their ex-
piry and without showing just cause. The terminations were very controversial within
the Ontario labor relations community. The court did not reinstate the board members
in question because little or no time remained in their term appointments when the
judgment was rendered. However, the court’s ruling implies that, in future, injunctive
reinstatement may be available against similar terminations. This decision may be per-
suasive but is not binding in other jurisdictions, since decisions of provincial courts of
appeal have persuasive but not binding authority in other provinces. 
24 Consolidated Bathurst Packaging Ltd. v. International Woodworkers of America Lo -
cal 2-69, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 282.
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professional relationship with either litigant. Tribunal members must
decide cases on the basis of evidence presented and the relevant law,
without unreasonable hostility towards a party or case being presented.
B. APPEALS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
Canada’s federal and provincial labor boards have the power to recon-
sider a decision. Their initial rulings are usually final and binding, how-
ever, as grounds for reconsideration are quite restricted. Those grounds
are generally limited to matters such as the submission of important new
evidence that was not presented earlier for good and sufficient reasons or
argument that the original decision turned upon an incorrect conclusion
of law or policy.
In Quebec, an application for leave to appeal a commissioner’s deci-
sion can be brought, within 10 days of the decision, to the Labour
Court. A worker who obtains a commissioner’s reinstatement order fol-
lowing the determination of a discriminatory dismissal must immedi-
ately be reinstated, notwithstanding the appeal. The Labour Court is
empowered to summarily reject appeals that it finds abusive or dilatory.
It must render its decision within 90 days of taking the case under con-
sideration, normally after receipt of post-hearing briefs.
Except in Quebec, there is no right of appeal to a court. There is in all
Canadian jurisdictions, however, a limited access to judicial review.
Grounds for judicial review include: breach of administrative fairness or
natural justice; constitutional grounds; exceeding of the powers granted
to the board by the legislature; error of law in interpreting a law beyond
the scope of the board’s expected area of expertise; and patent unreason-
ableness of a decision made within the scope of the board’s expected area
of expertise. Courts have exercised restraint in reviewing board decisions
and normally defer to the specialized expertise of labor board officials in
balancing the competing interests in labor-management matters.
In the United States, parties may appeal an administrative law judge’s
decision to the National Labor Relations Board, which reviews the
record and may affirm or reverse, in whole or in part, the administra-
tive law judge’s ruling. Decisions of the NLRB are appealable to feder-
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al appeals courts and may be appealed from there to the U.S. Supreme
Court, by what is known as a writ for certiorari. However, decisions by
a regional director refusing to issue a complaint or to settle a case with
the charged party may be appealed only to the general counsel, who in-
frequently overrules a regional director. In Mexico, CAB decisions are
final and subject to judicial review only through an action for amparo.
Such actions may be based only upon certain limited grounds, the most
important of which are error of law, breach of due process, and exceed-
ing legally authorized powers.
C. SANCTIONS AND REMEDIES
Canada’s labor boards are granted broad powers to remedy unfair labor
practices. Those powers typically include but are not limited to the abil-
ity to issue cease and desist orders, orders to rectify the acts complained
of, and orders to reinstate or hire the employee concerned, with or with-
out compensation for lost earnings. Labor boards can order remedies for
legal violations by employers or unions.
In practice, Canada’s labor relations boards and commissioners have
used their remedial powers flexibly in response to a wide variety of situ-
ations. Some labor boards have ordered employers to post notices or
board decisions in the workplace advising employees of unfair labor
practice findings. In more serious cases of interference with the right to
organize, boards have ordered employers to provide unions with access
to updated lists of names and addresses of all bargaining unit employees,
and/or direct access to employees on the employer’s time and premises,
and have awarded money compensation to unions and employees for
many forms of economic loss, including wasted organizing and negoti-
ating costs and associated legal fees, prospective losses incurred in or-
ganizing employees at new locations where a plant had been unlawfully
moved to escape union organizing activity, and lost union dues. In se-
vere cases of antiunion discrimination, individual workers have been
awarded damages for antiunion harassment suffered at the hands of their
employers. In the federal jurisdiction, British Columbia, Manitoba,
New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, the board has the power to certify a
union without a representation vote, if the true wishes of the employees
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are no longer likely to be ascertained by that vote, generally as a result of
employer unfair labor practices.25
The duty to bargain in good faith has been enforced through orders
that contract proposals put forward in bad faith be struck from the bar-
gaining table and orders that a party that has refused to bargain prepare
and present a collective agreement which it is willing to sign.
Labor relations boards can also provide a range of remedies to safe-
guard the rights of workers in their relationship with a union. Where a
union denies membership to a worker on discriminatory grounds or in a
manner otherwise contrary to the labor relations act, the board may or-
der the union to change its admission procedures or, in some cases, may
require it to accept the worker as a member. Similarly, labor relations
boards can order unions to comply with statutory requirements to fur-
nish independently certified union financial statements at the request of
a union member. To remedy a situation in which a union has disci-
plined or expelled a member for reasons that are discriminatory, unrea-
sonable or unfair, labor relations boards may order such measures as re-
instatement of the worker as a union member or that the union pay
compensation to the affected worker. Labor relations boards may also
take a wide range of steps to remedy union breaches of the duty of fair
representation. For example, a board can award compensation for losses
incurred by the complainant or require that a worker’s case be taken to
arbitration by a union that had unfairly dropped it.
Union members may also apply to court for a remedy in cases where
they believe that their union has violated its own constitution. Courts can
issue awards for monetary compensation, injunctions preventing certain ac-
tions, or declarations that actions are illegal; they may also require an ac-
counting of funds. Where the conduct of a union election has been found
to be in breach of a union’s constitution, a court may issue a declaration or
an injunction, award damages for lost election expenses, or order a union
to organize new elections in accordance with its constitution.
Though sometimes designed with deterrence in mind, labor board
25 Recent amendments to Ontario’s Labor Relations Act, 1995, have removed the
Ontario Labour Relation’s Board’s long-standing power to grant this remedy. See Bill
31, Economic Development and Workplace Democracy Act. 1998, 2nd Session, 36th Legis-
lature, 1998 (assented to June 26, 1998).
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remedies in Canada are compensatory and not punitive in nature.
Nonetheless, certain provisions of the labor relations acts in Canada can
be enforced by prosecution. Similarly, a failure to comply with a labor
relations board order can also be enforced by prosecution. Generally
speaking, however, it is necessary to obtain the consent of the labor rela-
tions board or the minister of labor in order to initiate such prosecu-
tions, and they are seldom used. Fines are the most common form of
sanction. For example, a violation of the Ontario Labour Relations Act
may be punished by fines of up to $2,000 against an individual and
$25,000 against a union or corporation.
Labor relations board orders are generally enforceable as court orders
upon their being filed in the appropriate superior court. Property may
be seized to satisfy court orders, and refusal to comply with a court order
can be sanctioned through prosecution for contempt of court, an of-
fence punishable by fine or even imprisonment.
6. PUBLICATION MEASURES
A. PUBLICATION OF LAWS, REGULATIONS, PROCEDURES
AND ADMINISTRATIVE RULINGS
Laws and regulations of the federal government and the provinces are
published in their respective statute books and related official govern-
ment registers and gazettes. All are generally available in public libraries
and law libraries and from the government offices themselves. They are
also available online in commercial databases. Many are available on
government Internet sites.
Canada’s labor relations boards publish periodical reports containing
the full text or summaries of labor board and labor court decisions. The
Quebec Society for Juridical Information publishes court decisions, as
well as a specialized publication containing decisions of the labor com-
missioners and the Labour Court.26 Commercial houses also publish la-
26 Décisions du commissaire du travail, du Tribunal du Travail et de la Commission de
la reconnaissance des associations d’artistes (CT/TT/CRAA).
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bor law decisions from around the country, notably the Can. L.R.B.R.
(Canadian Labour Relations Boards Reports) and the C . L . L . C . (C a n a d i a n
Labour Law Cases, CCH Publications). Decisions are also available on-
line through commercial services.
B. NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY FOR COMMENT
Proposed changes in laws are generally published in advance and subject
to public comment through hearings, briefs presented to and meetings
with legislators, and appearances by witnesses before legislative commit-
tees. Trade unions and employer groups maintain offices and staffs to
make their views known to public officials on proposed legislation.
7. PUBLIC INFORMATION AND AWARENESS
A. AVAILABILITY OF PUBLIC INFORMATION
Canada’s several labor boards and authorities publish various guides,
booklets and bulletins explaining in lay persons’ terms the provisions of
the labor relations acts or codes and the practices of the relevant boards
or ministry and judicial branches. For example, the Alberta Labour Re-
lations Board has published 20 Information Bulletins covering all major
aspects of its activities. Other provinces provide similar information.
Concerned workers, employers or individuals may visit offices of the la-
bor relations boards and commissioners to obtain advice and assistance
from staff employees.
The labor boards and labor ministries also publish annual reports.
These typically explain the organization of the board and its legal man-
date. They also provide an overview of the board’s operations, short bi-
ographies of tribunal members, a summary of revenues and expendi-
tures, and summaries of significant labor law decisions for the year. The
reports generally contain statistical tables. These typically show the
numbers of each type of case processed by the board during the year.
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The reports of the Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia boards also
include statistics on the length of time required for different types of
proceeding.
B. PUBLIC EDUCATION
Labor relations officials and staff in all Canadian jurisdictions sponsor or
participate in conferences, workshops, seminars and other public events
to inform the labor relations community of their policies, rules and pro-
cedures. Each office maintains a public information official to respond
to inquiries from the press and the public.
C. PRIVATE INFORMATION SOURCES
Trade unions and employer organizations regularly publish reports and
newsletters for their members on labor relations matters. Canadian labor
lawyers representing unions, employers and individual workers, along
with labor law professors, produce the quarterly Canadian Labour and
Employment Law Journal with articles analyzing labor law developments.
Law schools and industrial relations schools and programs publish aca-
demic and policy journals dealing with labor issues including the right to
organize, the right to bargain collectively, and the right to strike.
D. NAALC COOPERATIVE ACTIVITIES
The Canadian National Administrative Office, in collaboration with the
NAOs of Mexico and the United States, has undertaken an extensive
program of cooperative activities relating to the industrial relations prin-
ciples of the NAALC. Members and staff of various Canadian federal
and provincial labor agencies have participated in these activities. Infor-
mation on such programs can be obtained from the NAO of Canada.
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MEXICO
1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION
A. BASIC LABOR POLICY
The Political Constitution of the United Mexican States , promulgated in
the city of Queretaro on February 5, 1917, is the country’s basic legal in-
strument. The early 20th century was marked by social and political
movements that culminated in the Mexican Revolution of the 1910-
1917 period. The revolution’s original objectives were to remove then-
President Porfirio Diaz from office and to establish constitutional recog-
nition of the principle that a president may not be reelected. This
movement expanded to become a genuine national revolution that gave
rise to an entirely new constitutional order.
Article 123 of the Mexican Constitution of 1917 was the first in the
world to enact social and economic rights in a country’s basic charter. Ar-
ticle 123 guarantees the right to organize, to bargain collectively and to
strike. It also secures a set of workers’ social and economic rights, includ-
ing the eight-hour day and the six-day week, pregnancy and childbirth
leave and pay, minimum wages, profit sharing, overtime pay, severance
pay, worker housing and recreation, and occupational safety and health.
A basic objective of Mexican labor law is to ensure stability in the em-
ployment relationship and, in particular, to provide protection to work-
ers against unjust dismissal. Article 123 of the Mexican Constitution
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contains protections against unjust dismissal and dismissal for joining a
union or a lawful strike. The Federal Labor Law (Ley Federal de Trabajo,
hereinafter FLL), which is the key labor relations statute in Mexico,
specifies 15 reasons for which an employer can dismiss a worker justifi-
ably and without liability (see The Individual Employment Relation-
ship, section 1D, below). Any reason for discharge not encompassed by
those specified in the FLL is per se unjustified. Since union activity is not
among the lawful justifications for discharge, discharge for union activ-
ity is contrary to the FLL. Just cause protection provides to some extent
a functional equivalent to the unfair labor practice doctrines found in
U.S. and Canadian labor law. 
B. LABOR LAW JURISDICTION
Article 123 of the Constitution originally granted state legislatures the
power to enact their own labor laws. However, this system created uncer-
tainty and, in 1929, Articles 73-X and 123 of the Constitution were
amended to grant the federal Congress exclusive power to enact labor laws.
Article 123 of the Constitution and the Federal Labor Law are both in
force throughout the country. However, the responsibility for enforce-
ment of Mexico’s labor law is shared between the federal government
and local governments, that is, the 31 states and the Federal District
(D.F.). The authority of local governments is contained in Section
XXXI of Article 123, which states that “labor law enforcement belongs
to the authorities of the states in their respective jurisdictions.” Except in
key industries or sectors reserved by the Constitution for the federal ju-
risdiction (see box 3.1), all enterprises fall within the enforcement juris-
diction of local authorities.
Maquiladora industries are concentrated along the U.S.-Mexico bor-
der, where more than 3,000 factories employ over one million workers;
because of their location, the maquiladora plants generally come under
the jurisdiction of state labor authorities and the state-based Concilia-
tion and Arbitration Boards (CABs) in Baja California, Sonora, Chi-
huahua, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, and Tamaulipas.1
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1 See Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social (STPS), Estadísticas Laborales - Primer 
Box 3.1
Federal Labor Law Enforcement Jurisdiction
Article 123, Section XXXI of the Mexican Constitution states:
“Labor law enforcement belongs to the authorities of the states in their
respective jurisdictions, but the following matters remain within the ex-
clusive competence of the federal authorities:
a) Branches of Industry and Services:
1. Textile 2. Electrical 3. Cinematography
4. Rubber 5. Sugar 6. Mining 
7. Foundries and 8. Energy 9. Petrochemical
steel mills…
10. Cement 11. Limestone 12. Automotive…
13. Chemical… 14. Pulp and paper 15. Vegetable oils
16. Packaged food 17. Brewing… 18. Railroads
processing…
19. Lumber… 20. Glass… 21. Tobacco…
22. Banks and credit unions
b) Enterprises:
1. Those administered directly or in decentralized form by the federal
government.
2. Those operating by virtue of a federal contract or concession, and
connected industries.
3. Those operating in federal zones or under federal jurisdiction, in ter-
ritorial waters or in those included in the exclusive economic zone of
the nation.
Also within exclusive competence of the federal authorities are en-
forcement of labor laws in matters related to disputes that affect two or
more federal entities, collective contracts that have been declared manda-
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Trimestre 1998 (México, D.F.: STPS Subsecretaría “B”, CGPEET, 1998), at p. 17,
Cuadro I.6; and Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática (INEGI), I n -
dustria Maquiladora de Exportación - Indicadores Mensuales, Número de Establecimientos
por Entidad Federativa and Personal Ocupado Según Categoría,(México, D.F.: INEGI,
http://dgcnesyp.inegi.gob.mx/BDINE/J15/J150001.HTM, December 15, 1998).
tory in more than one federal entity, employer obligations in education
matters under the terms of the law, and with respect to employers’ obli-
gations in matters of training and skills development, as well as safety and
health in the workplace, for which the federal authorities shall have the
assistance of state authorities when it concerns branches or activities within
state jurisdiction, according to the terms of the relevant regulatory law.”
The United States maintains a single federal system of labor relations
laws and enforcement applying throughout the country with preemp-
tive effect over state laws. The United States maintains a single Na-
tional Labor Relations Board to enforce U.S. law on rights to organize,
bargain collectively and strike. By contrast, in Canada, federal labor law
does not prevail over provincial labor law; federal and provincial labor
relations statutes apply in parallel across different jurisdictions. Canada
has 11 distinct labor law regimes. Each Canadian jurisdiction main-
tains its own separate agency to enforce its labor relations laws. 
C. LEGAL SOURCES OF LABOR RIGHTS
Article 133 of the Mexican Constitution establishes a hierarchy among
different types of law. The Constitution itself, followed by laws which
emanate from the Constitution and duly ratified international treaties,
form the supreme law of the land. These laws take precedence over reg-
ulations,2 local (state or D.F.) constitutions, and local statutes. Howev-
er, there are no local labor law statutes in Mexico (see Labor Law Juris-
diction, section 1B, above).
The law governing the labor relations of private sector workers in
Mexico is found in several legal instruments. The key sources are the P o -
litical Constitution of the United Mexican States, the Federal Labor Law,
regulations made thereunder, and international treaties approved by the
federal Senate and signed into law by the President of the Republic. In
addition, where there is no express provision in those sources or in their
provisions covering similar cases, Article 17 of the FLL provides that the
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2 Regulations serve to implement a particular statute, generally by providing further
detail with respect to and establishing rules for the application of the law. A regulation is
issued by the executive branch of the government. 
general principles of law, the general principles of social justice deriving
from Article 123 of the Constitution, case law and precedent, custom
and equity will be taken into account.
In Mexico’s civil law system, court decisions do not necessarily create
binding precedent which governs the decisions of lower courts and tri-
bunals. The Mexican Supreme Court and the federal appeals courts
(Collegiate Circuit Courts) create binding precedent, referred to as ju -
risprudencia firme, only when they issue five consecutive consistent deci-
sions on the same point. In the absence of such a series of decisions, a
court ruling binds only the parties to a particular case in question and
need not be followed in other cases. Instead of relying on prior decisions,
Mexican courts and tribunals tend to base decisions upon a doctrinal
analysis of sections of relevant statutes, articles of the Constitution, or
regulations, as the case may be. Mexican courts may also give significant
weight to the doctrinal opinions of respected jurists, who are usually law
professors or legal researchers.
The U.S. National Labor Relations Board and Canadian provincial la-
bor relations tribunals operate largely by deciding cases that establish
precedents to guide future conduct. However, the Canadian province
of Quebec, like Mexico, comes from a civil law tradition which places
more emphasis on codes than on judicial or administrative tribunal
precedents.
1) The Federal Constitution
Article 9 of the Mexican Constitution establishes the right of all citizens
to freely associate for lawful purposes. In addition, Article 123 provides
specific labor rights. Article 123(A), Section XVI (Articulo 123, Aparta -
do A, Fracción XVI) states that “both employers and workers shall have
the right to organize for the defense of their respective interests, by form-
ing unions, professional associations, etc.” The introductory clause of
Article 123 has been construed to protect the right to bargain collective-
ly, as it empowers the federal Congress to enact laws governing “every
contract of employment.” Section XVII of Article 123 guarantees work-
ers the right to strike, and Section XVIII defines a lawful strike as one
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that has as its objective “[obtaining] balance between the different fac-
tors of production, harmonizing the rights of labor with those of capi-
tal.” Article 123 also establishes the organization and competence of the
Conciliation and Arbitration Boards (CABs), the federal and state labor
boards with jurisdiction over labor disputes. 
The rights contained in Article 123 directly govern relations between
employers, employees and unions. Thus, for example, a union could en-
force directly against an employer its constitutional right to strike. How-
ever, since the FLL deals with labor relations matters in greater detail
than the Constitution, it is more often the key point of reference in labor
relations. 
In Canada and the United States, the constitutional rights of workers,
unions or any other private parties generally do not offer direct protec-
tion against interference by other private parties. Constitutional rights
protect only against interference by government action. They do not
directly govern relations between private parties and cannot be en-
forced against private parties. 
2) The Federal Labor Law
The first comprehensive Federal Labor Law was passed in 1931. Its most
important forerunners were laws and regulations adopted in various
states and cities in the early 20th century. The textile industry and oth-
er key sectors were the focus of early efforts to organize and bargain col-
lectively. During the period between the 1917 Constitution and passage
of the first FLL in 1931, these sectors were regulated mainly by the states
and municipalities. In 1925, the federal government sponsored a con-
vocation of workers and employers in the cotton textile industry to stan-
dardize terms and conditions of employment in the sector. Terms and
conditions were then overseen by labor-management factory commit-
tees, district committees, and a joint national commission.
The revised FLL of 1970 defines the individual and collective em-
ployment relationship and regulates organizing, collective bargaining
and strikes. The FLL also governs the makeup and functioning of the
tripartite CABs that administer labor justice and provide conciliation,
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mediation and arbitration services. In addition to labor and industrial
relations, the FLL also covers minimum wages, hours of work and over-
time, child labor, protection for working women, workplace safety and
health, profit sharing, job training, and other labor matters. 
3) International Treaties
Under the Mexican Constitution, international treaties signed by the
President of the Republic and ratified by the Senate, including those
dealing with labor matters, are considered “self-executing” and become
an integral part of domestic law insofar as they do not contravene the
Constitution. In addition, Article 6 of the FLL provides that treaties
concluded and approved under Article 133 of the Constitution shall ap-
ply to labor relations insofar as they are to the workers’ advantage. 
The most important, albeit not the only, such international treaties
are the Conventions of the International Labor Organization (ILO).
The key ILO conventions relating to freedom of association and the
rights to organize, to bargain collectively and to strike are the Freedom
of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention
(No. 87) and the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Conven-
tion (No. 98). Mexico has ratified Convention No. 87.
Canada has ratified the Freedom of Association and Protection of the
Right to Organize Convention (No. 87), but the text of that Conven-
tion has not been incorporated directly into Canadian domestic law.
Canada has not ratified Convention No. 98. The United States has rat-
ified neither Convention No. 87 nor Convention No. 98.
D. THE INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP
The individual employment relationship in the private sector in Mexico
is governed by the Constitution and the Federal Labor Law. Detailed as-
pects of every employee’s job are defined and regulated by law. The
Constitution, as already noted, guarantees the rights to organize, bargain
and strike, the eight-hour day and the six-day week, paid pregnancy and
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childbirth leave, overtime pay, profit sharing, housing funds, health and
safety protection, and compensation for unjust discharge. In addition to
such matters the FLL regulates work shifts, holidays, vacations, promo-
tion standards, and other working conditions.
In Mexico every employee works under an individual contract of em-
ployment incorporating minimal terms specified in the Constitution
and the FLL, whether or not the contract is written and whether or not
the employee is also covered by a collective agreement. Individuals can
negotiate for terms and conditions superior, but not inferior, to those re-
quired by law for all individual contracts of employment.
Under Mexican law, collective contracts between a union and em-
ployer exist alongside each worker’s individual contract of employment.
The collective contract can be a standardization of the individual con-
tracts. Under general principles of Mexican labor law recognized under
the FLL (see Legal Sources of Labor Rights, section 1C, above), a col-
lective contract takes precedence over an individual contract, given the
superior general interest of workers in the collective contract. Mexican
law does not recognize modifications or exceptions to collective contract
terms that are negotiated between an employer and an individual worker.
In Canada and the United States, union-represented employees cannot
have individual employment contracts; their terms and conditions of
employment are set solely by the collective bargaining agreement and
any legislated minimum labor standards.
Every Mexican worker who enters into employment has a contract of
employment for an indefinite term unless the parties agree at the time
of hiring to a specific contract duration. A contract for a specific dura-
tion can be made only in situations stipulated in the FLL, such as where
the work to be done is of a temporary nature, or where the contract is to
provide a temporary substitute for another employee (art. 37). A work-
er is presumed to have a permanent employment contract which can be
terminated or modified — including changes in pay or job duties – only
in accordance with the law and subject to legal proceedings.
Employment contracts can be changed on agreement of the parties.
However, a general labor law norm applicable under the FLL provides
that the employment contract of a worker cannot be amended so as to
render its terms less advantageous to the worker. Moreover, a worker
whose wages are reduced by his or her employer is entitled to terminate
his or her employment and claim severance benefits (indemnización). A
Conciliation and Arbitration Board may, however, on application by an
employer, modify working conditions in an individual employment
contract where economic circumstances justify such action, provided
that no contract may provide terms less advantageous to an employee
than the conditions of work stipulated in the FLL. Conversely, a CAB
may, on application by a worker, modify the worker’s conditions of
work if the worker’s wages are not sufficiently remunerative, his or her
hours of work are excessive, or there are special economic circumstances
justifying such action.
Article 123, Section XXI of the Constitution and Title II of the FLL
provide that a worker may not be dismissed without just cause and may
claim reinstatement or compensation to remedy unjust dismissal. The
FLL specifies 15 just causes for discharging a worker without liability
(see box 3.2, below).
In the United States, most nonunionized employees are employed “at
will,” which means that, subject to certain statutory exceptions such as
antidiscrimination laws and other limited “public policy” exceptions,
their contract of employment can be terminated without notice or sev-
erance pay, at any time, for any reason. By contrast, unionized employ-
ees are typically covered by collective bargaining contract clauses stipu-
lating that they may be discharged only for “just cause.” In Canada, the
employment-at-will doctrine does not apply. Those covered by collec-
tive agreements (approximately 35 percent of the labor force) can gen-
erally have their employment terminated only for “just cause.” More-
over, statutory termination notice requirements are applicable to all
employees, as are antidiscrimination laws and a common law judicial
requirement of reasonable notice (or pay in lieu of notice) for any ter-
mination of an employment contract which is for an indefinite term.
Any discharged worker can challenge his or her discharge by filing a
complaint with the relevant CAB. At the time that the worker files the
complaint, he or she must elect either to claim reinstatement or to claim
a payment of three months’ wages (indemnización). The CAB will first
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seek to settle the case and, if the case is not settled, will hold a hearing to
determine whether the employer can prove one of the 15 just causes for
discharge. If the worker claims reinstatement and the employer fails to
prove cause for discharge, the CAB will order that the worker be rein-
stated in his or her employment and be paid wages in arrears from the
date of discharge to the date that the employer complies with the order. 
In discharge cases the CAB will either uphold the discharge without
compensation or, depending on which remedy the worker has elected to
pursue, order the reinstatement or indemnización of the worker. It will
not review the reasonableness of the penalty of discharge.
In some Canadian jurisdictions workers may claim statutory rights to
severance pay, but only in the event of mass terminations of employ-
ment. There is no statutory right to severance pay in the United States.
On the other hand, in both Canada and the United States government-
sponsored unemployment insurance programs replace a part (in Cana-
da 50-55%, in the U.S. generally about 50%) of a worker’s wages for a
period of time (in Canada between 14 and 45 weeks, in the U.S. gener-
ally up to a maximum of 26 weeks) in the event of involuntary termi-
nation of employment. There is no counterpart to these programs in
Mexico.
Many cases of unjust discharge are processed each year by the more
than 100 federal and state CABs throughout Mexico. Workers are enti-
tled to free legal assistance from the Federal Office of the Labor Public
Defender of the Mexican Department of Labor and Social Welfare
(STPS) (in matters of federal jurisdiction) and from similar functionar-
ies of the state departments of labor (in matters of state jurisdiction).
Many workers also turn to private attorneys who specialize in such cases
and who are paid from the proceeds of the severance pay won by such
workers.
Workers usually accept severance pay in liquidation of their claim for
reinstatement. According to data from the Federal Office of the Labor
Public Defender, only one worker among 154 who won a claim for un-
justified discharge in 1995 opted for reinstatement.3 In a case study of
3 Information supplied to the Secretariat by the Federal Office of the Labor Public
Defender of the Mexican Department of Labor and Social Welfare.
two state CABs, researchers examined 75 cases of individual claims of
unjustified dismissal. None of the workers who prevailed in those cases
opted for reinstatement.4
In addition to any severance pay to which he or she may be entitled,
a worker who has 15 or more years of service with an employer is enti-
tled, upon resigning or being discharged for any reason, to a statutory
seniority allowance of 12 days’ pay per year of service. The upper limit
for the daily salary amount used to calculate this payment is two times
the daily minimum wage.
Under Article 49 of the FLL, an employer is exempted from the obli-
gation to reinstate certain types of worker. These include workers em-
ployed in the enterprise for less than one year, confidential employees,
domestic servants, and casual workers. In such cases the CAB will order
the employer to give the worker compensation comprising a payment
of three months’ wages, a payment of 20 days’ wages per year of senior-
ity, the statutory seniority allowance (12 days’ pay per year of service)
and arrears of wages from the date of discharge to the date on which
compensation is paid.
The FLL specifies nine justified reasons for a worker to quit em-
ployment and still receive statutory severance pay (i n d e m n i z a c i ó n) ,
which is normally three months’ pay plus 20 days’ pay for each year of
service (see boxes 3.2 and 3.3). A worker may claim any severance pay
owing after resignation by filing a complaint with the relevant CAB in
order to collect it. The CAB will seek to settle any case brought before
it. If the case is not settled, the CAB will hold a hearing, receiving and
evaluating the evidence to determine whether the reason for quitting
falls within one of the definitions of just cause. If the CAB finds that
the worker was justified in quitting, it will order the employer to pay
the amounts owing.
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Box 3.2
Just Cause for Termination of Employment in Mexican Labor Law 
Article 47 of the FLL defines the following 15 just causes for terminating
an individual contract of employment: 
• falsification of documents or statements on which the worker bases his
or her application for employment;
• misconduct at work directed at the employer, members of the employ-
er’s family, or managers;
• misconduct directed at coworkers that upsets workplace discipline;
• misconduct outside of work directed at the employer, members of the
employer’s family, or managers;
• intentional material damage;
• material damage through negligence;
• inexcusable breach of workplace safety; 
• immoral acts in the workplace;
• revelation of trade secrets;
• three absences within 30 days without permission or without just cause;
• disobeying management orders without just cause;
• refusal to obey health and safety rules;
• working under the influence of alcohol or drugs (except medical pre-
scriptions);
• imprisonment under sentence of law;
• any equally grave act with similar workplace consequences.
The employer must provide the worker with a written statement of
reasons for discharge. If the worker refuses to accept it, the employer
must file it with the CAB within five days.
Article 51 of the FLL specifies nine just causes for a worker to terminate
employment and receive severance pay of three months’ pay plus 20 days’
pay for each year of service:
• deception by the employer about working conditions;
• mistreatment by the employer or agents of the employer within the
workplace against the worker or members of the worker’s family;
• mistreatment by the employer or agents of the employer outside the
workplace against the worker or members of the worker’s family; 
• reduction in the worker’s salary;
• failure to provide proper pay on the agreed date and location;
• malicious damage by the employer to the worker’s personal tools or
equipment;
• the existence of a serious danger to health and safety of the worker or his
or her family;
• negligence by the employer in compromising health and safety; 
• equally grave actions with similar consequences.
E. EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE
In general, the labor rights contained in the Constitution extend to
a l l workers within the national territory regardless of occupation or
s t a t u s .
Under the Federal Labor Law, any person who personally performs
subordinate work for another individual or legal person in return for
remuneration, except family members employed in a family enterprise,
has the rights to organize, to bargain collectively, and to strike. Work-
ers whose jobs are legally classified as “confidential,” such as managers,
general supervisors or workers in a position of trust, are legally pre-
vented from joining other workers’ unions and in practice rarely form
u n i o n s .
In addition to managers, supervisors, agricultural workers and domes-
tic employees, U.S. labor law generally excludes all independent con-
tractors. Canadian labor relations statutes exclude managers and those
employed in a confidential capacity in matters relating to labor rela-
tions. Some Canadian jurisdictions also exclude specific occupations
such as domestic servants, agricultural workers, or members of such
professions as law or medicine. In much of Canada, low-level supervi-
sors and contractors in a position of economic dependence are covered
by labor relations law.
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2. LEVELS OF PROTECTION – SUBSTANTIVE LABOR LAWS
A. LABOR PRINCIPLE 1 – FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND THE RIGHT TO
ORGANIZE
1) Legal Foundations
As noted above (see section 1C, Legal Sources of Labor Rights), the
Mexican Constitution guarantees freedom of association and the right
to organize.
The Federal Labor Law of 1970 defines unions as “the association of
workers or employers, constituted for the study, betterment and defense
of their respective interests” (art. 356) and establishes “the right to form
unions without need for previous authorization” (art. 357). Article 359
declares that “unions have the right to adopt their own constitutions and
bylaws, to elect freely their representatives, to organize their administra-
tion and activities and to formulate their program of action.” Unions re-
quire legal registration to obtain the status needed to engage in contrac-
tual activities or legal proceedings on behalf of their members (see Legal
Status of Unions, section 2A.3 below).
Workers may also form a temporary “coalition” to defend their inter-
ests, without going through the formality of forming a trade union.
Such coalitions do not have the same legal capacity as a registered union
to enter into contracts or engage in business transactions, but they may
act much as unions do in participating in profit sharing and health and
safety committees and negotiating for improvements in working condi-
tions. They may also undertake a strike to achieve their demands, even
without the same juridical capacity as a formal union.
2) The Formation and Dissolution of Unions
Under the FLL, any group of 20 or more workers in active employment
may form a trade union without the need for previous authorization.
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(i) Types of Union in Mexico
The FLL specifies various types of trade union. Unions must meet one
of these definitions: 
1) an enterprise union, made up of workers in a single company;
2) a guild union or craft union, made up of workers in the same
occupation, craft or specialty, who may work for different com-
panies;
3) an industrial union, made up of workers in two or more companies
in the same industrial sector;
4) a national industrial union, made up of workers in one or more
companies in the same industrial sector operating in two or
more states;
5) a general labor union, made up of workers with different occupa-
tions in those small localities where the 20-worker minimum
for union formation cannot be met by workers in the same occu-
pation.
Trade unions may join together in federations and confederations.
Federations are normally formed at the state level. Confederations are
formed at the national level or at a multistate level.
The dissolution of a union must be done by majority vote of at least
two-thirds of the union membership in an assembly called for this pur-
pose. Only a CAB order can ultimately dissolve a union.
3) Legal Status of Unions 
Article 374 of the FLL expressly defines unions as “persons” before the
law, with legal capacity to acquire property, enter into contracts, and de-
fend their legal rights before courts and tribunals.
(i) Registration of Unions
In Mexico, trade unions, like any other legal “person”, including busi-
nesses, civic associations, cooperatives and all other nongovernmental
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organizations, require a public act of state called “registration.” In prac-
tice, a union requires registration to obtain the status needed to engage
in most legal, contractual or commercial activities on behalf of its mem-
bers. Without registration, unions can still hold meetings, elect officers,
make demands on employers, issue public statements and the like, in
keeping with the principle of freedom of association. However, other
parties need not respond to their actions, since unregistered unions are
treated as lacking the required legal capacity.
Union registration is the key to collective bargaining in Mexico.
Once registered, unions can obtain title to collective contracts with em-
ployers (see Acquisition of Title to a Collective Contract, section 2B.2,
below), acquire property, and otherwise undertake action in keeping
with the defense of their members’ interests, including legal action.
Article 365 of the FLL requires unions within the federal jurisdiction
to register with the STPS General Directorate of Registry of Associations
and Unions within local (state or Federal District) jurisdiction to regis-
ter with the local-level CABs. In the federal jurisdiction, the STPS in-
forms the relevant federal CAB of the union’s registration.
The legal requirements for obtaining registration are minimal, and
the granting of registration should be a purely administrative act. Article
366 of the FLL states that union registration may be refused only if: (1)
the union does not have the aims and objects required by Article 356 of
the FLL; (2) the union does not have the number of constituent mem-
bers required by Article 364 of the FLL; or (3) the documents listed in
Article 365 of the FLL are not submitted to the CAB or STPS, as the
case may be. As long as the union complies with filing requirements, a
union can be denied registration only if its stated purposes deviate from
those related to the nature of a trade union, or when the union cannot
prove that it has met legal minimum membership requirements.
Article 356 defines a trade union as an association of workers (or em-
ployers) set up for the study, improvement and defense of their respec-
tive interests. Article 365 requires that an applicant for registration
submit in duplicate: (1) an authorized copy of the minutes of the con-
stituent assembly; (2) a list showing the number of members indicating
their names and addresses and the names and addresses of their employ-
ers, enterprises, or establishments in which they are employed; (3) an
authorized copy of the union’s bylaws; and (4) an authorized copy of the
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minutes of the meeting at which the board of directors was elected.
Article 364 provides that any group of 20 or more workers in active em-
ployment may register a union of which they are members. A union
must be one of the five types listed in Article 360 of the FLL (see The
Formation and Dissolution of Unions, section 2A.2, above). This means
that the group of workers registering the union must be composed of the
type of workers of which the type of union that they seek to register
must consist. For example, those registering a craft union must be work-
ers of the same occupation, trade or craft, and those registering an
enterprise union must all be employed in the same enterprise. An indus-
trial union must consist of workers who are employed in two or more
enterprises in the same branch of industry. Provided that they meet
the above requirements, the workers registering a union need not con-
stitute a majority of any particular workforce.
There is controversy in Mexico over whether CABs have a discretion
to deny union registration on grounds not specifically set out in Article
366. Some CABs have refused registration on the basis that a registered
union already exists in the workplace of the workers seeking to register
the new union, and some authorities maintain that this approach com-
plies with Mexican labor law. Other experts disagree. The Supreme
Court of Mexico has recently stated that limiting the number of unions
that may exist in a workplace is contrary to the constitutional protection
of freedom of association and the right to organize and that denying reg-
istration on the basis that a union already exists in a workplace would al-
so violate those protections.5 These decisions are not yet jurisprudencia
firme however (see Legal Sources of Labor Rights, section 1C, above).
Some CABs have used denial of registration to enforce the substantive
requirements for the contents of union bylaws such as those set out in
Article 371 (see Freedom of Association within Unions, section 2A.7,
below). This interpretation of the FLL is also controversial.
The CAB will generally verify that a registering union meets the min-
imum of 20 workers in active employment by consulting employer pay-
roll records, though other means of proof may be used. Some Mexican
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experts have questioned the legality and effectiveness of relying upon
inspection of employer records or employer testimony to verify the em-
ployment status of union members.6 Article 364 of the FLL requires that
the CAB include in its count those workers whose employment was ter-
minated or who received notice of dismissal at any time between 30 days
preceding the date on which the application for registration is made and
the date on which such registration is granted.
Once a union has been registered, it may obtain title to a collective
contract on behalf of appropriate groups of workers. For example, an en-
terprise union may hold an agreement only on behalf of workers in the
same enterprise. A union registered as a craft union may hold title to any
number of collective contracts made on behalf of persons in the same oc-
cupation. An industrial union may hold collective contracts with any
number of employers within the same industry.
The authorities must resolve registration applications within 60 days.
If they fail to respond, registration is considered to have been approved
for all legal effects.
Federations and confederations must register as labor organizations
with the STPS. Registration of a trade union federation or confederation
is an administrative process in which officials simply verify that the by-
laws of the federation or confederation address the subjects required
by articles 371 and 383 of the FLL.
Dissolution or cancellation of union registration cannot take place
by a simple administrative act. Instead, there must be a legal proceeding
before the relevant CAB, fulfilling strict requirements for procedural
and financial termination of union affairs. A union’s registration may
be cancelled only if the union ceases to fulfill the statutory requirements
for its objects and organizational form or if it is properly dissolved by its
m e m b e r s .
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4) Union Self-Governance
Under Mexican labor law unions are free to act within the mandate of
their constitution and bylaws under the direction of their own leader-
ship. This principle of trade union autonomy is an important element of
Mexican labor law. Except for the intervention of the authorities with
respect to union registration, government interventions are not contem-
plated in the FLL. As already noted, Article 359 of the FLL grants
unions the right to establish their constitution and bylaws, to freely elect
their representatives, to organize their administration and activities, and
to formulate their program of action.
Article 378 of the FLL provides that unions cannot intervene in reli-
gious activities or engage in for-profit commercial ventures. Some
unions, however, have negotiated with employers to obtain the right to
administer subcontracting arrangements for parts of the employer’s
business. In practice, these arrangements have brought problems in their
administration, so many unions have abandoned these ventures.
5) Political and Legislative Activities of Unions
Workers and unions in Mexico may engage in political and legislative
activity in accordance with Article 9 of the Constitution, which guaran-
tees the right of association for any legal objective. Unions may establish
in their own constitution and bylaws the extent and nature of their po-
litical activities and are free to decide how to spend union funds. In prac-
tice, many unions are aligned with particular political parties and work
closely with them on their legislative and administrative agendas.
6) Union Membership and Dues
The FLL provides that no one is required under the law to belong or not
belong to a labor organization. However, Article 395 of the FLL permits
an employer to agree with a union, in a collective bargaining contract, to
hire only members of that union. The employer may also agree with the
union to discharge any employee who resigns or is expelled from the
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union. This agreement is known as an “exclusion clause” in Mexican la-
bor discourse. A union’s internal rules may provide for the expulsion of
members who join or support another union. In general, an employee
who is discharged pursuant to an exclusion clause may not claim sever-
ance pay or reinstatement. However, under Article 123, Section XXII of
the Constitution a worker may claim such remedies if he or she is dis-
missed pursuant to an exclusion clause for joining or supporting a union
during the process of forming and seeking to register that union. An ex-
clusion clause may not be applied to require the dismissal of employees
in the service of the employer before such a clause was negotiated. How-
ever, an employer and a registered union may agree to implement such a
clause prior to the hiring of any workers at the employer’s establishment. 
The exclusion clause is a controversial element of Mexican labor law.
Supporters believe that the clause is necessary to maintain worker unity
to effectively confront employer power. Critics argue that the clause
serves as an instrument of control over potential union dissidents. Some
jurists consider exclusion clauses to unconstitutionally interfere with
freedom of association guarantees.
In the United States an employer may not discharge or discriminate
against an employee because that employee has lost or been denied
union membership, unless the employee lost or was denied member-
ship due to his or her failure to pay uniformly required union dues. In
Canada, an employer may not discharge or discriminate against such an
employee if he or she lost or was denied union membership because he
or she exercised rights under labor law, including the right to join or as-
sociate with another union. 
The FLL requires employers to deduct from union members’ pay and
remit to the union ordinary union dues payments. Ordinary union dues
are those which are paid at regular intervals to support the normal oper-
ating expenses of the union. A worker who is not a union member may
not be required to pay union dues. There are no legal restrictions on a
union’s ability to allocate funds to otherwise lawful activities, whether
collective bargaining related or political, except that unions may not en-
gage in for-profit activity or intervene in religious affairs (see Union Self-
Governance, section 2A.4, above).
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In the United States, compulsory union dues or fee payment is left to
the bargaining parties, except in 21 “right-to-work” states. These states
have exercised an option under federal labor law to prohibit negotiation
of a union security clause requiring either membership in a union or
payment of an amount equal to union dues by those workers in a
union’s bargaining unit who choose not to become union members. In
all U.S. states, unions are prevented from spending any portion of a
nonmember’s dues on political purposes if that nonmember objects to
such expenditures. In Canada the majority of labor relations statutes re-
quire that, at the request of the union, the employer deduct the amount
of regular union dues from the wages of each worker in a bargaining
unit that it represents. All but one of the Canadian jurisdictions allow
unions to decide whether and how to spend dues revenue, both from
union members and nonmembers, for political purposes.
7) Freedom of Association within Unions
Article 371 of the FLL sets out a list of subjects which a union’s bylaws
must address, including such matters as the rights and obligations of
members; the mode of payment and amount of union dues; and rules
for the administration, acquisition and alienation of property constitut-
ing the assets of the union. A union member has a legal right to ensure
that these bylaws are followed and may file a complaint with the relevant
CAB to do so.
Article 371 does not mandate that any particular member rights be
included in union bylaws, with two exceptions. First, it provides the fol-
lowing procedural protections for union members facing expulsion from
the union:
(a) a meeting of the workers shall be called for the sole purpose of in-
forming them of expulsion;
(b) in the case of trade unions subdivided into sections, the expulsion
procedure shall be carried out at a meeting of the section con-
cerned; the motion of expulsion shall be submitted to the workers
of each one of the sections of the trade union for their decision;
(c) the worker concerned shall be entitled to make a statement in his
or her defense in accordance with the bylaws;
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(d) the meeting shall hear the evidence on which the motion of ex-
pulsion is based and the evidence submitted by the worker con-
cerned;
(e) workers shall not be represented by proxy or vote by correspon-
dence or in writing;
(f) expulsion shall be approved by a two-thirds majority of the total
membership of the trade union; and 
(g) expulsion may be decided only in those cases expressly stipulated
in the bylaws, duly evidenced and exactly applicable to the case.
Article 371(VIII) also provides a mechanism whereby the members of
a union can convoke, by petition of workers representing at least 33 per-
cent of the total membership of the union, a general meeting of the
union if the board of directors of the union fails to do so. 
As noted above (see Union Membership and Dues, section 2A.6), the
Mexican Constitution provides remedies to workers against dismissal
pursuant to an exclusion clause for joining or supporting a union during
the formation or registration of that union.
Article 373 of the FLL requires the board of directors of a union to
provide a complete and detailed account of the administration of the
union’s assets to a general meeting of the union at least once every six
months. Unions must report to the relevant CAB the makeup of their
leadership, as well as registering new union members and any changes
in leadership. The CABs treat union membership lists as confidential.
Unions also must report any change in their constitution or bylaws
and respond to inquiries from the authorities about any union-related
a c t i o n s .
In the United States the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act (LMRDA) includes a comprehensive union member’s “bill of
rights” regulating internal union democracy. The LMRDA protects
free speech rights in union affairs; the right to vote on union dues; the
right to run for union office; the right to obtain the union’s charter, by-
laws and a copy of the collective bargaining agreement; the right to ob-
tain an accounting of union finances; and the right to union elections
free of intimidation or fraud. Canada does not regulate internal union
democratic processes as closely as the United States. Most Canadian ju-
risdictions require unions to provide their members with a copy of the
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union’s audited financial statements and prohibit unions from retaliat-
ing by seeking dismissal under union security clauses against bargain-
ing unit members for exercising labor law rights. Most of the other
rights provided to U.S. unionists under the LMRDA are left to the
discretion of Canadian unions as to their inclusion in the union’s con-
stitution.
B. LABOR PRINCIPLE 2 – THE RIGHT TO BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY
1) Legal Foundations
The Constitution does not explicitly mention the right to bargain collec-
tively. However, the introductory clause of Article 123 (A) of the Con-
stitution, which promotes “social organization for labor” and empowers
the federal Congress to “enact labor laws which shall apply… in a gener-
al way to all labor contracts,” has been interpreted to provide a constitu-
tional basis for the right to and regulation of collective bargaining.
The 1931 FLL incorporated the definition of the collective contract
developed in earlier state legislation, defining it as “any agreement con-
cluded between one or more trade unions of workers and one or several
employers, for the purpose of establishing the conditions under which
work will be performed in one or more companies or establishments.”
This remains the definition in Article 386 of the 1970 FLL. Articles 386
to 469 of the FLL set out the main provisions relevant to collective bar-
gaining in Mexico.
2) Acquisition of Title to a Collective Contract
The FLL definition of a collective contract establishes that only trade
unions can enter into such an agreement. The union that signs a collec-
tive contract is considered to hold title to the agreement. Its counterpart
may be a single employer, a multiemployer group, or a union of em-
ployers, depending on the type of union (see The Formation and Disso-
lution of Unions, in section 2A.2, above). A collective contract can be
negotiated with a single facility or with a multifacility employer, or a
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combination of the two, again depending on the type of registration the
union holds.
A union that holds title to a collective agreement has the exclusive
right to administer, enforce and renegotiate its terms. Moreover, the col-
lective contract is considered a right of workers as a class and must be ex-
tended to cover all workers in the enterprise (except managers and cer-
tain confidential employees), whether or not they are members of the
union that negotiates the collective contract. This rule does not apply to
the collective contracts of craft unions.
Unlike in Canada and the United States, where the scope of the group
represented by the union is based on the relatively fluid criterion of bar-
gaining unit appropriateness, in Mexico the coverage of a collective
agreement to which a union holds title is prescribed by the FLL and
depends primarily on the type of union.
In Mexico, a union may be formed and registered, may bargain collec-
tively, and may obtain title to a collective agreement without an election
or other evidence that it has the support of a majority of the workers that
it seeks to represent. There may be more than one registered union in a
given workplace (see, however, Union Membership and Dues, section
2A.6, above).
In Canada and the United States a union requires the support of a ma-
jority of any group of workers that it seeks to represent before engaging
in collective bargaining on their behalf. In Mexico, it is only when a
union is faced with either a challenge by another union seeking title to
the collective contract (see immediately below) or a challenge by an em-
ployer to its majority support for a strike (see Regulation of the Right to
Strike, section 2C.3, below) that it may be legally required to demon-
strate that it has the majority support of the workers it represents.
(i) Challenging the Title of Another Union
Any union of a type appropriate to the workers in question can at any
time seek support from workers covered by a collective contract and file
with the relevant CAB a challenge to the incumbent union’s title to that
contract. The CAB will then hold hearings into the challenge. If the in-
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cumbent union does not prove its majority support during such pro-
ceedings, it will lose title to the collective contract, and thus lose the
right to administer and negotiate revisions to it. The union that demon-
strates majority support obtains or maintains title to the contract, as the
case may be. In deciding such challenges, a CAB may supervise a vote by
the workers, known as a recuento, in order to obtain evidence of which
union enjoys majority support. A recuento will not necessarily be con-
ducted if other evidence is sufficient to prove majority support. If a vote
is held, it may be carried out by secret ballot or by public declaration of
support. The decision to conduct a recuento by secret ballot or not is at
the discretion of the CAB. The FLL does not specify a required voting
procedure. In practice worker votes are most often recorded publicly.
U.S. labor law provides that no union representation election may take
place within one year of an earlier election in the same bargaining unit.
Canadian labor law generally provides that, when a union’s application
for certification is unsuccessful, that union may be temporarily barred
from making another application for certification for substantially the
same bargaining unit. The length of the bar varies by jurisdiction but is
most often less than one year.
If multiple-enterprise or industrial unions compete for representation in
a single workplace, the collective contract must be concluded with the
union having the greatest number of members among workers em-
ployed in the enterprise (FLL art. 388). If there are multiple craft
unions, the employer may make a collective contract with a group of
unions representing a majority of the craft workers, as long as the rest of
the craft unions agree. If they do not, each craft union may negotiate a
separate collective contract. If a craft union competes with an enterprise
union, it may negotiate separately as long as it has more members than
the number of workers of that craft who prefer the enterprise union;
otherwise, the enterprise union will bargain for everyone.
3) The Collective Bargaining Process
Collective contracts generally have an unlimited duration. Salary scales
must be revisable on a yearly basis (FLL art. 399BIS). Either party may
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request revision of the collective contract. A request for revision must be
made at least 60 days before the expiry of a collective contract made for
a special fixed period, if such period does not exceed two years; or at least
60 days before the conclusion of a contract’s second year, in the case of
a contract for a specified period of time longer than two years or an un-
specified period of time, or for a specified or unspecified piece of work.
Collective contract negotiations thus generally take place at two-year in-
tervals. A request for revision of the salary scale must be made at least 30
days prior to the end of its one-year term. If neither party requests a
modification, or if the union does not exercise its right to strike for its
proposed changes, the collective contract is extended for a period equal
to its previous term.
(i) Obligation to Bargain
When an employer is asked by a union to sign a collective contract and
refuses to do so, the workers may exercise their right to strike (FLL art.
387 and art. 450). In practice, this generally compels the employer to
engage in bargaining and to conclude a collective contract with the
union. Unions must file a notice of strike with the relevant CAB prior to
striking (see Strike Procedures, in section 2C.3, below). Unions often
file a notice of strike with the relevant CAB at or soon after the begin-
ning of negotiations.
U.S. and Canadian labor laws establish a legal “duty to bargain in good
faith” on the part of employers. Unlike Canadian and U.S. labor law,
Mexican labor law does not create a legal duty to bargain. Mexican la-
bor law enforcement thus does not deal with negotiating practices or
refusals to bargain per se. Rather, legal enforcement deals with the re-
sults of an employer’s refusal to sign the contract sought by the union,
if the refusal results in a strike. The legal enforcement role of the CAB
in these situations is to verify that the strike meets legal requirements
and, if so, to enforce the right to strike by granting the workers the nec-
essary guarantees and assistance to halt company operations (see Regu-
lation of the Right to Strike, section 2C.3, and Prohibition of Striker
Replacement, section 2C.5, below).
122 MEXICO: LEVELS OF PROTECTION – SUBSTANTIVE LABOR LAWS
(ii) Disclosure of Information
There is no legal obligation upon parties to collective bargaining to dis-
close to each other information concerning subjects of negotiation.
However, under Article 121 of the FLL, an employer is legally obligated
to disclose its tax declaration to its workers within 10 days of filing that
declaration with the Department of Finance and Public Credit. This ob-
ligation is imposed for the purpose of facilitating mandatory profit shar-
ing under the FLL. Employees are not permitted to disclose information
contained in these returns to any third party. Employees may, however,
disclose such information to their union.
(iii) Changes to Working Conditions during Negotiations
The terms of the collective contract remain in effect until either (1) a
strike begins, or (2) a new collective contract is reached, whether by
agreement, CAB decision, or voluntary arbitration. Note that, as dis-
cussed below (see Binding Effect of Collective Contracts, in section
2B.4), collective labor relations may be suspended or terminated in cas-
es of economic necessity, pursuant to articles 427 to 439 of the FLL.
In the United States an employer may not unilaterally alter terms and
conditions of employment from the time when either party gives notice
to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement until the parties reach an
impasse in negotiations. The employer may, however, refuse to deduct
union dues or to participate in arbitration hearings once a collective
bargaining agreement has expired. In Canada a freeze on terms and
conditions of employment applies from the time that either party gives
notice to bargain to the time at which the parties have completed the
conciliation process and are in a legal strike or lockout position. 
(iv) Scope of Bargaining and Contents of Agreement
Article 391 of the FLL provides that every collective contract shall state:
I. the names and addresses of the contracting parties;
II. the enterprises and establishments covered by it;
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III. its duration or a statement to the effect that it is for an unspec-
ified time or for a specified piece of work;
IV. the hours of work;
V. rest days and vacation leave;
VI. wage rates;
VII. the training to be provided to workers in the enterprises or es-
tablishments covered;
VIII. the initial training to be given to persons recruited for work in
the enterprise or establishment;
IX. rules for the establishment and operation of the committees to
be set up in accordance with the Federal Labor Law; and 
X. any other stipulations agreed to by the parties.
If the agreement lacks a salary scale, the CAB nullifies it for failing to
fulfill this legal requirement. If there are no terms regarding holidays and
vacations or hours of work, the constitutional and statutory minimums
are applied and the contract is approved as legal by the CAB (FLL art.
393). A first collective contract may not contain terms less favorable to
workers than those contained in their individual employment contracts.
Unlike the U.S. system of collective bargaining, there is no distinction
in Mexican labor law between “mandatory” and “permissive” subjects
of bargaining. Canadian labor law likewise does not make this dis-
tinction. 
Mandatory Joint Committees
The FLL mandates the formation of worker-employer joint commit-
tees to carry out social and economic functions prescribed by the FLL or
the collective contract. The most important committees are those that
determine profit sharing (FLL art. 125 s. 1), those that create the gener-
al framework for seniority rules (art. 158), those that formulate compa-
ny disciplinary policies (art. 424 s. 1) and joint health and safety com-
mittees (art. 509). Health and safety committees are empowered to
propose preventive measures, to investigate the causes of accidents and
occupational disease, and to supervise measures they adopt. The agree-
ments of joint committees may add to but may not take away from the
rights of workers contained in the FLL or in a collective contract.
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(v) Conciliation and Arbitration of Bargaining Disputes
A union and an employer may at any time voluntarily request concilia-
tion by the labor authorities. The federal STPS has created a Concilia-
tors Corps to assist parties in settling contract disputes. Once a union
has filed a notice of strike with the relevant CAB, conciliation by the
CAB becomes mandatory. At that point, the CAB will summon the em-
ployer in order to give it an opportunity to respond to the union’s posi-
tion and will hold a conciliation hearing prior to the commencement of
any strike action. If no agreement is reached in conciliation, the union
may strike on the date given in its notice. 
Arbitration of bargaining disputes is not legally mandatory in Mexi-
co, though the parties may agree to submit their disputes to such
processes at any time. In addition, once a strike has begun, a union may
submit the labor dispute to the relevant CAB for resolution. For a more
detailed discussion of CAB conciliation and dispute resolution process-
es, see Regulation of the Right to Strike, section 2C.3, below. 
In practice, when unions in Mexico declare their intention to strike,
the parties often seek intervention of the labor authorities to mediate
and conciliate the conflict. If the dispute arises in an important enter-
prise or industry, the federal or state secretary of labor often gets in-
volved, either personally or through high-level aides. This is when gen-
uine bargaining usually takes place, with mediation helping the parties
to reach an agreement.
In most Canadian jurisdictions, conciliation is a mandatory precondi-
tion to striking. Binding first-contract arbitration is available to pre-
vent an employer from “stonewalling” a newly certified union. In the
United States, unions may proceed to strike upon the expiration of a
collective bargaining agreement without mandatory mediation or con-
ciliation. The U.S. National Labor Relations Act generally limits gov-
ernment intervention to mediation at the request of both parties. The
U.S. Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) may enter a
dispute only when both parties request it. Only a genuine “national
emergency” can provoke stronger government intervention. The Rail -
way Labor Act , however, which covers the railroad and airline indus-
tries, requires mediation before any strike in those industries. It also
provides for farther-reaching government intervention, even by the
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President or the Congress of the United States, in those industries (see
Appendix 4A, below).
(vi) Law-Contracts: Extension of Contract Terms to an Entire Sector
or Region
Unions representing at least two-thirds of unionized workers in a given
industrial or geographic sector may petition the relevant federal or state
Department of Labor and Social Welfare for a declaration bringing a
law-contract into force throughout the sector. A law-contract (LC) is de-
fined by Article 404 of the FLL as “the agreement made between one or
more unions of workers and various employers, or one or more unions
of employers, for the purpose of establishing conditions of work in a de-
termined branch of industry where such conditions are declared obliga-
tory in one or more federal states, in one or more economic zones with-
in one or more states, or in the entire national territory.” The LC thus
extends negotiated contract terms to all employers and employees in the
specific branch of industry.
Upon receiving a petition, the authorities may convene a meeting of
interested unions and affected employers. Those attending the meeting
may, by separate majority votes of unions representing and employers
employing two-thirds of the unionized workers in the industry or sector
in question, adopt a law-contract for the sector. Before such mandatory
extension of contract terms, nonunionized workers and employers have
an opportunity to state their objections.
The LC is administered by the majority union in each workplace,
commonly through a labor-management committee overseen by a na-
tional commission. There are currently seven such law-contracts. They
cover the following sectors: four textile sectors (cotton, wool, silk and
hard fibers), with 30 unions and 34,507 workers in 1996; rubber (one
union and 10,004 workers); sugar (nine unions and 27,942 workers);
and radio and television (seven unions and 18,256 workers).7
The duration of an LC may not exceed two years (FLL art. 412). The
LC can be modified by petition to the labor authorities by the represen-
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7 See Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social (STPS), Informe de Labores 1996-1997
(Mexico, D.F.: STPS , 1997), at p. 104, Cuadro 6.
tative trade unions and employers in the sector, under terms similar to
those for modifying collective contracts. It can terminate through mu-
tual consent of the parties or if a petition for revision does not end with
an agreement and the unions have not subsequently exercised the right
to strike.
In Canada the province of Quebec has a similar institution, through
which collective agreement terms are extended by legal decree to cover
an entire sector or type of occupation. Such extension decrees cover 29
occupations or sectors. The mandatory extension of collective bargain-
ing agreements to nonunionized employers and employees does not oc-
cur in the United States or in Canada outside of Quebec. 
4) Enforcement of Collective Contracts
(i) Binding Effect of Collective Contracts
All collective contracts must be examined by the CAB for their legality
and to ensure that they do not diminish workers’ minimum rights under
the FLL. Once this is done, the collective contract is treated as a judicial
order of the CAB itself and is enforceable as such. The collective con-
tract can be terminated by mutual consent of the employer and the
union, due to completion of the project for which work has been
contracted, or due to the permanent closure of the company or estab-
lishment.
In articles 427 through 439, the FLL provides a mechanism by which
an employer may suspend or terminate collective labor relations in cer-
tain cases of economic necessity. Suspension of collective labor relations
is somewhat analogous to a temporary layoff under Canadian or U.S. la-
bor law, and a termination is analogous to a permanent layoff or plant
closure. Articles 427 and 434 stipulate the legally recognized grounds for
such measures.8 Suspension or termination of collective labor relations is
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8 Article 427. Temporary suspension of labor relationships. The following shall be
deemed to be grounds for the temporary suspension of the labor relationships in an en-
terprise or establishment:
subject to CAB approval. Except in cases falling under Article 427, Part
I, or Article 434, Part I or V,9 CAB authorization must be obtained pri-
or to the suspension or termination. Suspension or reduction of the
work hours of particular workers takes place in reverse seniority order. In
approving a suspension, the CAB awards compensation to the workers
in question of up to one month’s salary. Workers whose employment is
terminated are entitled to receive at least three months’ pay plus a sen-
iority allowance (see the description in The Individual Employment Re-
lationship, section 1D, above). Suspended workers maintain rights to be
recalled to their former positions. In the event that a terminated under-
taking is started up again, the hiring preference clauses in the collective
contract will apply.
U.S. and Canadian labor relations statutes do not provide mechanisms
through which collective bargaining agreement terms can be suspend-
ed or terminated in cases of employer economic hardship or necessity.
Such mechanisms are left to the parties to negotiate and include in the
agreement.
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I. “force majeure” or any unforeseen event not attributable to the employer, or the
employer’s physical incapacity or death, shall entail the suspension of work as an in-
evitable, immediate and direct consequence;
II. lack of raw materials not attributable to the employer;
III. over-production in relation to the enterprise’s economic situation and the state of
the market;
IV. the known and obvious inability, of a temporary nature, of the enterprise to pay
its way;
V. lack of money and the impossibility of obtaining it for the normal continuance of
work, on condition that these facts are adequately proved by the employer.
Article 434. Grounds for termination of labor relations. The following shall be
grounds for terminating the labor relationship:
I. “Force majeure” or any unforeseen event not attributable to the employer, or
the employer’s physical incapacity or death, shall entail the suspension of work as an in-
evitable, immediate and direct consequence;
II. the known and obvious inability of the enterprise to pay its way;
III. the exhaustion of the substance being extracted by a mining enterprise;
IV. the cases referred to in Art. 38;
V. statutory declaration of insolvency proceedings or bankruptcy, if the compe-
tent authority or the creditors decide on the permanent closing down of the enterprise or
the permanent retrenchment of production.
9 Ibid.
(ii) Enforcement Procedures
The union has the right to file a complaint with the CAB claiming that
the employer has violated the collective contract. Each individual work-
er has the same right. Such complaints are normally filed when a prob-
lem has not been resolved in direct discussions with the employer. In
CAB proceedings, a worker may present his or her claim alone or with
the union’s assistance. The CAB will at the outset of the proceedings
seek to conciliate the dispute between the parties. If a settlement is not
reached it will conduct a hearing and issue an order in the case. 
The use of the Mexican government CABs to resolve grievance issues,
including individual workers’ grievances, contrasts with the systems of
the United States and Canada. There private arbitration is generally the
contract enforcement mechanism, rather than recourse to the NLRB
(in the U.S.) or the federal or provincial labor boards (in Canada). 
5) Substitute Employers
A change of employer, whether through the sale or transfer of an estab-
lishment or enterprise or other transaction, does not affect labor rela-
tionships in the establishment or enterprise. The collective contract con-
tinues unchanged, the substitute employer is bound by its terms, and
title to the agreement is not affected.
Canadian labor law also requires that the terms and conditions of a col-
lective agreement carry over to an employer continuing the business of
a previous employer. In the U.S., a “successor” employer has a duty to
bargain with the union only if the successor employer hires a majority
of the former company’s union-represented workers. Otherwise there is
no duty to bargain. The terms of the collective bargaining agreement
are not binding on the successor employer.
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6) Obligations of Unions towards Represented Workers
Article 375 of the FLL provides that a union shall represent its members
in defending their individual rights unless the individual chooses to act
directly and without the assistance of the union.
U.S. and Canadian laws impose a duty of fair representation on unions.
The duty requires them to represent all bargaining unit members with-
out arbitrariness, bad faith or discrimination. It applies to the union’s
administration of rights under the collective bargaining agreement. In
the U.S. and in most Canadian jurisdictions, it also applies to the ne-
gotiation of that agreement.
7) Termination of Title to a Collective Contract
Workers who wish to change collective bargaining representatives may
at any time seek through a registered union to challenge the title of the
current union to the collective contract (see Acquisition of Title to a
Collective Contract, section 2B.2, above). Workers wishing to terminate
their union representation completely rather than switch union repre-
sentatives may seek to dissolve their union or to install as the contract ti-
tle holder a union that they will later dissolve (see The Formation and
Dissolution of Unions, section 2A.2, above). In practice workers seldom
seek to deunionize.
Canada’s labor laws create periodic opportunities during which em-
ployees are allowed to change or remove their union representative. In
the interests of labor relations stability, Canadian labor legislation typ-
ically gives unions a secure period of one year within which to negotiate
a collective agreement. Where a collective agreement is in place, a
union may in general be decertified only during specified “open peri-
ods,” generally within two months of the expiry of the collective agree-
ment. U.S. law provides similar opportunities for workers to change or
remove their bargaining representative. There a union may not be de-
certified if an election was held in the bargaining unit within the previ-
ous year or during the first three years of a collective bargaining agree-
ment. 
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C. LABOR PRINCIPLE 3 – THE RIGHT TO STRIKE
1) Legal Foundations
The 1917 Mexican Constitution was the first in the world to protect the
right to strike. Four sections of Article 123 speak directly to the right to
strike:
Section XVII states that “the laws shall recognize the strike and the
lockout10 as a right of workers and of employers.”
Section XVIII states that “strikes shall be lawful when they have as
their purpose achieving balance between the different factors of produc-
tion, harmonizing the rights of labor with those of capital… Strikes shall
be considered unlawful only when the majority of the strikers engage in
violent acts against persons or property.”
Section XIX states that “lockout shall be lawful only when a produc-
tion surplus makes it necessary to suspend work to maintain prices at a
level with costs, and with prior approval of the Conciliation and Arbi-
tration Board.”
Section XXII states that “an employer who dismisses a worker with-
out justifiable cause or because he has entered an association or union, or
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1 0 The English word “lockout” in this constitutional provision is the usual translation
of the Spanish paro. However, it is not an accurate translation in terms of U.S. or Cana-
dian labor discourse. “Lockout” has a precise meaning in Canadian or U.S. collective
bargaining. The lockout is the weapon of economic strength available to an employer
who “locks out” workers to compel them to accept the employer’s bargaining proposal.
In the United States and Canada, the lockout is the employer’s counterpart to the work-
ers’ strike weapon. When it is used, the lockout usually accompanies employer demands
for wage or benefit reductions. In both countries it is relatively rare. In Canada, extensive
conciliation and mediation requirements usually preclude the lockout. In the United
States, the employer’s ability to unilaterally implement its final offer once the parties
reach impasse in bargaining limits resort to the lockout, since implementation forces the
union to strike or to work under the unilaterally imposed terms.
By contrast, paro in the Mexican constitutional sense has nothing to do with collec-
tive bargaining. The “lockout” concept does not exist in Mexican labor law. Employers
are not permitted to lock out workers to force them to agree to wage or benefit reduc-
tions (although there have been instances of companies closing and reopening under
other provisions of the law to achieve such a goal). In this constitutional provision, paro
has a different meaning. It means a stoppage of work initiated by the employer because
of economic necessity. Thus, it is best rendered by “layoff” or “furlough.”
for having taken part in a lawful strike, shall be required, at the election
of the worker, either to fulfill the contract or to indemnify him to the
amount of three months’ wages.”
The first recorded strike in Mexico was one by singers and minstrels
at the Metropolitan Cathedral of Mexico City in 1582 when the city re-
duced their salaries. The strike lasted one and a half months. Another
early strike was one in 1766 by miners at the Real del Monte mine in
Hidalgo. In notable 19th-century strikes, the weavers of Tlalpan in the
Federal District went on strike for a shorter workday. Textile workers at
the La Magdalena plant struck against the company store, and miners in
Pachuca, Hidalgo, struck to improve working conditions. Early in this
century, the best-known strikes were those by mineworkers in Cananea,
Sonora, and by textile workers in Rio Blanco, Veracruz. Some authors
find in these strikes the antecedents of the revolution of 1910.
The 1915 labor law of Yucatan was the first Mexican legislation deal-
ing with strikes. It defined a strike as a stoppage by workers leaving their
jobs or breaking their employment contract “with the purpose of com-
pelling the employer to accede to their needs and demands.”
For a decade and a half after passage of the 1917 Constitution, labor
law jurisdiction rested exclusively with the states. Between 1917 and
1929, many states adopted labor laws dealing with strikes, among them
the 1925 Tamaulipas Act, which established an important precedent for
the federal law of 1931. The Tamaulipas law defined a strike as “the sus-
pension of work as a consequence of a coalition of workers.” This intro-
duced the important concept of coalition, or concerted activity, by a
group of workers for the defense of their common interests.
In Oaxaca, legislation defined a strike as the collective action of work-
ers through a temporary suspension of their normal labor with the ob-
jective of balancing the different factors of production, harmonizing the
rights of workers with those of employers. This formulation paved the
way for the definition and norms that emerged in the FLL of 1931. The
FLL brought labor law under federal jurisdiction, with enforcement
shared between federal and state authorities. The 1931 FLL defined a
strike as “the temporary suspension of work as a result of a coalition of
workers.”
The statutory regulation of the constitutional right to strike remained
a controversial issue in Mexican labor law. Later reforms introduced the
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concept of a “legal” strike, implying that workers needed prior approval
of the authorities to undertake a strike. Adding to the constitutional def-
inition of licit and illicit strikes, new statutory concepts of “legal” and
“illegal” strikes, “existing” and “nonexisting strikes” and “justified” and
“unjustified strikes” complicated this area of labor law in Mexico.
Article 440 of the current FLL of 1970 refined the definition of a
strike, expressing it as “the temporary suspension of work carried out by
a coalition of workers.” This formulation effectively recognizes the right
to strike without prior approval. Articles 440 to 469 and 920 to 938 of
the FLL are the key provisions governing the right to strike.
2) Protected Strike Activity
Article 443 of the FLL limits the definition of a strike to “the mere act of
suspending work.” Thus the legal framework protecting the right to
strike does not protect work slowdowns or other tactics that stop short
of suspending work.
Canadian labor laws employ a broad definition of the term strike,
which typically includes most concerted refusals, cessations or slow-
downs of work or other concerted activities designed to limit output.
The U.S. National Labor Relations Act uses a narrower definition, ex-
cluding partial and intermittent strikes as well as work slowdowns from
its definition of “protected concerted activities.”
3) Regulation of the Right to Strike
Strikes are permitted during the term of a collective contract if the em-
ployer violates the contract, to seek new collective contract terms during
an annual wage reopener, or during general collective contract negotia-
tions. Strikes are also permitted to enforce the profit sharing provisions
of the FLL. Solidarity strikes are expressly permitted under FLL Article
450, Section VI. A no-strike clause in a collective contract is unconsti-
tutional under Mexican labor law.
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In Canada, all jurisdictions prohibit strikes during the term of a collec-
tive agreement, requiring arbitration to resolve any dispute relating to
the interpretation, application or alleged violation of the agreement. In
the United States, a no-strike clause is a matter for bargaining between
the parties. The vast majority of union contracts contain a no-strike
clause for the duration of the contract, with arbitration as the specified
recourse for a claimed violation of the agreement. Neither Canada nor
the United States permits secondary strike activity in support of work-
ers involved in a primary labor dispute.
Mexican labor law regulates the right to strike in the following ways:
1) It specifies the permissible objectives of a strike.
2) It allows an employer, striking workers or an affected third party to
require that a striking union show that the strike has the support of
a majority of the workers at the enterprise(s) or establishment(s)
affected by the strike. 
3) It terminates the employment of workers involved in a strike in
which the majority of the strikers perpetrate violence against per-
sons or property, or in a strike during a time of war by workers
employed in establishments or services under the government.
4) It requires certain workers providing key services to continue to
work notwithstanding a strike.
5) It creates a set of mandatory strike procedures, which include a
minimum period of notice of a strike (six days in the private sec-
tor) and conciliation conducted by the relevant CAB.
6) It provides a mechanism through which a union can submit the la-
bor dispute to the relevant CAB for resolution and can seek redress
where the cause of the strike is imputable to the employer.
Some of this regulation is achieved through a set of legal definitions.
The key definitions are those of illicit, legally nonexistent, and justifiable
strikes.
(i) Legal Definitions
*A legally nonexistent strike (FLL art. 459) is one that is not carried out by
a majority of workers in the undertaking or establishment or is not car-
ried out for any of the purposes enumerated in the law (FLL art. 450), or
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fails to comply with procedural requirements set out in Article 920 (see
Strike Procedures, below in this section).
FLL Article 450 defines the necessary objectives of a legally existing
strike as follows:
I. to obtain a balance between the different factors of production,
harmonizing the rights of labor with those of capital;
II. to achieve the employer’s or employers’11 acceptance of a collec-
tive contract and revisions of the contract at the end of its term;
III. to achieve the employers’ acceptance of a law-contract and revi-
sions of the contract at the end of its term;
IV. to secure compliance with the collective contract or law-contract
when the employer violates the agreement;
V. to secure compliance with the legal requirements for profit shar-
ing;
VI. to support a strike which has any of the foregoing objectives; and
VII. to obtain salary revisions on the anniversary date of the contract
in accordance with articles 399 and 419. (Those articles require
annual salary negotiations at the anniversary date of the collec-
tive contract, normally at the mid-point of a two-year contract.)
If a strike is declared legally nonexistent, workers must return to work
within 24 hours or face dismissal.
* An illicit strike is one in which violence is perpetrated by a majority of
the strikers against persons or property or, in time of war, one in which
the striking workers are employed in establishments under the govern-
ment. Workers involved in a strike determined to be illicit are consid-
ered to have terminated their employment.
* A justifiable strike is one whose cause is attributable to the employer
(e.g., a strike precipitated by an employer’s systematic violation of a col-
lective contract). A CAB finding that a strike is justifiable can have sig-
nificant economic consequences for an employer (see Strike Procedures,
below in this section).
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11 Mexican labor law allows unions holding the appropriate type of registration to
bargain with multiemployer groups. See Legal Status of Unions, section 2A.3, and Ac-
quisition of Title to a Collective Contract, section 2B.2, above. 
(ii) Services Maintained Notwithstanding a Strike
Article 466 requires certain workers on strike to continue to provide cer-
tain services. In particular, transportation workers must complete their
travel to a final destination, and health care workers must ensure that
patients are safely transferred to other facilities before they may join a
strike.
On occasion, the President of the Republic has issued an executive
order, referred to as a r e q u i s a, transferring control of a telecommuni-
cations or transportation enterprise facing a strike to a government-
appointed administrator. R e q u i s a s are authorized only under specific
legislation applying to the telecommunications and transportation in-
dustries. In general, the purpose of these laws is to ensure the continuity
of such services to the public in order to avert harm to national interests.
The legislation empowers the federal government to take control of
transportation or telecommunication enterprises in specified situations,
such as in times of war or in cases of “imminent danger to the national
economy.” The administrator who assumes control of the enterprise
may be authorized to use other workers in order to keep it running
notwithstanding the strike. Some unions have argued that the use of r e q -
uisas in this manner breaches workers’ constitutional right to strike.
On occasion, Canadian governments have enacted ad hoc b a c k - t o - w o r k
legislation in order to bring an end to otherwise lawful strikes, general-
ly in economically important enterprises. For example, the government
of Canada passed back-to-work legislation in the federal jurisdiction 30
times between 1950 and 1999 in order to end railway, postal service,
port operations, shipping and grain handling strikes. Under “national
emergency” provisions of U.S. labor law, the President of the United
States may direct the Attorney General to seek a court injunction
against a strike or threatened strike. A court may issue an 80-day in-
junction if it finds that the strike or threatened strike will imperil the
national health or safety. These “national emergency” provisions have
been used in a number of industries, including steel, coal, atomic ener-
gy, maritime transport, and telecommunications.
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(iii) Strike Procedures
Articles 920 to 938 set out the procedures governing strike action. Arti-
cle 920 requires that a union give written notice of its bargaining de-
mands to the employer, with a copy to the CAB, declaring the objectives
of the strike and specifying a date and time when a strike will commence
unless the demands are met. At least six days’ advance notice is required
before a strike may begin, except where the employer provides a public
service, in which case 10 days’ notice is required. Strike notice is referred
to in Mexican labor discourse as emplazamiento de huelga.
Unions normally convey a strike notice in connection with every con-
tract renewal or annual wage reopener, so labor law authorities record
thousands of e m p l a z a m i e n t o s each year. The actual launching of a strike,
the estallamiento de huelga, is much less frequent.
Under articles 448 and 902, a union’s exercise of the right to strike
(by giving a strike notice) suspends all legal proceedings between the
parties before a CAB unless the union submits the dispute to the CAB
for resolution. Under FLL Article 924, serving a strike notice also sus-
pends the enforcement of all judgments against an employer’s assets and
prevents the sequestration of those assets, which must be preserved to
protect the rights of workers, particularly with regard to pensions, sever-
ance pay, social security and housing fund payments. Workers’ claims to
these obligations have priority over all others except taxes.
Within 48 hours of receiving a strike notice, the employer must reply
to the union’s demands in writing. Unless Article 923 applies, the CAB
then summons the parties to a conciliation hearing. Article 923 provides
that a CAB may not act upon a notice of intention to strike if that notice
is given by a union that is not a party to the relevant collective contract
or law-contract or by an organization that seeks to conclude a collective
contract, notwithstanding that one covering the workers in question has
already been deposited with the CAB. As a result, if a collective contract
or law-contract is in force, the CAB will not carry out the conciliation
and adjudication procedures described below unless a strike notice is
filed by the union that holds title to the collective contract or by the
union administering the law-contract. Further, a CAB will not carry out
such dispute resolution procedures if a union files a strike notice to seek
a new collective contract, notwithstanding that a collective contract
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which is not yet open for revision (see The Collective Bargaining
Process, section 2B.3, above) has been deposited with the CAB.
If conciliation does not produce an agreement, the union may pro-
ceed to strike. 
(iv) Suspension of Work and Preservation of Equipment and Raw
Materials
If a strike occurs, the union sets up red and black flags at entrances to the
workplace. Red and black flags are the universal strike symbol in Mexi-
co. All union workers in the struck facility must halt work when the flags
go up (see, however, Services Maintained Notwithstanding a Strike,
above in this section). The company must cease operations except those
necessary to protect equipment and raw materials. FLL Article 449 com-
mands the CABs and corresponding civil authorities to enforce the right
to strike and to grant workers the necessary guarantees and assistance to
halt company operations. The union assumes legal responsibility for the
preservation of equipment and raw materials and must cooperate by
supplying workers for that purpose.
Before the strike begins, the CAB is required to set the number of
workers who must remain at their posts to preserve equipment and raw
materials, in order for the union to meet its obligation to preserve the
employer’s property during the work stoppage. The parties are entitled
to be heard by the CAB on this matter. The union must submit to the
CAB a list of members who can remain at their posts. 
(v) Application for Determination that a Strike is Legally Nonexistent
or Illegal
As noted above, FLL Article 451 provides that a strike that is not carried
out by a majority of workers in the undertaking or establishment is legal-
ly nonexistent. Striking workers, the employer or an affected third party
may apply within 72 hours of the suspension of work to the relevant
CAB for an order declaring a strike legally nonexistent. The CAB will
then open a proceeding that includes a hearing and the taking of evi-
dence. It may also conduct a recuento or vote count to determine major-
ity sentiment and to qualify the strike as existent or nonexistent. If a ma-
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jority does not support the strike, the CAB declares it to be nonexistent
and workers must return to their jobs within 24 hours or face dismissal.
If the CAB is not petitioned to declare a strike nonexistent, it is deemed
to exist for all legal purposes.
In the United States strike votes are not mandatory, though as a matter
of practice many unions hold them. Canadian labor relations statutes
require a strike vote, usually by all workers in the bargaining unit, be-
fore a strike may occur.
An application for a declaration that a strike is illicit may be brought
at any time after the strike has begun. Articles 928 to 933 set out detailed
procedures for hearings of applications to have a strike declared illegal or
nonexistent, including procedures for any strike vote that may be held to
determine the legal existence of a strike. 
(vi) Means of Ending a Legally Existent and Lawful Strike
FLL Article 469 defines the methods for ending a legally existent and
lawful strike:
I. by agreement between the striking workers and the employer;
II. if the employer accepts the union’s written demands and covers
the salaries that the workers did not receive;
III. by arbitral order of an arbitrator or arbitral panel freely chosen
by the parties; and 
IV. by an order of the Conciliation and Arbitration Board if the
striking workers have submitted the dispute for the CAB’s deci-
sion.
Most strikes are settled by agreement between the union and the em-
ployer. Where a union does submit a bargaining dispute to the CAB for
resolution, Article 937 provides that if the CAB declares in its award that
the reasons for the strike are attributable to the employer, it must order
the employer to meet the workers’ claims, insofar as they are lawful, and
pay them for the days that they were on strike. However, an employer
may not be required under this section to pay such wages to workers en-
gaged in a solidarity strike.
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The union’s option to submit a bargaining dispute for decision by the
CAB contrasts with U.S. and Canadian law, where both parties nor-
mally must agree to have a strike resolved by a third party. An exception
exists in the U.S. Railway Labor Act, which provides for binding gov-
ernment intervention (even of the Congress or the President) in some
disputes, and in many Canadian jurisdictions where the board or labor
minister can act to settle a first-contract dispute.
4) Supportive Action
As noted above, Article 450 of the FLL provides that workers may strike
in support of a lawful strike by other workers. Workers may also demon-
strate in support of their demands or those of other workers, consistent
with their freedom of assembly and freedom of expression. While work-
ers are free to do so, they seldom picket their employer in labor disputes.
Employers are in any event required to cease production once a strike
begins (see immediately below).
5) Prohibition of Striker Replacement
Article 4 of the FLL prohibits the use or attempted use of replacements
for lawfully striking workers. The only exception to this prohibition aris-
es if the union refuses to provide workers needed to preserve equipment
and raw materials (see Regulation of the Right to Strike, section 2C.3,
above). In such a case the employer may use temporary replacements un-
der Article 936 of the FLL.
In the United States, employers may seek to continue operations dur-
ing a strike. They may solicit workers represented by the union to re-
main at or return to work during the strike. They may hire replacement
workers to maintain operations, and such replacements can perma-
nently displace strikers unless the strike was provoked by the employ-
er’s unfair labor practices. Canadian labor relations statutes prevent the
permanent replacement of striking workers. Employers may seek to
continue operations using management personnel and, in most
provinces, nonstriking workers and temporary replacement workers.
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D. PROTECTIONS AGAINST INTERFERENCE
1) Just Cause Protection
Article 123, Section XXII of the constitution and various provisions of
the FLL seek to ensure that employees who are dismissed for union or
other lawful activities have access to reinstatement or severance pay, at
their option.
Section XXII of Article 123 provides that an employer who dismisses
a worker without justifiable cause or because he has entered an associa-
tion or union, or for having taken part in a lawful strike, shall be re-
quired, at the election of the worker, either to fulfill the contract or to
indemnify him to the amount of three months’ wages. The law shall
specify those cases in which the employer may be exempted from the ob-
ligation of fulfilling the contract by payment of an indemnity.
Article 47 of the FLL defines l5 “just causes” for discharge and makes
unlawful a discharge that is not based on one or more of the permissible
reasons spelled out in the law. Union activity, like any other lawful ac-
tivity, is not among those reasons. Thus, a discharged Mexican worker
does not have to show that antiunion motivation was a factor in the dis-
missal. The burden always rests with the employer to prove that the rea-
son for the discharge falls within the statutory definition of just cause for
discharge. Under general principles of Mexican labor law, any ambigui-
ties in the evidence with respect to whether just cause existed must be re-
solved in favor of the worker. Article 48 of the FLL gives the worker who
is discharged for union activity a choice between seeking a reinstatement
order from the relevant CAB or accepting a payment of at least three
months’ salary (indemnización). In the majority of cases workers negoti-
ate a severance payment with the assistance of an attorney, instead of
seeking reinstatement. For further detail, see The Individual Employ-
ment Relationship, section 1D, above.
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Box 3.3
Severance Pay in Mexican Labor Law
For U.S. and Canadian readers of this report, the importance of sever-
ance pay in the Mexican system cannot be overstated. All workers are en-
titled to severance pay when they lose their jobs, unless they are dis-
charged for one of the 15 specified acts of misconduct in Article 47 of the
FLL. There is no unemployment insurance system in Mexico, so the im-
mediate provision of severance pay, in the highest possible amount, be-
comes of paramount interest to workers in both individual discharge cas-
es and mass layoffs.
A great number of cases of alleged unjust discharge are processed each
year in Mexico’s federal and state CABs (in 1996 the Federal CAB in
Mexico City processed 4,610 of these cases). For their part, the CABs
normally press the parties to reach a private settlement for severance pay. 
Throughout the country, workers can obtain free legal assistance in
such cases from the Federal Office of the Labor Public Defender. Because
it is a statutory benefit for all workers, there is a high demand for such le-
gal assistance. Where workers engage private attorneys to represent them
before the CAB, the attorney’s fees are customarily a percentage of the to-
tal severance amount. This creates an incentive for them to reach a settle-
ment at the highest possible amount.
The caseload of the Federal Office of the Labor Public Defender has
increased dramatically in the past decade. In 1985, the labor public de-
fender provided some 15,000 consultations, achieved about 3,000 settle-
ments, and took 1,200 cases before the CABs. In the 1996-1997 fiscal
year, more than 50,000 consultations, 7,075 settlements, and 9,803 CAB
cases were initiated.12
2) Limitations on the Use of Exclusion Clauses
Article 123 of the Constitution provides workers with remedies against
dismissal pursuant to an exclusion clause for joining another union dur-
ing the registration of that union (see Union Membership and Dues,
section 2A.6, above).
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12 See Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social (STPS), Informe de Labores 1996-
1997 (Mexico, D.F.: STPS , 1997), at p. 82, Section 3.5.2, paragraph 3.
3) Prohibitions against Coercion
Article 133 of the FLL provides that employers shall not “compel an em-
ployee by coercion or any other means to join or withdraw from the
union or association of which he or she is a member, or to vote for a
specified candidate.” It also prohibits employers from interfering in any
manner in the internal activities of a union.
Mexican labor law does not specifically address other forms of em-
ployer interference with freedom of association, the right to organize or
the right to strike, or such interference by trade unions. However, as
noted above (see Legal Sources of Labor Rights, section 1C), ILO Con-
vention 87 (Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Or-
ganize Convention, 1948) applies to labor relations in Mexico. The
ILO’s Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and
Recommendations has stated that “the protection afforded to workers
and trade union officials against acts of antiunion discrimination consti-
tutes an essential aspect of freedom of association, since such acts may
result in practice in denial of the guarantees laid down in Convention
No. 87.”13
4) Civil Rights and Protection
Without civil and political rights there can be no normal exercise of
trade union rights. The Mexican Constitution provides fundamental
civil and political rights to all Mexicans. Like other Mexican residents,
unions and union members enjoy constitutional protection of their free-
dom of assembly, provided that the exercise of this freedom does not
pose significant danger of substantial harm to property or physical safe-
ty. Unionists have the freedom to travel within and outside the country
that is granted to all residents and have the right to attend national and
international trade union meetings with full freedom and independence.
Similarly, unions and employees have the constitutional right to express
their views and opinions publicly and to impart information through
D. PROTECTIONS AGAINST INTERFERENCE 143
13 See International Labour Organization, Freedom of Association and Collective Bar -
gaining (Geneva: I.L.O., 1994), at p. 92, paragraph 202.
any media, like other Mexican residents. Note, however, that under Ar-
ticle 378 of the FLL, unions may not intervene in religious activities (see
Unions Self-Governance, section 2A.4, above).
Unions and employees engaged in union activity, like all Mexican
residents, have a constitutional right to be free from search and seizure of
their property without a judicial warrant. Similarly, unionists enjoy con-
stitutional freedom from arbitrary arrest or detention without a warrant
and without charges being brought. Unions and their members are enti-
tled to full protection of the criminal laws which prohibit physical as-
saults and damage to property and to the same police protection from
such harms as other Mexican residents.
3. GOVERNMENT ENFORCEMENT
The public administration of key elements of Mexican labor law is car-
ried out in a tripartite fashion, involving government, labor and man-
agement representatives. The federal and state CABs that regulate and
enforce rights to organize, bargain collectively and strike are made up of
government, labor and management representatives. National commis-
sions and institutes on minimum wages, profit sharing, housing, and so-
cial security also have such tripartite composition.
Box 3.4
Union Involvement in Tripartite Labor Policy Bodies
Mexican unions are represented on tripartite bodies that serve as the
mechanisms of national consultation and cooperation among business,
labor and the government. In recent decades these have included the Na-
tional Tripartite Commission of 1971, giving unions a voice in the draft-
ing of proposed labor law amendments; the 1977 Alliance for Produc-
tion; and successive agreements such as the 1983 Economic Solidarity
Agreement, the 1989 Stability and Growth Agreement, and the 1995 Al-
liance for Economic Recovery. The 1983, 1989 and 1995 agreements
(p a c t o s) had as a key purpose controlling inflation through wage restraint.
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Mexican labor legislation states that the “most representative nation-
al unions” are entitled to serve on such tripartite bodies. Under the S o c i a l
Security Law (art. 248) and the law creating the National Workers’ Hous-
ing Fund (art. 8), the STPS is empowered to designate these organiza-
tions (under a regulation that takes into account the number of union
members as documented before the labor authorities) and to organize
assemblies where unions and employers elect their representatives to
these bodies.
The National Minimum Wage Commission is the body charged with
setting minimum wages for various occupations in the country. This
commission consists of a government chairperson and an equal number
of labor and management representatives (art. 554).
The National Profit Sharing Commission is a tripartite body that sets
the percentage of income of employers upon which profits must be
shared with workers. Under Article 579, it is also made up of an equal
number of labor and management representatives.
The governing body of the Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS)
is made up of 10 representatives each from the federal government, em-
ployer organizations and unionized workers (art. 246-247 of the 1945
Social Security Law). The Technical Council of the IMSS operates in a
similar tripartite fashion, with four persons from each of these groups.
The National Workers’ Housing Institute (INFONAVIT) is another tri-
partite national organization in which unionized workers participate
through national trade unions. The ruling body is composed of 15 repre-
sentatives of government, labor and management. This body administers the
housing fund created through obligatory payroll taxes to provide a source of
low-interest loans for workers to purchase or improve their homes.
A. GOVERNMENT LABOR AUTHORITIES
1) Federal
The federal labor authorities are headed by the Department of Labor
and Social Welfare (STPS), an executive agency that oversees compli-
ance with labor laws, as well as collective bargaining, fair labor standards,
labor defense, and job training. The STPS also oversees the Federal
Conciliation and Arbitration Board (FCAB) and various other tripartite
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organisms such as the National Minimum Wage Commission and the
National Profit Sharing Commission. The STPS contains the General
Directorate for Registration of Associations, which is charged with trade
union registration in the federal jurisdiction. The STPS has approxi-
mately 50 offices called Federal Labor Delegations where most federal
jurisdiction labor affairs are handled. These offices are found in state
capitals and in other cities with a large labor presence.
2) State and Federal District
In each of the states and in the Federal District of Mexico (Distrito Fed-
eral, D.F.) there are departments of labor under the authority of the local
executive branch (the state governor or the chief of the government of the
D.F.). These local authorities carry out the same functions as the STPS,
but within the local jurisdiction. They oversee the local CABs. The local
labor departments also assist federal authorities in implementing job
training programs and other programs in federal jurisdiction. Local CABs
are responsible for trade union registration within state jurisdiction.
B. ADMINISTRATIVE LABOR TRIBUNALS
The CABs are judicial tribunals located in the executive branch of gov-
ernment. They are charged with interpreting and enforcing the labor
laws to resolve disputes arising out of labor relationships between work-
ers and employers or between workers only or employers only. This
mandate covers disputes between workers and their unions and disputes
between employers and their organizations. They are composed in tri-
partite fashion of representatives of the government, workers and em-
ployers. CABs have varying numbers of members depending on the vol-
ume of cases in their jurisdiction. CAB chairpersons are appointed by
the STPS (in the federal administrative jurisdiction), by the relevant
state governor (in state administrative jurisdiction), or by the chief of the
government in the Federal District. They must be lawyers. Labor and
management members of the CABs are elected in annual assemblies of
their respective organizations.
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The Federal CAB has its headquarters in Mexico City, but it also op-
erates 21 Federal Special CABs in Mexico City and 43 Federal CABs
throughout the country for various sectors of federal jurisdiction. In
every state capital and in the Federal District, tripartite local CABs car-
ry out equivalent functions within local jurisdiction. In total, over 100
CABs operate to enforce the Federal Labor Law within their respective
jurisdictions.
The CABs administer all aspects of industrial relations issues in Mex-
ico — union formation, union registration, disputes between unions for
representation rights, collective bargaining, plant closings, the right to
strike and so on — as well as individual discharges and other grievances
between individual workers and employers outside the industrial rela-
tions context. They generally dispose of cases in a single proceeding,
starting with an attempt to resolve the matter through conciliation. If
conciliation fails, the parties will generally proceed directly to a hearing
of their dispute. Decisions of the CAB are final. They may be appealed
only under a proceeding for judicial review known as an action for am -
paro. Such actions may be based only on certain limited grounds, the
most important of which are error of law, breach of due process, and ex-
ceeding legally authorized powers (see Appeals and Judicial Review, sec-
tion 5B, below).
In the federal jurisdiction, Special Conciliation Boards have been es-
tablished as part of the Federal CAB structure. The Special Conciliation
Boards are empowered to arbitrate disputes involving amounts not ex-
ceeding three months’ salary. They are also empowered to conciliate in-
dividual and collective labor disputes.
The impartiality of the CABs in matters of union registration and
other actions has been the subject of extensive debate in Mexico. There
are various currents of opinion, and some have been translated into pro-
posals aimed at modifying the Federal Labor Law. For example, propos-
als have been advanced to substitute a single judge for the current tri-
partite boards.
Mexico’s tripartite CABs combine many of the functions carried out in
the United States and Canada by labor boards, labor tribunals, media-
tion and conciliation services and private arbitrators. The U.S. NLRB
is made up of public members appointed by the President. A majority
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of Canadian jurisdictions provide for tripartite participation in labor
boards.
The U.S. NLRB’s enforcement procedures can involve several steps:
the filing and investigation of a complaint, the issuance of charges or
dismissal of the complaint, administrative law judge (ALJ) hearings, ap-
peal of the ALJ’s decision to the National Labor Relations Board, and
court proceedings for enforcement of the NLRB’s order or to appeal it.
By contrast, like Mexico’s CABs, Canada’s federal and provincial labor
boards (and in Quebec the Office of the Labour Commissioner and the
Labour Court) are more integrated than the U.S. NLRB in their struc-
ture and operation. Most boards have labor relations officers or inves-
tigation officers who summarily investigate and attempt to settle cases
prior to hearings. If settlement efforts are unsuccessful, the board holds
a single set of hearings and issues a final decision. Most boards will re-
consider such decisions only in unusual cases. The board’s decision is
generally not appealable to the courts. The decisions of Canada’s fed-
eral and provincial labor boards are immediately enforceable as judicial
orders upon filing of the decision in the appropriate superior court.
Quebec’s Labour Court is a judicial body whose orders are immediate-
ly enforceable.
4. RIGHTS OF PRIVATE ACTION
A. ACCESS TO ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS
Any worker has the right to file a complaint with the relevant CAB to
enforce individual employment rights under the FLL or under a collec-
tive contract, if the worker is covered by one. If the worker is covered by
a collective contract, the union with title to it may represent the worker.
However, workers can waive union representation and represent them-
selves, personally or through counsel, in disputes arising under the col-
lective contract as well as the FLL. Upon such a waiver, the intervention
of the union ceases. The individual worker is entitled to representation
at no cost by an attorney from the Federal Office of the Labor Public
Defender, a branch of the labor ministry in the federal jurisdiction, or by
an attorney from the analogous local (state or D.F.) office.
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In the United States, following a preliminary investigation of charges,
a complaint may be issued; at that point the Office of the General
Counsel of the NLRB prosecutes the case on behalf of the charging par-
ty (worker, union or employer) and the people of the United States.
The board’s attorney effectively serves as the charging party’s counsel in
proceedings before an administrative law judge and in any appeal to the
full board or the courts. By contrast, in Canada individual workers,
unions or employers may file complaints directly with the labor rela-
tions tribunal and present a case directly to the tribunal. The parties are
responsible for their legal representation costs.
B. ACCESS TO COURTS
In general, the Constitution (art. 123) and the FLL give the relevant
CAB exclusive jurisdiction over all employment law matters. A private
party therefore may not take a labor law claim directly to court. Howev-
er, a party may invoke a right of amparo to obtain judicial review in a
constitutional court of a CAB action that is alleged to violate individual
constitutional rights or due process protections (see Appeals and Judicial
Review, section 5B, below).
5. PROCEDURAL GUARANTEES AND REMEDIES 
TO ENSURE ENFORCEMENT
A. DUE PROCESS
Article 14 of the Constitution provides a general guarantee of due
process of law in the legal system (see Appeals and Judicial Review, be-
low). In addition, extensive provisions in articles 685 to 991 of the FLL
apply due process guarantees in proceedings before the CABs. The Fed -
eral Administrative Procedure Law (FAPL) of 1995 provides procedural
protections which apply to the administrative acts, proceedings and de-
cisions of federal administrative agencies, including the STPS. These
protections apply to the process of registering a union in the federal ju-
risdiction. They do not apply to the federal or local CABs. 
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1) Procedural Protections
Key elements of due process guarantees in CAB labor proceedings re-
quire that they be: (1) open to the public (with certain exceptions, such
as not offending morals); (2) free, that is, there are no filing fees or oth-
er procedural costs; (3) immediate, in the sense that the members of the
tribunal must be in personal contact with the parties; and (4) predomi-
nantly oral, short and simple.
Parties to CAB proceedings have the right to receive notice of hear-
ings and to attend them in person. The hearing must generally take
place upon 10 days’ notice and within 15 days of the filing of the rele-
vant complaint with the CAB. No specified form is required for tender-
ing pleas or making statements. Parties have the right to be represented
by an attorney during CAB proceedings.14
At the outset of proceedings, CABs seek to settle through conciliation
the cases that come before them. If a settlement is not reached, the case
moves to the hearing stage, where the CABs receive the evidence offered
by employers and workers in relation to the matter in dispute and hear
their arguments. Hearings must generally continue from day to day un-
til they are completed. Parties may present evidence in support of their
claims and, at the request of a party, the CAB will compel the appear-
ance of witnesses, whom the parties may examine and cross-examine,
provided that the evidence to be obtained through questioning such wit-
nesses is relevant to the case. Parties have the right to respond to each
other’s pleadings, evidence and arguments.
The CAB evaluates the evidence and issues a decision called a laudo.
The laudo must be issued in writing and contain a concise statement of
the issue and the positions of the parties, an account of the evidence and
the evaluation of the evidence by the CAB, the legal reasoning behind its
decision, underlying jurisprudence and legal doctrine, and the points
resolved.
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14 A worker may choose to be represented at the conciliation stage of CAB proceed-
ings, notwithstanding Article 876 of the FLL. See the jurisprudencia established in Con-
tradicción de Tesis 16/83, Semanario Judicial de la Federación, octava época, tomo IV,
primera parte, julio-diciembre de 1989, p. 330, analyzing the relationship between arti-
cles 876 and 692 of the FLL.
Mexican labor law assumes that employers have inherent advantage
over workers in the employment relationship and in the intricacies of le-
gal proceedings. Therefore the labor law is expressly tutelar, that is, pro-
tective of workers’ rights. For example, the burden of proof in CAB cas-
es always rests with the employer, which must produce evidence to
support its position in the case. If a worker’s complaint does not cover all
of the legal grounds for relief that could be raised on the basis of facts al-
leged by the worker, the CAB must correct the complaint petition by
adding those grounds (FLL art. 685). CABs are also required to note any
evident irregularities or matters in a worker’s complaint which could
lead to contradictory legal claims and provide the worker with three days
to correct such matters (FLL art. 873).
In most Canadian jurisdictions the burden of proof in an unfair labor
practice case involving discrimination for union activity rests with the
employer, who must prove that it had no antiunion animus in acting as
it did. In the United States, the NLRB’s general counsel has the burden
of proof in unfair labor practice cases, including cases involving dis-
crimination for union activity. However, the general counsel need on-
ly present prima facie proof of antiunion actions or motivations in or-
der to shift the burden of proof to the employer, which must then show
that the same personnel action would have occurred in the absence of
union activity, or that prohibited motivations played no part in its de-
cisions.
As noted above, the FAPL provides procedural protections which apply
to the administrative acts, proceedings and decisions of federal adminis-
trative agencies, including the STPS, and these protections apply to the
process of registering a union in the federal jurisdiction. Among other
things, the FAPL provides that an agency may not set any requirements
for an application additional to those stipulated in the law, must provide
an applicant with information on the legal and technical requirements
for the application, must admit evidence permitted by law and take it in-
to account in reaching a decision on the application, must permit access
to its files and archives within the time limits set out for the application,
and must give an answer to all questions raised by an application within
time limits for processing it. It gives to an applicant the right to know at
any time the status of the application, the right to obtain at its own ex-
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pense certified copies of the documents contained in the administrative
file pertaining to the application, and the right to timely notice of deci-
sion on application.
2) Independence and Impartiality of Decision Makers
CAB members serve six-year renewable terms. The FLL sets the remu-
neration of Federal and Federal District CAB chairpersons at the amount
received by judges of the Mexican Supreme Court and the President of
the High Court of Justice respectively. Articles 643 to 645 of the FLL
stipulate the grounds upon which a CAB chairperson may be dismissed
and restricts those grounds to such matters as dereliction of duty, ac-
cepting gifts from a party, voting an evidently illegal or unjust decision,
or failing to provide for timely enforcement of decisions. Article 646
vests the power to dismiss a chairperson with the authority that made the
appointment (see Government Enforcement, section 3, above).
Article 707 of the FLL sets out the grounds upon which CAB mem-
bers may be legally disqualified from conciliating or hearing a particular
case. These grounds include: a direct personal interest in the case; a rela-
tionship of economic dependence on one of the parties; a family,
debtor/creditor, heir or legatee or business partnership relationship with
a party. A CAB member may not conciliate or hear a case in which he or
she has acted as an attorney for a party, or upon which he or she has is-
sued an opinion. There is some disagreement among Mexican jurists
over whether a CAB member who is assigned to adjudicate a case and
who is a member of a union, union confederation, or employers’ organ-
ization that is a party to that case can be disqualified from adjudicating
the case on that ground.
Articles 708 to 711 set out disqualification procedures. Article 708 re-
quires any representative of the government, employers or workers to
withdraw from a case upon finding himself or herself involved in one of
the circumstances described in Article 707. Under Article 710 a party to
a case who believes that a CAB member should be disqualified from hear-
ing that case may file an application to have that member disqualified. In
the case of worker or employer representatives, or in the case of the pres-
ident of a Special Conciliation Board, the president of the relevant CAB
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decides the application. Where the application seeks to disqualify the
president of the CAB, it is brought to the STPS in the case of the Feder-
al CAB, or to the governor of the state or chief of the government of the
Federal District, as the case may be, where a local CAB is concerned. If a
CAB member is disqualified, a substitute is appointed. For a CAB presi-
dent the substitute is a CAB officer stipulated in Article 710, generally
the secretary of the CAB. Workers’ or employers’ representatives are re-
placed by their respective alternates on the CAB. CABs are required to
make their awards in good faith, on the basis of well-informed truth and
an appraisal of the facts made in good conscience (art. 841).
The FAPL prevents any federal public official from intervening in a
federal jurisdiction union registration proceeding when that official has
a direct or indirect interest in the outcome of the matter, has a family
relationship with a party to it, objectively demonstrates the existence
of manifest friendship or enmity towards a party through clear acts or
evident attitudes, has previously intervened in the matter as an expert
witness, or has a relationship of service with a party directly interested in
the matter.
B. APPEALS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
Decisions of the CABs are self-enforcing. This means that they do not
require any other act of authority in order to become effective. They
normally are not reviewable, and CABs cannot reverse their own deci-
sions (FLL art. 848). However, without changing the essence of its rul-
ing, the CAB may clarify it at the request of a party to correct mistakes of
fact or to make a point more precise (art. 847). Parties may also seek re-
view by the CAB of actions taken by the chairperson to enforce CAB
awards (see Sanctions and Remedies, section 5C, below.)
Canada’s labor laws also make labor board rulings self-enforcing upon
filing with the appropriate court. Judicial review is limited to constitu-
tional, jurisdictional and due process issues. In contrast, rulings of the
U.S. NLRB are not self-enforcing. Employers may ignore NLRB rul-
ings, forcing the board to seek enforcement of its orders in the courts.
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1) Amparo
The action for amparo (translated literally, “shelter” or “protection”) is
an institution which originated in Mexico and now forms part of the le-
gal system of many Latin American countries. Amparo permits any per-
son to obtain judicial review of a law or act or decision by a public au-
thority which allegedly violates his or her constitutionally guaranteed
individual rights. Articles 2 to 28 of the Mexican Constitution provide a
set of civil rights including freedom of speech, press and assembly, rights
in civil and criminal proceedings, property rights, and social rights.
These form the primary bases for amparo actions.
Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution are of particular importance.
These articles ensure that legal decisions and actions affecting the rights
of persons (including legal or artificial persons such as corporate em-
ployers or unions) are taken both in accordance with procedural due
process and in accordance with the law. In particular, Article 14 requires
that the essential elements of procedural due process be observed in any
proceedings through which a person’s rights are removed. Due process
requires that the parties be properly notified, represented and heard by a
tribunal and that the proceedings of the tribunal be fair, unbiased and
unaffected by coercion, intimidation or fraud. Article 14 also requires
that in civil suits (including labor law matters) final judgments be made
according to the letter of the juridical interpretation of the law or, in its
absence, be based on the general principles of law. Article 16 requires
that acts or decisions of public authorities which directly affect individ-
ual persons or their property be specifically authorized by law and be
permitted by law.
The federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over actions for a m p a r o .
An action for amparo must be filed with the court within 15 days of the
act or decision being challenged.
Actions for review of a final decision are referred to as “direct” a m p a r o
actions. A direct a m p a r o action is filed with the CAB, requesting that it
temporarily suspend the application of the decision in question and that
the case file be sent to the Collegiate Circuit Tribunal for review. Where
the action challenges the constitutionality of a law or regulation, the Col-
legiate Circuit Tribunal will send the file to the Mexican Supreme Court
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for hearing and decision. In general, decisions of the Collegiate Circuit
Tribunal in direct a m p a r o cases are final and may not be appealed.
A party may also seek amparo review of an interlocutory decision or
procedural ruling where the party alleges that the decision or ruling will
cause him or her irreparable harm. Such actions are referred to as “indi-
rect” a m p a r o actions. Indirect a m p a r o actions are normally filed with the
relevant federal district court. A party dissatisfied with a decision by the
federal district court to deny amparo may petition the Collegiate Circuit
Tribunal for review. The tribunal will hear the request for review, unless
it challenges the constitutionality of a law or regulation, in which case
the request for review will be heard by the Mexican Supreme Court.
Under the federal A m p a r o Law (Ley de Amparo, hereinafter LA) courts
are required in labor law matters to correct deficiencies in an a m p a r o
complaint for the benefit of the worker. The LA also provides that in la-
bor law matters an employer must post a bond prior to a CAB’s suspend-
ing the application of a decision or action with respect to which the em-
ployer seeks a m p a r o review. The chairperson of the CAB may then give
to the worker the amount of the bond in the event that the worker suffers
serious hardship while awaiting completion of the a m p a r o p r o c e e d i n g .
A final decision granting a m p a r o overturns an act or decision that was
the subject of the amparo proceeding. In cases where the constitutional-
ity of a law or regulation is successfully challenged, a decision granting
amparo suspends the application of that law or regulation to the peti-
tioning party. An amparo decision generally affects only the parties to
the amparo action, creating no binding precedent (see Legal Sources of
Labor Rights, section 1C, above). 
Where a CAB decision is overturned, the court will identify the legal
errors committed, indicate the legal interpretations that should govern,
and direct that the CAB reopen or resume its proceedings so that a deci-
sion may be reached in accordance with those interpretations.
C. SANCTIONS AND REMEDIES
The final decisions of the CABs are called laudos. Laudos are judicial or-
ders and immediately enforceable as such. A CAB may directly invoke
police powers to enforce a laudo. There is no need to file a laudo with a
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court prior to its enforcement. Noncompliance with a CAB order
subjects the violating party to fines or seizure of assets to satisfy the
judgment.
The CABs have general powers to award remedies to provide redress
for violations of the FLL. A laudo may require, among other things, the
reinstatement of or severance payment to a worker unjustifiably dis-
charged or may order the employer otherwise to comply with the law or
with the collective contract. The chairperson of the CAB is empowered
to take necessary measures to ensure prompt and expeditious enforce-
ment of laudos (FLL art. 940).
If an employer refuses to submit a dispute with an employee to arbi-
tration or to accept a CAB award in such a dispute, the CAB must: (1)
declare the labor relationship to be terminated; and (2) order that the
employer pay the worker three months’ wages plus compensation set out
in articles 50 and 162 of the FLL (generally 20 days’ pay per year of serv-
ice plus a seniority allowance of 12 days’ pay per year of service), plus
back pay from the date of termination of employment (art. 947). How-
ever, this rule does not apply in cases where an employer has dismissed a
worker without justifiable cause or for joining a union or association or
participating in a lawful strike.
CABs may issue fines against employers who fail to fulfill contract
terms regarding wages, the workday and days off. Such fines can amount
to 15 to 315 times the general daily minimum wage, and fines can accu-
mulate for prolonged violations, with a 25 percent additional penalty.
Each day of an ongoing violation of the law can be treated as a separate
offence, subject to an additional fine. Under Article 994 of the FLL, a
CAB may also fine an employer between 15 and 155 times the daily
minimum wage for violating Article 133’s prohibition against coercing
or compelling a worker’s choice of representative. 
The federal Criminal Code and criminal codes of the states create a
special category of labor-related crimes, including salary fraud or the
fraudulent use of joint funds created under collective contracts. If a CAB
decides upon a review of the evidence in a case that there may be
grounds for prosecution, it will direct the relevant file to the public pros-
ecutor, who may then pursue criminal sanctions.
156 MEXICO: PROCEDURAL GUARANTEES AND REMEDIES TO ENSURE ENFORCEMENT
6. PUBLICATION MEASURES
A. PUBLICATION OF LAWS, REGULATIONS, PROCEDURES AND
ADMINISTRATIVE RULINGS
By law, Mexico’s laws and regulations must be published in the Diario
Oficial de la Federación (DOF), which appears daily Monday through
Friday. A section devoted to the STPS contains all matters related to la-
bor laws and regulations. Copies are distributed throughout the country
at low cost and are generally available in any library.
Judicial decisions are published in the Judicial Weekly, with Supreme
Court decisions also published in the Annual Report of the Chief Justice of
the Court. The Supreme Court also issues a compact disc on general ju-
risprudence every year. The National Autonomous University of Mexi-
co (UNAM), the Institute of Juridical Research (IIJ), and the STPS
jointly issue a compilation of labor law jurisprudence, labor laws and
regulations, and a specialized bibliography. This compilation, entitled
Sistema de Información Juridico Laboral, is published in CD-ROM for-
mat. Commercial services such as the Mayo collection also publish court
decisions and related matters. Similarly, laws and regulations are pub-
lished in the Andrade collection, produced by another commercial pub-
lishing house.
The Federal CAB publishes the Gazette of the Federal Board, which
contains materials on new developments in labor law and jurisprudence,
as well as analytical studies. CAB decisions can be found in the archives
of the relevant boards.
The archives of the General Registry of Associations are not open to
the public. With regard to trade union registrations, only parties with a
legal interest may consult the archives. Collective contracts filed with the
CABs are generally not publicly available.
B. NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY FOR COMMENT
Proposed laws and legislative amendments may be introduced by
deputies or senators in the legislative branch or by the President of the
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Republic. The two houses of the legislature normally function through
specialized committees that consider the legislation. A committee may
organize public activities and forums to receive the views of persons, or-
ganizations and institutions. The mass media, especially the press, dif-
fuse proposals for new law, giving rise to a process of analysis and public
commentary.
7. PUBLIC INFORMATION AND AWARENESS 
A. AVAILABILITY OF PUBLIC INFORMATION
To disseminate knowledge of labor law, the STPS publishes 30,000
copies of the FLL each year for free distribution to the public in general
and to workers in particular. The STPS also publishes numerous book-
lets on workers’ rights. 
The STPS publishes an annual report which contains an overview of
its programs, activities and expenditures, including information specific
to the workings of the Federal CABs and the Federal Office of the Labor
Public Defender. Statistical tables include information on the number of
individual and collective disputes, the number of collective agreements,
and the number of strike notices filed with the CAB. The report also
contains statistics on the number of strikes that occurred, the number of
collective dispute conciliations undertaken by the CAB, and the number
of cases in which the Federal Office of the Labor Public Defender was
consulted by or represented workers in legal proceedings.
The STPS publishes the Mexican Labor Review, containing studies on
labor law themes. It also publishes the thrice-yearly Labor Notes, the
bimonthly General Conditions in Matters of Safety and Health, and semi-
annual reports of labor statistics. The statistical reports include data
o n the number and type of collective and individual labor disputes with-
in the federal jurisdiction and whether those disputes were resolved
through conciliation or adjudication. The state CABs also produce an-
nual reports.
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B. PUBLIC EDUCATION
The STPS and state labor departments maintain public affairs officers to
deal with inquiries from the public and the press and to publicize the ac-
tivities of the departments. Labor department and CAB offices are open
to the public with staff responsible for responding to requests for assis-
tance. The office of the Federal Office of the Labor Public Defender
provides advice as well as legal representation to workers who believe
their rights have been violated.
The STPS, state labor agencies and CABs sponsor and participate in
conferences, workshops, forums and other events to disseminate knowl-
edge of labor law.
C. PRIVATE INFORMATION SOURCES
Several private publishers market low-cost editions of the Federal Labor
Law for sale in bookstores and newsstands.
Among management groups, the Employers Confederation of the
Mexican Republic (COPARMEX) publishes a monthly review and a
weekly bulletin. The National Confederation of Chambers of Industry
(CONCAMIN) publishes a monthly review.
In the trade union sector, the major federations and confederations
publish newsletters and reports. These include the Confederation of
Workers of Mexico (CTM), the Revolutionary Laborer-Farmworker
Confederation (CROC), the National Union of Workers (UNT), the
Regional Workers Confederation (COR), and the Authentic Labor
Front (FAT). Other labor groups also publish newspapers, journals and
special reports.
The Institute of Juridical Research of the Universidad Autónoma de
Mexico (UNAM) publishes the Mexican Comparative Law Bulletin and
the Juridical Annual with labor themes. Similarly, the Law School of
UNAM and other faculties and schools of law publish law reviews in-
cluding labor matters.
There are also private labor-related organizations such as the Mexican
Academy of Labor Law and Social Security and the Mexican chapter of
the Iberoamerican Academy of Labor Law, which sponsor labor educa-
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tion events. A commercial publication called Laboral contains extensive
labor law information.
D. NAALC COOPERATIVE ACTIVITIES
The Mexican National Administrative Office (NAO), in collaboration
with the NAOs of Canada and the United States, has undertaken an ex-
tensive program of cooperative activities on industrial relations princi-
ples of the NAALC. Members and staff of various Mexican federal and
provincial labor agencies as well as many unions and employers’ organi-
zations have participated in these activities. Information on such pro-
grams can be obtained from the NAO of Mexico.
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Appendix 3A
PROVISIONS OF THE FEDERAL LABOR LAW RELATING
TO SPECIAL TYPES OF WORK
Title VI of the FLL (art. 181-353) contains provisions governing certain
specific types of work. These provisions serve mainly to create special
terms for individual employment relationships, the details of which are
beyond the scope of this volume. However, some of Title VI’s provisions
relate directly to freedom of association and the rights to organize, to
bargain collectively and to strike. The most important of those provi-
sions are the following:
EX C L U S I O N O F CE R T A I N AI R L I N E WO R K E R S F R O M CO L L E C T I V E BA R G A I N I N G
Operational managers, flight superintendents, persons in charge of
training, chief pilots, pilot instructors or examiners, and any other offi-
cials who perform similar duties are deemed to be representatives of the
employer (art. 219). Such workers therefore cannot be represented by a
union in their dealings with their employer.
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN UNIVERSITIES AND LEGALLY AUTONOMOUS
HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS
Unions of university workers must be composed only of: (1) academic
personnel (defined as individuals who render teaching or research serv-
ices to the university or institution); or (2) administrative personnel (de-
fined as individuals who render nonacademic services to the university
or institution); or (3) both academic and administrative personnel. A
union of either group is treated as an occupational union, while a union
of both groups is treated as an enterprise union. Unions of university
workers may exist only at an enterprise level: the boards of directors and
membership of such unions may be drawn only from workers who ren-
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der their services at a particular university or institution. Collective con-
tracts may not contain clauses requiring that only members of the union
be admitted to employment or that the employment of those who are
not members of the union be terminated. (These are known as “exclu-
sion clauses” and would otherwise be permitted by art. 395.) Notice of
any strike must be given at least 10 days in advance of the strike date.
Workers required to remain on duty during a strike include those work-
ers who are necessary to prevent irreparable prejudice to an investigation
or experiment which is under way (see art. 353J – 353U).
SPECIAL GROUNDS FOR LEGALLY JUSTIFIABLE DISMISSAL
Certain classes of worker may be dismissed for just cause for reasons not
enumerated in Article 47 of the FLL. Such grounds are enumerated in
specific articles contained in Title VI of the FLL. (See art. 185, 208,
244, 255, 264, 291, 303, 341, and 353G). These exceptions relate
mainly to various transportation workers, to confidential employees,
and to “commercial agents” (salesmen, publicity and sales promoters
and the like).
The employment of a confidential worker may be terminated if there
are “reasonable grounds for loss of confidence” by the employer, even if
these do not coincide with the justified grounds for termination set out
in Article 47.
The employment of seafarers may be terminated for, among other
things: failing to report for work, drunkenness, use of stupefying drugs,
insubordination or breach of laws with respect to import or export of
merchandise.
The employment of members of flight crews may be terminated for,
among other things: loss of passport or visas required by national or for-
eign laws; being under the influence of alcohol, a narcotic or a stimulant
(not prescribed by a specialist in aviation medicine) at any time in the 24
hours preceding the start of the flight; violation of laws with respect to
import or export of merchandise; refusal without good cause to carry out
mercy or search and rescue flights; refusal to commence or continue as-
signed flying duties; refusal to undergo training courses organized by the
employer; a deliberate act or omission or negligence likely to endanger
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his or her own safety or that of others or to damage or endanger proper-
ty of the employer or any third party.
The employment of railway workers may be terminated for: allowing
goods or passengers to be taken aboard at places other than those speci-
fied by the enterprise for such purposes; or refusal to make a scheduled
run as contracted for, or unjustified interruption of the run.
The employment of road transport workers may be terminated for:
refusal to make a trip as contracted for, or interruption of the same for
insufficient reason; or for “considerable and repeated falloff in the vol-
ume of income, unless there are circumstances justifying the same.”
The employment of commercial agents may be terminated for “any
considerable and reiterated falloff in the volume of trade, unless there are
extenuating circumstances.”
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UNITED STATES
1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
A. BASIC LABOR POLICY
Section 1 and Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act set forth the
central precepts of U.S. labor law. 
Section 1 states: “It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United
States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the
free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions
when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of
collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full
freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representa-
tives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and
conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.”
Section 7 provides that: “Employees shall have the right to self-or-
ganization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collec-
tively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or oth-
er mutual aid or protection.”
The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 added to Section 7 the
clause “and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such ac-
tivities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agree-
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ment requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of
employment as authorized in Section 8(a)(3).”
Because U.S. labor law protects “concerted activities” and “mutual
aid or protection,” employees do not have to be involved in trade union
activity to be protected by the law. Indeed, intent to unionize is not re-
quired as long as employees act in concert.
The central mechanism under in U.S. law for protecting workers’
rights to organize, to bargain collectively and to strike is found in sec-
tions 8(a) and (b) of the National Labor Relations Act, which define un-
fair labor practices (ULPs). An unfair labor practice violates the law and
is subject to the remedies provided by the Act.
B. LABOR LAW JURISDICTION
United States labor laws dealing with private sector employees fall al-
most entirely within federal jurisdiction. Under the “Commerce Clause”
in Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution, federal law pre-
vails over state laws on matters of interstate commerce — an extremely
broad jurisdiction in the complex modern U.S. economy. 
U.S. labor laws dealing with private sector employees are enforced by
federal government authorities and by federal courts. Occasional state
efforts to pass legislation on labor relations matters are most often struck
down by the courts as preempted by federal law. The states are permit-
ted a limited legislative or law enforcement role where predominantly lo-
cal interests are at stake, such as preventing picket line violence. In addi-
tion, fields not covered by federal legislation can be the subject of state
legislation. Agricultural workers are an example; they are often covered
by state law.
In Canada, the federal role is limited and labor law is primarily a
provincial responsibility. Mexico has a single Federal Labor Law (FLL)
which was enacted under authority granted to the federal government
by the states of the Mexican Federation. Enforcement of the FLL is di-
vided between federal and state authorities, generally on the basis of the
type of industry or service in question. In both nations, the law desig-
nates certain commercial or industrial sectors of national scope that fall
under federal jurisdiction.
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C. LEGAL SOURCES OF LABOR RIGHTS
Common law traditions influenced the development of the legal system
in the United States.
The common law tradition did not develop doctrines recognizing the
right to organize, to bargain collectively and to strike, and constitution-
al recognition of those rights is limited (see below). As a result, most
U.S. labor law is based on statutes. Statutes also establish administrative
agencies and tribunals to ensure the enforcement of labor rights. 
Once a statute takes effect, U.S. administrative law provides two
methods of applying it. One is called “rulemaking” — enacting regula-
tions based on the language of the statute before adjudication of any cas-
es. The purpose of rulemaking is to advise parties how the law has been
interpreted and will be applied. The second method, “adjudication,”
proceeds by deciding individual cases by applying the statute to the facts
of the case.
U.S. labor relations statutes set out few detailed standards on freedom
of association, protection of the right to organize and the right to strike.
Instead, labor law has generally developed through case law, as adminis-
trative tribunals and courts interpret constitutional and statutory law as
they apply to specific cases that come before them. Through adjudica-
tion, courts and tribunals play a central role in the development of U.S.
labor law.
Case law establishes precedents that guide parties, tribunals and
courts. Decisions of higher courts are considered binding by lower
courts within the same jurisdiction. Case decisions may also carry per-
suasive weight outside of the particular jurisdiction. A decision of the
U.S. Supreme Court is considered as a definitive interpretation of the
law both by lower courts and administrative tribunals. Of course, every
new case contains unique facts and circumstances, creating a constant
shifting of nuance and interpretation of the law. Tribunals may also un-
dertake a basic shift in policy, reversing the precedent of earlier cases.
Similarly, courts may adopt a different interpretation of the law and re-
verse earlier decisions.
Except in Quebec, the Canadian legal system also developed out of the
English common law tradition. The legal systems of Quebec and Mex-
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ico arose from a civil law tradition, which places more emphasis on
statutory codes than on judicial or administrative tribunal precedents.
1) Constitutional Sources
The U.S. Constitution makes no specific mention of the right to organ-
ize, to bargain collectively or to strike. The First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution (1789), however, protects freedom of assembly, free
speech and the right to petition the government for redress of griev-
ances. Laws or regulations that violate these rights may be struck down
as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States. The
14th Amendment (1866) and its mandate for “equal protection of the
law” applies the Bill of Rights (the first 10 amendments to the Constitu-
tion) to the individual states. Moreover, each state has its own constitu-
tion and bill of rights providing equivalent guarantees. The U.S.
Supreme Court has specifically interpreted the First Amendment to pro-
tect labor organizing, workers’ political and legislative action, peaceful
picketing, and other lawful trade union activity.1
In practice, constitutional guarantees are not absolute. Courts have
upheld limitations on assembly, speech and other aspects of the right of
association in the labor organizing context on such grounds as protect-
ing public safety or the property rights of employers. Moreover, U.S.
constitutional rights generally do not offer direct protection against the
actions of private parties. Rather, they protect only against interference
by government action. Constitutional rights do not directly govern rela-
tions between private parties and cannot be enforced against private parties.
Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms is silent on specific labor
rights. Constitutional protection for labor rights can be found only in
their recognition as aspects of the more general rights of freedom of as-
sociation, assembly and expression which are found in the Charter.
Like the U.S. Constitution, the Canadian Charter does not offer pro-
tection against the actions of private parties. In contrast, Mexico’s Con-
stitution contains guarantees of the right to organize and the right to
1 See Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88
(1940).
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strike, as well as extensive constitutional norms on wages, hours and
working conditions which are intended to protect workers. These con-
stitutional rights and norms are directly binding upon public and pri-
vate employers. 
2) Statutory Sources
Landmark federal legislation in the 20th century set the framework for
protection of workers’ rights to organize, to bargain and to strike. The
key statutes are listed below in chronological order. (Note that American
laws often carry the name of their congressional sponsors and are often
referred to by those names.)
T h e Railway Labor Act of 1926 (RLA) established the right of workers in
the railroad industry to organize and bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing. The Act covered only railway labor be-
cause of the central importance of rail transportation to the national
economy. The RLA was extended to workers and employers in the air
transportation sector in 1936. Today, nearly one million U.S. workers
are covered by the RLA. Appendix 4A provides an overview of the key
features of the regime created by the RLA.
The Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 outlawed employment contracts re-
quiring that workers promise never to join a union. Such “yellow-dog”
contracts, as they were called, were a common device used by employers
to prevent union organizing. The Norris-LaGuardia Act also sharply
constrained the ability of employers to obtain injunctions as a strike-
breaking measure. In addition it relieved union leaders of criminal and
civil liability for the acts of union members unless the leaders participat-
ed in or ratified the acts.
The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA or Wagner Act) ex-
tended to most private sector employees “the right to self-organization,
to form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
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protection.” The NLRA created a new concept in U.S. law: the unfair la-
bor practice. The Act defined and made unlawful five unfair labor prac-
tices by employers. The NLRA also established the National Labor Re-
lations Board (NLRB) to administer the Act.
The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA or Taft-Hartley
Act) amended the NLRA, retaining the key rights and responsibilities of
the Wagner Act but introducing important limitations on the rights to
organize, to bargain collectively and to strike. The amended NLRA re-
tained the five employer unfair labor practices and included a new cate-
gory of union unfair labor practices. It permitted “employer free speech”
to campaign against union organization.
The Taft-Hartley amendments also allowed individual states to enact
“right-to-work” laws prohibiting union security agreements (by which a
union and an employer agree to require payment of union dues by all
represented employees). Finally, the amendments prohibited “secondary
boycotts,” by which workers involved in a “primary” labor dispute apply
pressure against “secondary employers” and seek solidarity action by
workers at a supplier or customer of their own employer. 
The Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA
or Landrum-Griffin Act) established a “bill of rights” for individual
union members in internal union affairs, including a right to democrat-
ic elections of union officers. The Act also set forth detailed financial re-
porting and disclosure requirements for unions. 
Today, the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Labor Man -
agement Relations Act, and the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure
A c t comprise the most important federal labor laws governing private sec-
tor labor-management relations. Other laws, such as the Fair Labor Stan -
dards Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act and the Equal Pay Act, ad-
dress minimum wage, hours of work, child labor, workplace safety,
nondiscrimination in employment, and other labor standards.
The Canadian federal jurisdiction and the 10 provinces each have a
comprehensive labor relations statute governing workers’ rights to or-
ganize, to bargain collectively and to strike. These 11 jurisdictions also
have separate legislation on labor standards. Mexico’s single Federal
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LaborLaw covers industrial relations matters as well as labor standards
and most other aspects of employment.
3) Rulemaking
In general, the National Labor Relations Board does not engage in rule-
making. Therefore, there is no common practice of communicating pro-
posed changes in rules and regulations in advance for public comment.
The Board decides particular cases brought before it through charges by
private parties. In some exceptional instances, the NLRB undertakes
rulemaking by publishing proposed rules for advance notice and public
comment. 
D. THE INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP
Common law principles of “master-servant” relations, where the “mas-
ter” held both authority over and responsibility for the “servant,” gov-
erned the employment relationship in the United States from the earli-
est colonial periods. Until the early 19th century, individual workers
could be bound by an employment contract for years without an oppor-
tunity to seek new employment under better terms. The courts gradual-
ly overturned this form of employment because it did not suit a growing
market economy. By the 1830s, the shift in judicial opinions created the
“employment-at-will” doctrine of freely contracted individual employ-
ment. Under this doctrine, employment is a voluntary relationship un-
regulated by the government. The employee agrees to work under the
direction and control of the employer, and the employer agrees to pro-
vide compensation for work performed. For most workers, there is no
written contract of employment. The employment-at-will relationship
still predominates in the United States for the majority of workers not
covered by collective bargaining agreements. 
In its classic formulation, the at-will doctrine permits either a worker
or an employer to terminate an employment relationship at any time for
“a good reason, a bad reason or no reason at all.” No severance pay or
other form of indemnification is required under U.S. law.
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There are three basic exceptions to the at-will rule. First, a written
contract of employment can contain conditions for terminating the re-
lationship. Professionals and executives often have such individual con-
tracts of employment, as do the approximately 16 percent of the Amer-
ican workforce (12 percent in the private sector) covered by collective
bargaining agreements. Most collective bargaining agreements contain a
“just cause” standard for discharge, which provides a recourse to neutral,
binding arbitration in disputed cases.
Second, the employment-at-will doctrine is superseded by statutes
that prohibit certain forms of discrimination in employment or require
advance notice of workplace closures. For example, U.S. laws prohibit
discrimination based on concerted activity (including union organiz-
ing), race, color, sex, age, national origin, religion and disability. Protec-
tion against discrimination generally covers all employees in both the
private and public sectors. Federal antidiscrimination statutes provide
exemptions for small enterprises, but such firms are usually covered by
state and local antidiscrimination measures. Requirements for advance
notice of plant closings or mass layoffs apply only to employees of large
firms.
Third, exceptions can be created by courts applying state laws or di-
rectly by state statute. Courts in some jurisdictions have established a
“public policy” exception to the at-will rule. For example, an employee
fired for refusing to perform an illegal act may be reinstated. Some
courts have also found an implied contract of employment requiring just
cause for discharge. In employee handbooks an implied “covenant of
good faith and fair dealing” under common law principles may also pro-
vide a basis for the reinstatement of workers who were unfairly dis-
charged.
Court-fashioned exceptions to the at-will rule remain limited. Indi-
vidual employees must bring private lawsuits to challenge a discharge.
The costs and risks of litigation make such challenges rare. In several
states, however, statutes have been enacted that codify public policy ex-
ceptions and other variations from the at-will doctrine. For example, in
several states employers are prohibited from discharging an employee for
reporting illegal activity to public authorities. These prohibitions are
commonly referred to as “whistle-blower protections.” Among the 50
United States, only Montana — a lightly populated, rural state with lit-
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tle industrial employment — has enacted a statute creating a just cause
standard for discharge covering all private sector employees in the state,
with a right of action in state courts. 
Labor and employment law specialists generally agree that the tradi-
tional at-will employment relationship is gradually being eroded by the
effects of broadened antidiscrimination laws and the accumulation of
court decisions and state laws which carve out exceptions to the at-will
rule. Nonetheless, the employment-at-will doctrine remains the prevail-
ing basis of the individual employment relationship in the United States.
The at-will employment doctrine does not apply to employment rela-
tionships in Mexico or Canada. Mexican law establishes a set of limit-
ed and specific just causes for terminating any individual’s employ-
ment, whether or not the individual is covered by a collective
bargaining agreement. Any worker may bring a claim of unjustified dis-
charge before a labor tribunal. Canadian employees covered by collec-
tive agreements (approximately 35 percent of the labor force) can gen-
erally have their employment terminated only for “just cause.”
Statutory notice of termination requirements are applicable to all em-
ployees, as are antidiscrimination laws and a common law judicial re-
quirement of reasonable notice (or pay in lieu of notice) for any termi-
nation of an employment contract which is for an indefinite term.
E. EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE
Under the National Labor Relations Act, legal protection for the right to
organize, to bargain collectively and to strike is afforded to those falling
within the definition of an “employee.” The definition excludes agricul-
tural workers, domestic workers, managers, supervisors, confidential
employees, independent contractors, and employees covered by the
Railway Labor Act.
Most Canadian jurisdictions are more expansive than the United States
in their labor law coverage, including front-line supervisors and con-
tractors in a position of economic dependence (often referred to as “de-
pendent contractors”) within the definition of “employee” under the
law. Mexican labor law covers any person who personally performs
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subordinate work for another individual or legal person in return for
remuneration, except family members employed in a family enterprise. 
2. LEVELS OF PROTECTION – SUBSTANTIVE LABOR LAWS 
A. LABOR PRINCIPLE 1 – FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND
THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE
1) Legal Foundations
Although the U.S. Constitution does not contain specific guarantees of
labor rights, the U.S. and state constitutions do provide protection for
freedom of association by protecting rights of assembly, free speech and
petitioning the government for redress of grievances. Moreover, the con-
stitutions of some states specifically guarantee the right of state employ-
ees to organize. Because U.S. constitutional guarantees apply only to
government action, constitutional protections do not apply to the ac-
tions of private parties. Affirmative legislation is required to protect free-
dom of association and the right to organize in the private employment
context. The key statutes protecting freedom of association and the right
to organize in the private sector are outlined in section 1C, above, and
are discussed in more detail below. 
2) The Formation and Dissolution of Unions
U.S. federal law protects the right of two or more employees to form a
union. This right belongs solely to workers. Neither recognition by the
employer nor prior authorization, registration or other official act by the
government is required to form a union.
Only two workers are necessary to form a union — whether they are the
only employees of the employer or part of a larger workforce. Union mem-
bers can elect officers, collect dues, establish a union constitution, obtain
property, engage employees, hold meetings, assist workers in legal pro-
ceedings outside the workplace, or otherwise act to defend their interests.
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Members of a union determine whether and when it should be dissolved.
The legal existence of a union is not by itself sufficient to require an
employer to bargain or to conclude a collective bargaining agreement.
Rather a union must obtain bargaining rights, which are normally ob-
tained through union representation elections conducted by the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (see Acquisition of Bargaining Rights, sec-
tion 2B.2, below). The election process is a method of determining
whether a majority of employees in an “appropriate bargaining unit”
(see section 2A.2, below) desire representation for purposes of collective
bargaining. If so, the law will compel the employer to bargain. Even if a
majority of workers do not vote in favor of a union in such an election,
or if an election never takes place, workers retain the right to form a
union and engage in protected concerted activity. The right to organize
exists independently of any such election. In practice, certification by
the NLRB as a result of an election is by far the most common means
by which workers organize a union, since their objective is to achieve a
collective bargaining agreement.
3) Legal Status of Unions
Section 301 of the LMRA creates a private right of action for unions to
sue or be sued for the enforcement of contracts. In addition, the U.S.
Supreme Court has held that unions may sue or be sued as legal entities
in the federal courts in any action involving the application of federal
law to a union.
4) Union Self-Governance
Unions are governed by the terms of their own constitutions. Union
members have the power to create and amend their union’s constitution.
Unions are free to determine their own course of legal, political and
strategic action, provided that they comply with their constitutions, as
well as with laws regarding internal union democracy (see Freedom of
Association within Unions, section 2A.7, and Protections against Inter-
ference, section 2D, below), laws restricting the purposes for which
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union dues may be spent (see Union Membership and Dues, section
2A.6, below) and general laws governing economic and political activity.
5) Union Political and Legislative Activity
Trade union political action is a vital aspect of freedom of association.
Workers and unions in the United States have a constitutional right
(regulated by statutes) to engage in electoral and legislative activities.
U.S. unions often endorse candidates for public office and work to have
favored candidates elected by distributing handbills to their members and
local communities, organizing volunteer “phone banks” to telephone vot-
ers urging a favorable vote, and providing financial support to candidates.
Most unions do not endorse political parties. The law places certain re-
strictions on the use of union dues for political expenditures (see Union
Membership and Dues, below). Resources from union dues may be used,
however, for nonpartisan legislative and voter education campaigns.
Unions participate in the legislative process by persuading legislators
to introduce prolabor bills, meeting with legislators to persuade them to
support prolabor bills (“lobbying”) and testifying at legislative commit-
tees in support of prolabor bills. Many unions also develop “grass roots”
campaigns to undertake similar activities at the local level. Finally,
unions often mobilize their members to participate in demonstrations,
marches, rallies and other forms of peaceful assembly and free expression
protected under the First Amendment of the Constitution.
6) Union Membership and Dues
An individual employee cannot be compelled to become a union mem-
ber under U.S. principles of freedom of association. However, a union
and an employer may generally negotiate an “agency shop” or “union se-
curity” clause requiring nonmembers of the union to pay, as a condition
of employment, equivalent fees for representation. Such employees are
often referred to as “agency fee payers.” An employee cannot be termi-
nated from employment for refusing to join the union as long as he or
she tenders agency fee payments.
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In a majority of states, trade unions may negotiate union security
clauses. However, the LMRA amended the NLRA to permit states to
prohibit such contract clauses under state statutes, commonly referred to
as “right-to-work” laws. Twenty-one states, most in the southern region
of the United States, have enacted right-to-work laws. These laws gen-
erally provide that an employee may not be required to pay agency fees
as a condition of employment. Unions are nonetheless legally obligated
to represent each employee in the bargaining unit, regardless of the em-
ployee’s union membership status and regardless of whether the em-
ployee pays any agency fees to support such representation. While
unions represent more than 20 percent of employees in states where
union security agreements are permitted, unions represent fewer than 10
percent of employees in right-to-work states.
In 1988, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that an agency fee payer
may not be compelled to pay dues which go to expenses other than those
“necessarily or reasonably incurred for the purpose of performing the
duties of an exclusive bargaining representative,” which the court found
to be limited to collective bargaining, administering collective bargain-
ing agreements, and union administration.2 Where a nonmember ob-
jects to the expenditure of his or her dues money on activities other than
those, such as expenditures on political and legislative activities or on
some types of union organizing activities, the union must reduce his or
her dues by the portion devoted to such purposes. Courts have been
faced with the task of deciding on a case-by-case basis which expenses are
necessary to a union’s duties as exclusive bargaining representative. 
In both Canada and Mexico, unions may negotiate agreements with
employers requiring employees to be union members as a condition of
employment. In Mexico the Federal Labor Law requires employers to
deduct from union members’ pay and remit to the union ordinary
union dues payments. Most Canadian jurisdictions require that collec-
tive agreements contain “Rand Formula” clauses if the union opts for
one. Rand Formula clauses do not require union membership but do
require that all bargaining unit members pay regular union dues. All
but one Canadian jurisdiction allow unions to decide whether and how
to spend dues revenue from both union members and nonmembers for
2 Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 108 (1988).
A. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE 177
political purposes. As long as unions do not interfere in religious mat-
ters, unions in Mexico enjoy autonomy in making spending decisions.
7) Freedom of Association within Unions
The Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) estab-
lishes rules for internal union democracy. The Act provides union mem-
bers with the following rights:
• free speech rights in union affairs;
• the right to vote on union dues;
• the right to run for union office;
• the right to obtain the union’s charter and bylaws;
• the right to receive a copy of the collective bargaining agreement;
• the right to obtain an accounting of union finances; and 
• the right to union elections free of intimidation or fraud and other
procedural guarantees.
The Act also requires labor organizations to file with the Labor De-
partment annual financial reports detailing salaries, expenses, sources of
income, use of contractors, etc. These records are available to the public.
Canada does not regulate internal union democratic processes as close-
ly as the United States. Most Canadian jurisdictions require unions to
provide their members with a copy of the union’s audited financial
statements and prohibit unions from retaliating against bargaining unit
members for exercising labor law rights by seeking their dismissal un-
der union security clauses. Most of the other rights provided to U.S.
unionists under the LMRDA are left to be voluntarily included in the
constitutions of Canadian unions. In Mexico a union member may be
lawfully expelled from a union only by a two-thirds majority vote of the
union’s membership, following procedures set out in the FLL and any
procedures established by the union’s constitution. The Mexican Con-
stitution protects workers against dismissal for joining or attempting to
form a union. Workers dismissed pursuant to a closed shop union se-
curity clause (known as an “exclusion clause” in Mexican labor law dis-
course) for joining or supporting another union, during the formation
or registration of that union, may seek reinstatement or severance pay
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by filing a claim with the relevant CAB. In addition, Mexican labor law
provides a mechanism by which the membership can convoke a gener-
al meeting of the union if the board of directors fails to do so and re-
quires that the board of directors provide members every six months
with accounts of the administration of the union’s assets. 
B. LABOR PRINCIPLE 2 – THE RIGHT TO BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY
1) Legal Foundations
The U.S. Constitution does not specifically address the right to bargain
collectively. During the 19th century and into the early 20th century, ef-
forts by workers and unions to engage in collective bargaining were of-
ten treated as criminal conspiracies or restraints of trade. During and af-
ter the First World War, however, governmental hostility to collective
bargaining began to yield to the reality of industrial conflict, especially in
the railroad industry. American workers’ mass organizing and political
movements of the 1930s succeeded in normalizing collective bargaining
as a method of industrial relations.
The Railway Labor Act of 1926 (RLA) gives railroad industry em-
ployees the right to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing and establishes the duty of industry employers to “make
and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, rules and working
conditions.” Since 1936, the RLA has also applied to airline industry la-
bor relations. An overview of the RLA is provided in Appendix 4A.
The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA) grants employees
the right “to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing” and “to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining.” Section 1 of the NLRA declares the policy of the
United States as “encouraging the practice and procedure of collective
bargaining” and “protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of
association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their
own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions
of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.” The NLRA
makes it an unfair labor practice (ULP) for an employer to interfere with
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those rights or “to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives
of his employees.”
The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA or Taft-Hart-
ley Act) created a new group of union ULPs analogous to employer
ULPs, such as a union’s refusal to bargain. The LMRA also created the
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) to assist unions
and employers in the collective bargaining process.
The principal features of U.S. law on collective bargaining are:
• the right of workers to bargain;
• the duty of employers to bargain;
• the requirement of proof of union majority representative status
before bargaining rights and duties attach to the union and the em-
ployer;
• certification of majority status by the National Labor Relations
Board, which affords protection to the union as bargaining repre-
sentative;
• exclusive representation by the certified union (i.e., the union has
the exclusive right to bargain on behalf of the employees that it rep-
resents and to conclude an agreement on their behalf); and
• minimal government intervention in bargaining, limited to medi-
ation (except in national emergencies).
Canadian collective bargaining laws are similar to U.S. laws. In Cana-
da, however, a majority of jurisdictions give unions the right to certifi-
cation by “card-check” (verifying that a majority of workers have vol-
untarily signed cards designating a union to represent them) rather
than by an election. Canadian law creates a system in which the gov-
ernments intervene more directly in the bargaining process than in the
United States. Canadian law also specifies certain clauses that must be
contained in a collective bargaining agreement.
Mexican labor law contains the principles of majority status and ex-
clusive representation, but it does not create a duty to bargain collec-
tively. Instead, it creates a context to stimulate bargaining by guaran-
teeing the right to organize and the right to strike. Voting to determine
majority status may take place if one union challenges another for title
to a collective contract. In deciding such challenges, a CAB may super-
vise a vote of the workers, known as a recuento, in order to obtain
evidence of union majority support. A recuento will not necessarily be
conducted if other evidence is sufficient to prove majority support.
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Mexican law establishes requirements for the content of a collective
contract agreement and makes conciliation mandatory once a union
has delivered notice of its intention to strike.
2) Acquisition of Bargaining Rights
A union cannot compel an employer to bargain collectively except in the
following circumstances: (1) the employer voluntarily recognizes a
union’s evidence that it has the support of a majority of bargaining unit
employees; (2) the union’s majority support is certified as the result of an
NLRB election in which a majority of those casting ballots vote to be
represented by the union; or (3) the Board issues a bargaining order in
response to employer unfair labor practices (see The Gissel Doctrine, be-
low). In practice, a certification election is the usual means by which
workers seek to achieve a collective bargaining agreement. Once a union
has acquired bargaining rights, the employer is required to bargain in good
faith for the purpose of concluding a collective bargaining agreement.
(i) Petitioning for an Election
The NLRA speaks only of representatives “designated or selected”
by workers for the purpose of collective bargaining. The Act does not
specify the method for designating representatives. Strictly speaking, an
election is not necessary to determine a union’s majority status and the
employer’s obligation to bargain. Cards signed by a majority of workers
without coercion, or any other objective measure of employees’ will, are
sufficient in principle to establish majority status.
In practice, however, U.S. employers generally dispute a union’s claim
of majority status and its demand to bargain by asserting a “good-faith
doubt” about the union’s majority status. The National Labor Relations
Board does not require an employer to recognize a union’s majority support
based only on signed membership cards, and there is no inquiry into the
good faith of the employer’s doubt. The employer may petition the NLRB
for an election to determine majority status or the employer may do noth-
ing and refuse to deal with the union. The union may seek to pressure the
employer for recognition through appeals for public support or collective
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action. A union striking for recognition must petition the NLRB for an
election within 30 days of the start of the strike.
A union may petition the NLRB to conduct an election when it has
obtained cards from 30 percent of the employees that it seeks to repre-
sent designating the union as their collective bargaining representative.
American unions generally seek the support of a substantial majority of
employees before seeking certification. They do this for two reasons.
First, unions commonly receive a lower percentage of votes in an elec-
tion than the percentage of signed cards obtained. Second, the NLRB
may obligate the employer to bargain in good faith without an election
(see The Gissel Doctrine, below) if the union can demonstrate it at one
time had the support of a majority of the employees it seeks to represent.
In recent years, some U.S. unions have negotiated agreements with
some employers which require the employer to recognize the union as
the employees’ bargaining agent at unorganized sites on the basis of
more expeditious processes than NLRB elections, such as proof of mem-
bership cards signed by a majority of the employees that they seek to rep-
resent at the site in question. Such agreements may be achieved through
collective bargaining, where the union already represents a substantial
portion of the employer’s workers, or by seeking public support or oth-
erwise pressing employers to agree to such terms.
In a majority of Canadian jurisdictions, signed cards may serve as the
basis for certification without need for an election. In Mexico a union
requires a minimum of 20 members in order to obtain registration.
“Registration” in Mexico is not the same as “certification” in the Unit-
ed States and Canada. Registration gives a union the legal capacity to
enter into contracts and act as a party to legal proceedings. It is ob-
tained through an administrative procedure which does not require
proof that the union represents a majority of any group of workers.
Once registered, a union can demand a collective contract from an em-
ployer and give a strike notice to induce bargaining and/or conciliation
or arbitration by government authorities. 
(ii) Appropriate Bargaining Unit
When a union petitions for an election, it must specify which group of
employees it seeks to represent. This group is referred to as a “bargaining
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unit.” Upon receipt of an election petition, the NLRB is empowered by
Section 9(b) of the NLRA to determine whether the unit sought by the
union is appropriate. The employer may challenge the union’s proposed
bargaining unit with its own proposed unit. The NLRB regional office
will then conduct a hearing and decide which employees make up an ap-
propriate bargaining unit and are entitled to vote in the election. If the
employer and union reach an agreement on the scope of the proposed
bargaining unit and the agreement is approved by the regional director,
a hearing is unnecessary. Unions may decide to compromise on some as-
pects of scope in order to expedite the election process.
In general, a “community of interest” of workers and common man-
agement control of labor relations policy covering those workers within
the enterprise are required for a bargaining unit to be found “appropri-
ate.” The practice within an industry will typically be taken into ac-
count. Within these guidelines, an appropriate unit might, in certain
circumstances, be a narrow one, such as workers in one department or
one occupation at a single facility. On the other hand, an appropriate
unit in another case might cover all departments and all nonsupervisory
occupations in more than one facility or even nationwide. Bargaining
units are generally confined to a single employer. The Board may ap-
prove a multiemployer bargaining unit in which a group of employers
agrees to be bound in collective bargaining by group actions and a union
representing a majority of the workers of each of such employers agrees
to bargain collectively with that group.
Supervisory employees are excluded from coverage under the NLRA.
There are often disputes between employers and unions as to whether
certain employees are really “work leaders,” who share a community of
interest with other employees, rather than supervisors, whose commu-
nity of interest lies with management.
Canadian law defines an appropriate bargaining unit in a similar fash-
ion. Low-level supervisors are normally included in a unit. In Mexico,
the type of workers that a union may represent depends on the type of
union (craft, enterprise, industrial, etc.). Confidential employees such
as managers, supervisors, and workers in a position of trust may not be
represented by the same union as other employees.
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(iii) The Representation Election Campaign
Once the bargaining unit is determined, a date for an election is set. The
NLRB normally seeks to arrange an election within 42 days of the filing of
the petition. The union is provided with a list of employee addresses dur-
ing an NLRA election so that the union may contact employees at home.
The period preceding the election is generally one of intensive cam-
paigning by the union and employer. Some employer conduct during an
election campaign (such as discharging a leader of the prounion campaign
for union activities or making threats of reprisal if the union wins the elec-
tion) might rise to the level of an unfair labor practice. A meritorious ULP
charge (see NLRB Enforcement Procedures, section 3B, below) will delay
the election until it is settled or litigated, unless the charging party consents
to go forward with the election and resolve the ULP case later.
(iv) Secret Ballot Elections
NLRB agents conduct a secret ballot election at the workplace (although
dispersed workers might instead have a mail ballot). The employer and the
union are entitled to have election observers present at the polling places
and at the tabulation of ballots. The observers can challenge the votes of
those they believe are not eligible to vote. Challenged votes are segregated
for a later determination whether they would affect the final results.
The average number of elections has decreased from more than 7,000
per year in the 1960s and 1970s to approximately 3,800 in the 1990s.
Unions currently win approximately one-half of NLRB elections.
(v) Election Objections
Depending on the results, the union or the employer may file objections
to the election. NLRB case law requires “laboratory conditions” at elec-
tions, meaning “conditions as nearly as ideal as possible, to determine
uninhibited desires of employees”3 with respect to union representation
(see Protections against Interference, section 2D, below). Campaign
conduct that might not amount to an unfair labor practice can still de-
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3 General Shoe Corp., 77 NLRB 124 (1948).
stroy the laboratory conditions for an election. The NLRB may order a
new election if it finds merit in such objections to the election. In prac-
tice, NLRB election campaigns are normally as hard-fought and pas-
sionate as any political campaign, with charges of unfair tactics, mis-
leading propaganda and other misconduct commonly raised by both the
union and management.
(vi) The Gissel Doctrine
The NLRB and the courts have fashioned an important legal doctrine
affecting the right to organize and the right to bargain, known as the
Gissel doctrine.4 When an uncoerced majority of workers has designat-
ed the union as their bargaining representative and the employer com-
mits unfair labor practices that tend to undermine the union’s majority
and make a fair election impossible, the NLRB may issue a bargaining
order without an election. This order requires the employer to bargain
in good faith with the union as if the union had won an election.
Most Canadian jurisdictions have enacted legislative provisions em-
powering the labor board to order automatic certification without ma-
jority support in cases where ULPs by the employer have rendered the
board unable to ascertain the true wishes of the employees. Bargaining
orders are not an issue in Mexico. There, workers may register a union
regardless of whether the union represents a majority of any group.
Once registered, a union may seek to negotiate a collective contract.
When an employer is asked by a union to sign a collective contract and
refuses to do so, the workers may exercise their right to strike, subject
to mandatory conciliation and other legal requirements. In practice,
this generally compels the employer to engage in bargaining and con-
clude a collective contract with the union.
(vii) NLRB Rulings Not Self-Enforcing
Although the NLRB is the labor law enforcement agency that decides
whether an employer or a union has violated the law, the Board cannot
enforce its own decisions. If parties refuse to comply with a Board order,
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4 See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
enforcement must occur through the judicial system. By way of exam-
ple, a union organizing effort sometimes follows this course:
1) the union wins the NLRB election;
2) the employer files objections to the election accusing the union of
improper tactics in the election process;
3) the NLRB rules against the employer and issues a bargaining order;
4) the employer refuses to bargain;
5) the union files a ULP charge alleging refusal to bargain;
6) the regional director issues a ULP complaint.
The ULP procedure then begins (see section 3, Government En-
forcement, below), with the general counsel prosecuting the case
through a trial before an administrative law judge, an appeal to the
NLRB, and appeals from the Board to the federal courts, which may or
may not enforce the Board’s order. Only a final ruling by a court is en-
forceable. In practice, the availability of numerous appeals can mean
that a union election victory is followed by extended litigation before the
employer is finally compelled to bargain. The cycle of litigation can be-
gin all over again with new ULP charges of refusal to bargain in good
faith. In recent years, the NLRB’s general counsel has sought to reduce
litigation delays by bringing a motion for summary judgment in re-
sponse to appeals of ALJ decisions to the NLRB.
(viii) The One-Year Rule
Regardless of the outcome, no new election may be held within one year
of an earlier election in any given bargaining unit. If the union wins and
is certified as the exclusive representative of employees, it has a one-year
period in which its representation rights cannot be disturbed. The em-
ployer is obligated to bargain in good faith during this period.
Canadian labor law generally provides that where a union’s application
for certification is unsuccessful, the union may be temporarily barred
from making another application for certification in respect of sub-
stantially the same bargaining unit. The length of the bar varies by ju-
risdiction but is most often less than one year. Canadian labor legisla-
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tion typically gives a newly certified union a secure period of one year
during which to negotiate a first collective agreement. In Mexico, a reg-
istered union can at any time seek support from members of the union
that holds title to an existing collective contract and make an applica-
tion to the relevant Conciliation and Arbitration Board to obtain title
to the collective contract.
3) The Collective Bargaining Process
Collective bargaining can be initiated by the union or by the employer
to conclude a first collective agreement or to modify, terminate or re-
place an existing one. Collective bargaining is normally initiated by one
party delivering a “notice to bargain.” Notice to bargain can be delivered
at any time following certification of a union as a new bargaining agent.
Notice to bargain modifications to, or the termination or renewal of, an
existing contract must generally be delivered 60 days prior to the expira-
tion date of the agreement. In the event that the agreement contains no
expiration date, notice must be delivered 60 days prior to the proposed
date to alter or terminate the agreement. The party giving notice must
also give advance written notice to the Federal Mediation and Concilia-
tion Service.
(i) Obligation to Bargain
“Good Faith Bargaining” Requirement and the “Refusal to Bargain” ULP
Section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act defines collective bar-
gaining as the obligation to bargain “in good faith” with respect to
wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment and to ex-
ecute a written contract to incorporate any agreement reached. The Act
specifies that “such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a
proposal or require the making of a concession.” Section 8(a)(5) of the
Act makes it a ULP for an employer “to refuse to bargain collectively
with the representatives of his employees.” Section 8(b)(3) of the Act
makes a union’s refusal to bargain a ULP.
The duty to bargain does not compel the parties to reach a collective
agreement. They are simply required to meet at reasonable times, with-
out unreasonable delays, and to negotiate in good faith. Dilatory tactics
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such as refusing to meet and confer at reasonable times and intervals,
sending a representative with inadequate authority to bargain, or im-
posing numerous or unreasonable conditions upon initiating negotia-
tions or the final execution of a contract have been found to breach the
good faith bargaining obligation. Similarly, the employer may not ne-
gotiate with any other union, bypass the union to deal directly with em-
ployees, or deal individually with employees, since Section 9(a) of the
National Labor Relations Act makes the union chosen by a majority of
workers the exclusive representative of the employees for collective bar-
gaining purposes. The union has the duty and the right to represent all
employees in the bargaining unit. Within these largely procedural obli-
gations, however, the parties remain free to bargain hard and to disagree.
The duty to bargain continues during the term of the collective bar-
gaining agreement unless it has been discharged or waived. Matters which
were neither discussed nor embodied in any of the terms and conditions of
a collective bargaining agreement remain subject to the duty to bargain. In
practice, the parties often negotiate a clause (commonly referred to as a “zip-
per clause”) waiving the right to bargain about terms and conditions of em-
ployment during the term of a collective bargaining agreement.
Surface Bargaining
Surface bargaining is the term applied to a practice by an employer of
going through the motions of bargaining without intending to reach an
agreement.
Surface bargaining can occur in any labor negotiation, but usually
arises in the context of a newly certified bargaining unit where manage-
ment resisted the organizing effort. Surface bargaining is an unfair labor
practice because it is a refusal to bargain in good faith. Since surface bar-
gaining involves subjective motivation rather than obvious external con-
duct, such cases are among the most difficult to prosecute.
Canadian labor laws also contain a “good faith bargaining” obligation
with an equivalent unfair labor practice of breach of the duty to bar-
gain. In contrast, Mexican law does not contain the unfair labor prac-
tice concept. It does not impose a duty to bargain. Instead, by protect-
ing workers’ right to strike, the law seeks to induce bargaining by
giving workers the right to strike if the employer refuses to conclude a
collective contract with their union.
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Canadian and Mexican labor laws also uphold the principle of ex-
clusive representation by a single union for the relevant bargaining
unit. As in the United States, there may be two or more unions that
bargain with the employer, but not for the same categories of workers
in a given workplace.
(ii) Disclosure of Information
Under U.S. law, the duty to bargain in good faith includes the duty to
provide relevant information to the other party for collective bargaining.
The duty applies to requests for information relevant to any mandatory
subject of bargaining (see Scope of Bargaining and Contents of Collec-
tive Bargaining Agreement, below).
In practice, most unions send detailed information requests to em-
ployers prior to bargaining, covering all major aspects of employment
conditions. As long as the information sought is relevant, employers
must respond. The NLRB and the courts have given a broad interpreta-
tion to the relevance requirement, providing unions with a valuable
bank of information for bargaining purposes.
Disputes over information requests are sometimes grounds for a ULP
charge by a union that the employer has refused to bargain in good faith.
Such disputes over information requests may also serve as grounds for a
ULP strike by workers (see Unfair Labor Practice Strikes and Economic
Strikes, in section 2C.5, below).
(iii) Changes to Working Conditions during Negotiations
An important feature of U.S. collective bargaining law is that the em-
ployer is not permitted to change any terms or conditions of employ-
ment without first engaging in good faith bargaining with the union. A
unilateral change prior to a genuine impasse having been reached con-
stitutes a ULP of refusal to bargain. A genuine bargaining impasse exists
only when each party has fully bargained over and complied with infor-
mation requests with respect to all mandatory issues (see Scope of Bar-
gaining and Contents of Collective Bargaining Agreement, below), but
the parties are still apart and unwilling to make further substantive con-
cessions. This rule against unilateral changes by the employer continues
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to apply even when a collective bargaining agreement has expired, except
that an employer may at that point refuse to honor obligations that were
created by the collective bargaining agreement, such as deduction of
union dues and participation in the arbitration of grievances.
After a true impasse has been reached, the employer may unilaterally
implement all or part of its final proposal to the union. At that point, the
union must either take strike action or work under the terms unilateral-
ly imposed by the employer. In practice, the workers will sometimes
work under the imposed terms while carrying out informational picket-
ing or other actions to press the employer to return to negotiations.
In all Canadian jurisdictions, an employer may not alter terms and con-
ditions of employment from the time at which either party gives notice
to bargain a collective agreement until the parties have completed the
conciliation process and are in a legal strike or lockout position. At that
point, the employer may impose unilateral changes in terms and con-
ditions of employment, provided that those changes do not constitute
an attempt to undermine or interfere with the union.
Under Mexican law an employer may not unilaterally change the
terms of a collective contract or an individual employment contract.
Once filed with the relevant CAB, a collective contract that meets basic
legal requirements for minimum contents is treated as a judicial order
of the CAB itself and is enforceable as such. Collective contracts gener-
ally have an unlimited duration. A union may strike in response to uni-
lateral changes to a collective contract. In cases of economic necessity a
collective contract may be suspended or terminated, subject to CAB ap-
proval, if the employer can prove the existence of one of the legally rec-
ognized grounds for such measures.
(iv) Scope of Bargaining and Contents of Collective Bargaining 
Agreement
Freedom of Contract
Under U.S. labor law, no clause of a collective bargaining agreement
is required by law, and neither the NLRB nor the courts can impose any
clause of an agreement on either the union or the employer. Parties may
voluntarily submit contract negotiation disputes to binding arbitration,
but this mechanism is rarely used in U.S. labor relations. The negotiat-
190 UNITED STATES: LEVELS OF PROTECTION – SUBSTANTIVE LABOR LAWS
B. THE RIGHT TO BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY 191
ing parties normally go to the brink of a strike or lockout, then ulti-
mately compromise in a settlement.
Canadian laws specify several clauses that must be contained in every
collective agreement. Mexican law stipulates a number of subjects that
a collective contract must address, such as wage rates, hours of work,
rest days and vacation leave.
Mandatory Subjects of Bargaining
In the United States, the obligation to bargain extends only to
“mandatory subjects of bargaining.” The NLRB and the courts have de-
veloped this concept to a high degree of nuance, but the controlling fac-
tor is the subject’s relevance to wages, hours and working conditions.
Parties are required to bargain over mandatory subjects, but may refuse
to bargain over other “permissive” subjects.
An important distinction between mandatory and permissive subjects
relates to decisions by employers to close or transfer all or part of their
operations. The Supreme Court has defined matters that lie at “the core
of entrepreneurial control” as nonmandatory subjects that are left to
employer discretion, as long as they are unrelated to labor costs. Al-
though the “effects” of such decisions are a mandatory bargaining sub-
ject, the decision itself is not subject to negotiation. On the other hand,
a decision that turns on labor costs or other issues related to wages, hours
and working conditions could fall within the mandatory subject scope.5
Neither Canadian nor Mexican law has an equivalent to the U.S. doc-
trine of mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining.
(v) Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration of Bargaining Disputes
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS)
The FMCS was created by the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 “to assist
parties to labor disputes … to settle such disputes through conciliation
5 See Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964); First National
Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
and mediation.” The FMCS may undertake mediation and conciliation
only if both parties request its involvement in the bargaining dispute.
A union or an employer seeking to modify or terminate a collective
bargaining agreement must notify the other party and the FMCS and
any state mediation body of such intention. An FMCS mediator nor-
mally calls both parties as the contract nears its expiration to check on
the status of negotiations and to offer mediation services if the parties
jointly agree to request mediation.
The FMCS has no enforcement power. It can serve only as a media-
tor and conciliator, attempting to persuade the parties in a collective bar-
gaining dispute to compromise their differences and reach an agree-
ment. The FMCS can make recommendations to the parties but cannot
arbitrate the dispute.
The FMCS employs a staff of mediators at its headquarters in Wash-
ington, D.C., and in regional offices around the country. Mediators are
usually experienced labor negotiators with a background in union or
management activity. Mediators normally use a “shuttle diplomacy”
method of bridging communication between the employer and the
union when bargaining has broken down or a strike has erupted. Most
state governments also have a mediation and conciliation office which
provides similar services for private sector parties located in the state,
even when the parties are within federal labor law jurisdiction. Federal
and state mediators generally coordinate their activities to avoid dupli-
cation of effort.
U.S. labor law does not provide for mandatory arbitration of collec-
tive bargaining disputes although parties may voluntarily agree to arbi-
tration.
A majority of Canadian provinces and the federal jurisdiction provide
for a mandatory conciliation process and access to binding arbitration
of a first-contract dispute where a newly formed union is unable to
achieve a negotiated agreement with the employer. In Mexico, concili-
ation by the relevant CAB is mandatory once a union delivers notice of
its intention to strike. In addition, once a union has filed a strike notice
with the CAB, it has the choice of submitting the dispute to the CAB
for settlement or going forward with the strike.
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(vi) Extension of Agreement Coverage
There is no provision in U.S. labor law for extension by law of collective
bargaining agreement terms to workers outside the bargaining unit.
In Canada, only Quebec provides for extension of collective agreement
coverage. On the other hand, law-contracts which extend negotiated
terms of employment to cover an entire sector or region are an impor-
tant feature of Mexican labor law.
4) Enforcement of Collective Bargaining Agreements
(i) Binding Effect of Collective Bargaining Agreements
A collective bargaining agreement is legally enforceable by either party
(the union or the employer). Its terms govern relations between the par-
ties unless they are waived or amended by mutual agreement.
(ii) Enforcement Procedures
Collective bargaining agreement obligations can be enforced through
three different mechanisms: (1) grievance and arbitration under the
terms of an arbitration clause contained in the collective agreement; (2)
filing of a complaint with the NLRB; or (3) court action.
Arbitration
Private arbitration under the terms of a collective bargaining agree-
ment is the most common recourse available to private parties in the
U.S. labor relations framework. Most collective bargaining agreements
contain a “no-strike” clause forbidding a work stoppage while the con-
tract is in effect and providing for arbitration of disputes that concern
the rights and obligations contained in the agreement. Disputes arising
under the contract are normally first subject to a grievance procedure, in
which union and employer representatives attempt to resolve differ-
ences. Most grievances are resolved in this manner.
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Unresolved grievances are generally submitted to a neutral arbitrator.
Labor arbitration is an entire system of private jurisprudence in U.S. in-
dustrial relations. Arbitrators are private citizens, not government offi-
cials. The method of selection of an arbitrator and the powers of the ar-
bitrator are usually established by the contract’s arbitration clause, not
by laws or regulations.
If necessary, an arbitrator’s award can be enforced by obtaining a
court order. Courts will generally enforce such awards. Indeed, case law
has established that arbitrators’ awards must be enforced even if the ar-
bitrator’s interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement is am-
biguous or would differ from the court’s decision on the merits of the
dispute. Courts will overturn an arbitrator’s decision only if it violates
the law or an overarching public policy, if it exceeds the authority grant-
ed by the parties in their arbitration clause, or if it is inconsistent with
the essence of the contract. Such cases are rare.
Box 4.1
Arbitration — “Private Jurisprudence” in U.S. Labor Relations
Arbitral decisions over the past 50 years of U.S. labor relations constitute
a body of private law that guides current decision making. Although each
case presents new facts and there is no application of precedent as at com-
mon law, there is a de facto pattern of deciding similar cases in a similar
manner.
Two principal arbitration services serve as a source of arbitrators in la-
bor-management matters. The American Arbitration Association (AAA)
is the primary private organization of arbitrators. Arbitrators must meet
standards established by the AAA to be included on the AAA roster of ar-
bitrators. The second organization is the Federal Mediation and Concil-
iation Service (FMCS), which maintains a list of private arbitrators (not
FMCS mediators, who are government employees) from which parties to
a collective bargaining agreement may select an arbitrator. FMCS arbi-
trators must meet FMCS standards. Many arbitrators are on both the
AAA and the FMCS lists.
Some companies and unions agree in their labor contract to forego
AAA or FMCS procedures for selecting an arbitrator and instead agree on
a permanent arbitrator or panel of arbitrators to handle all their arbitra-
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tions. Most such permanent panelists are experienced arbitrators who are
also on the AAA and FMCS lists. Arbitrators conduct thousands of labor
arbitrations each year in the United States.
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
A refusal by an employer to deal with an alleged violation of the col-
lective bargaining agreement through contractual grievance and arbitra-
tion provisions can be the subject of a refusal-to-bargain charge. The
courts have held that collective bargaining is a continuing process, which
includes day-to-day adjustments in working rules, resolution of prob-
lems not covered by existing agreements, and the protection of employ-
ee rights already secured by the terms of an agreement. However,
charges relating to collective bargaining agreement violations are often
subject to the NLRB’s deferral doctrine, described below.
NLRB Deferral Doctrine
Compared with ULP cases taken to the NLRB or lawsuits in federal dis-
trict courts, arbitration is generally faster and less expensive. Most griev-
ances (complaints that the opposite party to a collective bargaining agree-
ment has breached that agreement) submitted to arbitration are resolved in
three to six months, compared with possibly years of litigation before the
NLRB or the courts. The NLRB has developed a “deferral” doctrine by
which the Office of the General Counsel will defer ULP cases alleging vio-
lation of the collective bargaining agreement pending completion of the
grievance-arbitration procedure, by which such cases are susceptible to pri-
vate arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement.
Courts
Section 301 of the LMRA creates a private right of action in federal dis-
trict court for an alleged violation of a collective bargaining agreement. This
means that either party may sue for breach of a collective bargaining agree-
ment and seek any remedy available under statutory and common law rules.
A Section 301 suit is often preferable to a ULP charge because the remedies
of a federal district court order — including financial damages — are self-
enforcing. However, because of the costs and time involved in such suits,
they are in practice undertaken only in cases involving very large amounts
of money or important but intractable issues.
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5) Successor Employers
When a business with a collective bargaining obligation is sold, U.S. la-
bor law requires the new owner to bargain in good faith with the union
for a new collective bargaining agreement, as long as a majority of the
former company’s union-represented workers are employed by the new
owner. There is no obligation, however, to extend the terms and condi-
tions of the former contract, unless the new employer is really an “alter
ego” of the old one, meaning that the new employer has substantially
identical management, business purpose, operation, equipment, cus-
tomers and supervision, as well as ownership. A new employer is not re-
quired to hire the employees of its predecessor. However, it is an unfair
labor practice for a successor employer to refuse to hire its predecessor’s
employees because of their union membership or activities or to avoid
recognition of and bargaining with the union.
Canadian and Mexican laws require terms and conditions of collective
agreements and collective contracts, respectively, to carry over to an
employer continuing the business of a previous employer. The new em-
ployer assumes all rights and obligations created by the contract with
the union.
6) Obligations of Unions towards Represented Workers
U.S. labor law imposes a “duty of fair representation” on the union, re-
quiring it to represent bargaining unit members in contract negotiations
and in the administration of a collective agreement without hostile dis-
crimination, fairly, impartially, and in good faith. A violation of the du-
ty of fair representation can give rise to an unfair labor practice charge
against the union. In practice, the NLRB and the courts have created a
high threshold for proving a violation of the duty of fair representation,
leaving wide discretion to the union in managing its negotiations and
contract administration.
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Canadian law provides for a similar duty of fair representation. In Mex-
ico, Article 375 of the Federal Labor Law requires unions to represent
their members in defending their individual rights unless the individual
chooses to act directly and without the assistance of the union.
7) Termination of Bargaining Rights
A union may lose its certification under certain circumstances. It may be
decertified by a majority vote of bargaining unit members. U.S. law per-
mits workers to change their collective bargaining representative or to
decertify their bargaining representative and revert to nonunion status.
The NLRB will conduct a decertification election if it receives a petition
voluntarily signed by at least 30 percent of the employees in the bar-
gaining unit. However, there are certain restrictions on the holding of
such elections. First, no election may be held if a certification or decer-
tification election has been held in that bargaining unit within the pre-
ceding year. Second, to enhance stability in bargaining relationships, the
NLRB has devised a “contract bar” rule. This rule precludes any election
for a new union to replace an incumbent union or for the decertification
of an existing union for the first three years of a collective bargaining
agreement. A representation petition for a new union or a decertification
petition must be filed 60 to 90 days before the expiration of the existing
contract. An employer, supervisor or other agent of the employer may
not file a petition for a decertification election.
Canada’s labor laws provide for similar methods of decertifying or
changing the bargaining representative. Under Mexican labor law any
duly registered union may challenge another union’s title to a collective
contract at any time by filing a claim to that title with the relevant
CAB. If an incumbent union does not prove its majority support dur-
ing such a proceeding, it will lose title to the collective contract and
thus lose the right to administer and negotiate revisions to it.
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C. LABOR PRINCIPLE 3 – THE RIGHT TO STRIKE
1) Legal Foundations
The United States Constitution does not explicitly address the right to
strike. Instead, legislation has established rules for strike activity.
(i) The Labor Injunction in U.S. Labor History
Throughout the 19th century and the early 20th century, many U.S.
legislatures and courts treated strikes as a criminal conspiracy or restraint
of trade. One phenomenon peculiar to Anglo-American labor law histo-
ry, critical in understanding U.S. treatment of the right to strike, is the
so-called “labor injunction.”
Labor injunctions were widely used in the 19th century and early
20th century at the behest of employers to break strikes. Injunction pro-
ceedings often took place ex parte, without an opportunity for workers
or unions to be heard. Many judges also held union leaders personally li-
able, both criminally and civilly, for the acts of union members. The ju-
dicial repression of strikes deeply affected organized labor’s views and
later gave way to legislation on the right to strike.
In the 1920s and 1930s, sustained political efforts by workers and
their allies achieved greater protection of the right to strike, culminating
in the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 and the National Labor Relations
Act of 1935. In later legislation, Congress demonstrated greater interest
in protecting employers’ interests and those of “neutral” third parties by
enacting legislation governing workers’ right to strike.
(ii) Norris–LaGuardia Act and National Labor Relations Act Policy
In the collective bargaining context, where workers seek better terms and
conditions of employment in a first contract or in a new contract, work-
ers’ right to strike is relatively unfettered. Workers’ right to engage in
“concerted activities” for “mutual aid or protection,” including collec-
tively withholding their labor, is protected by the basic provisions of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act and the National Labor Relations Act. In general,
U.S. law provides that workers cannot be discriminated against for exer-
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cising this right, nor can employers obtain labor injunctions from judges
to halt a strike. Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act declares the
right of workers to engage in “concerted activities” for “mutual aid or
protection” and underscores this point in Section 13: “nothing in this
Act shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or dimin-
ish in any way the right to strike.”
(iii) Federal Preemption
U.S. federal law on the right to strike is paramount and preemptive in its
scope and enforcement. For example, when in 1992 the state of Wis-
consin enacted a state law prohibiting the permanent replacement of
strikers within the state, federal courts ruled that the state act was pre-
empted by federal law and voided the state statute.
States, counties and municipalities do have a critical ancillary role af-
fecting the right to strike because they enforce public safety provisions gov-
erning the conduct of strikes. State courts can issue civil injunctions to stop
violence, trespassing or other public safety disturbances in the course of an
otherwise legal strike. Local police and, much less commonly, the Nation-
al Guard (which is under control of the governor of a state) may be de-
ployed to guarantee access to and from work sites for managers, nonstrik-
ing employees, replacement workers, suppliers and others crossing the
picket lines of striking workers. State and local police and prosecutors also
have jurisdiction over picket line violence and other unlawful activity.
2) Protected Strike Activity
As noted above, Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act protects
the right of employees to engage in concerted activities, including the
right to strike. The National Labor Relations Board and U.S. courts
have ruled that certain types of strike activity are not protected by that
section. In particular, partial strikes (such as concerted refusals to per-
form overtime work), concerted production slowdowns, intermittent
work stoppages, and minority strikes conducted without the authoriza-
tion of a certified or voluntarily recognized majority bargaining repre-
sentative are treated as unprotected. As a result, an employer is free to
take disciplinary action against employees involved in such strikes.
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Canadian labor law protects a wider range of strike activity, including
partial and intermittent strikes. Canadian unions may lawfully strike,
however, only to conclude a collective agreement and only once statu-
tory conciliation, mediation and notice requirements have been met.
Mexican labor law limits the definition of a strike to “the mere act of
suspending work” and thus does not protect work slowdowns.
3) Regulation of the Right to Strike
U.S. workers and unions are relatively free to engage in peaceful strike
action without interference by the employer or intervention by the state.
No law mandates requirements or conditions for workers to begin, sus-
tain or end a strike. However, the law makes certain types of strike un-
lawful, mandates that unions provide certain types of notice, allows for
no-strike clauses to be included in collective agreements, and allows for
injunctions against strikes in “national emergencies.” The Railway Labor
A c t establishes somewhat different procedures and regulations for strikes
in the airline and railway industries (see Appendix 4A).
(i) Unlawful Strikes
The Taft-Hartley Act (the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947)
amended the National Labor Relations Act to make it unlawful to strike
to achieve certain purposes.
The most important of these restrictions are contained in Section
8(b)(4) of the NLRA, which basically prohibits union actions against
neutrals in a labor dispute. Section 8(b)(4) prohibits workers and unions
from inducing or engaging in work stoppages or refusing to handle
products for such purposes as: (1) forcing any employer or self-em-
ployed person to join any labor or employer organization; (2) requiring
a neutral third party to cease doing business with an employer with
whom the union has a labor dispute; (3) forcing an employer to recog-
nize a union when another union has already been certified as the repre-
sentative of its employees; or (4) forcing an employer to assign particu-
lar work to employees in a particular union (unless the employer is
failing to comply with a certification or order of the NLRB determining
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the bargaining representative of employees performing such work). A
strike to force an employer to designate a multiemployer organization as
its bargaining representative violates other subsections of Section 8(b), as
does a strike seeking to force an employer to pay for services which are
not performed or are not to be performed.
(ii) Notice Requirements
A union must give 60 days’ advance notice to the employer of its inten-
tion to modify or terminate an existing collective bargaining agreement.
It must also provide notice of the existence of a bargaining dispute to the
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service within 30 days after pro-
viding such notice. Section 8(d)(4) of the NLRA bars strikes by a union
that has failed to provide the required notice to the FMCS until 60 days
after that notice is eventually filed. If any strike action is taken within a
required notice period, striking workers lose their status as employees for
the purpose of protection against unfair labor practices and the right to
vote in representation elections until such time as they are reemployed
by the employer.
In addition to those general notice requirements, amendments to the
NLRA in 1974 covering the health care sector established special ad-
vance notice requirements for strikes in the private sector health care in-
dustry, including 10 days’ advance notice by health care unions of an in-
tent to strike.
(iii) No-Strike Clauses
In the United States, the vast majority of collective bargaining agree-
ments contain a no-strike clause barring work stoppages while the con-
tract is in effect. The normal quid pro quo for the no-strike clause is an
arbitration clause, in which the employer agrees to submit disputes that
arise during the contract term to binding arbitration before a private ar-
bitrator under terms of reference established by the contract. Most
strikes occur after the expiration of a contract when the employer and
the union cannot reach agreement on a new contract.
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No-strike clauses and the arbitration quid pro quo in American labor
contracts are products of agreement between the parties. In contrast,
Canadian labor laws require no-strike and compulsory arbitration
clauses in every collective bargaining agreement. Statutes will apply the
requirement if it is not contained in the agreement. Mexican law does
not restrict the right to strike but requires that formal advance notice of
strikes be given and that, once such notice is given, the union and the
employer attend CAB conciliation hearings. It also permits a union
that has given a strike notice to submit the dispute giving rise to the no-
tice to the CAB for resolution.
(iv) National Emergencies
Sections 206 to 210 of the LMRA create an exception to the Norris-La-
Guardia Act, permitting labor injunctions where a strike creates a “na-
tional emergency.” Under these provisions, if the President believes that
an actual or threatened strike or lockout will imperil “the national health
or safety,” he or she may appoint a board of inquiry to investigate the is-
sues in dispute and report publicly on them. Upon receiving this report,
the President may direct the Attorney General to seek a court injunction
against the strike or lockout. Section 208 of the LMRA gives the court
jurisdiction to issue an injunction if it finds that the threatened or actu-
al strike or lockout: (1) affects all or a substantial part of an industry en-
gaged in interstate or international commerce or engaged in the produc-
tion of goods for commerce; and (2) will “imperil the national health or
safety.” If an injunction is issued, the parties must resume bargaining
with the aid of the Federal Conciliation and Mediation Service. Sixty
days after the issuing of the injunction the board of inquiry must submit
a further report on the current status of the bargaining dispute and on
the employer’s last offer of settlement. Within 15 days of that report the
NLRB must conduct a vote of the affected employees on that offer. Sub-
sequent to the election the injunction must be dissolved. The national
emergency provisions of the LMRA have been used in a number of in-
dustries, including steel, coal, atomic energy, maritime transport, and
telecommunications.
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(v) Airline and Railroad Industries
The Railway Labor Act establishes different requirements and regula-
tions of the right to strike in the airline and railway industries. A sum-
mary of these conditions is included in Appendix 4A.
(vi) Strike Votes
No U.S. law requires a strike vote or a vote by workers on an employer’s
last contract offer before strike action is taken or after a strike has begun.
As a matter of democratic practice, however, most unions’ constitutions
and bylaws require a strike vote, some requiring a two-thirds majority to
launch a strike. The government plays no role in overseeing such votes.
In Mexico, once a strike has started, employers, workers, or interested
third parties may request that the CAB certify the legal “existence” of
the strike. This requires the CAB to determine, among other things,
whether a majority of workers support the strike, for which purpose a
strike vote of workers (called a recuento) may be held in order to deter-
mine whether the strike enjoys majority support. If the strike does not
enjoy majority support it will be declared “nonexistent,” and work
must be resumed. In Canada, federal law and most provincial laws re-
quire mandatory strike votes.
4) Picketing and Other Supportive Action
Peaceful picketing, handbilling and other concerted activities are gener-
ally protected under the National Labor Relations Act. Many such activ-
ities also benefit from constitutional protection against state interference
with freedom of expression. However, the NLRA restricts some union
actions, such as “secondary boycotts.”
(i) Secondary Boycotts
U.S. law on secondary boycotts is a significant limitation on the scope
and impact of the right to strike. Section 8(b)(4) of the National Labor
Relations Act makes unlawful any form of “secondary boycott” by a U.S.
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union. Secondary boycotts are a type of action by workers or their union
which seeks to influence an employer by bringing economic or social
pressure to bear on those who deal with that employer.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has held that the NLRA does
not prohibit peaceful handbilling, unaccompanied by picketing, that
urges customers and consumers not to patronize a neutral employer.
The Court has also held that a union can, in most situations, lawfully
picket a secondary employer for the limited purpose of persuading cus-
tomers or consumers not to buy the products of the primary employer.
Unions can be subject to lawsuits for financial damages and to ULP
charges for secondary boycott activity. Many strike-related ULP charges
are filed by employers against unions and union members for secondary
boycotts. The general counsel is required by Section 10(l) of the NLRA
to immediately seek an injunction in federal court against any secondary
boycott by a union.
Box 4.2
Secondary Boycotts by Farmworkers
Although farmworkers’ unions in the United States are generally disad-
vantaged by their exclusion from federal labor relations laws (they can or-
ganize only under state laws, where such laws exist), they have an advan-
tage in this area since they are free to seek secondary boycotts both by
unions and consumers. Some farmworkers’ unions were able to gain a
foothold in the agricultural sector because they were able to organize con-
sumer boycotts of large grocery store chains in major U.S. cities.
5) Striker Replacement
The Supreme Court enunciated an important rule which affects the
right to strike in the 1938 Mackay Radio case, when it held that an em-
ployer may permanently replace striking workers engaged in an eco-
nomic strike.6 It is fairly common today for U.S. employers to threaten
to employ permanent replacements in the event of a strike.
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6 See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
An exception to the rules permitting permanent replacement of strik-
ers applies where a strike is undertaken to protest an employer’s unfair
labor practices. In such cases, strikers cannot be permanently replaced
(see Unfair Labor Practice Strikes and Economic Strikes, below).
Striking workers who are permanently replaced under the Mackay doc-
trine are not terminated from employment. Rather, they remain on a recall
list and must be offered employment if a position becomes available.
U.S. trade unionists and their allies argue that the right to strike nec-
essarily implies that all striking workers should have the right not to be
permanently replaced in response to strike action and that this right
should not be limited to strikes provoked by an employer’s ULPs. Em-
ployers counter that their right to permanently replace economic strikers
maintains balance in the test of economic force between the parties. Pro-
posals to amend U.S. labor law to overturn the Mackay decision and bar
the permanent replacement of striking workers have been strongly de-
bated in the U.S. Senate twice during the 1990s. In both attempts, the
efforts were filibustered, and supporters of reform were unable to muster
the 60 percent vote needed to cut off the filibuster and proceed to a vote.
Canadian labor laws do not permit the permanent replacement of strik-
ers. British Columbia and Quebec prohibit most forms of temporary
replacement of strikers as well. Mexican law requires a company to
cease operations during a strike, except as necessary to maintain equip-
ment and preserve raw materials. The law requires the members of the
union on strike to perform these tasks and makes the union responsible
for the installations of the company during the strike.
(i) Unfair Labor Practice Strikes and Economic Strikes
U.S. labor law makes a critical distinction between strikes provoked by
an employer’s unfair labor practice and strikes motivated by workers’
economic interests in improved wages, benefits or working conditions.
A ULP strike has greater protection under the law, since workers en-
gaged in a ULP strike cannot be permanently replaced under the Mack-
ay doctrine. They may be temporarily replaced, but they must be rein-
stated, displacing any temporary replacement workers, when they decide
to end their strike and return to work.
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In practice, many unions file ULP charges when they begin a strike.
The union hopes to prevail on the ULP charge to protect strikers against
permanent replacement. A final decision by the NLRB or by the courts
on the ULP case may not be forthcoming for a period of months or
years, and so striking workers cannot be certain that their action is pro-
tected. However, an equivalent risk exists for the employer: if it replaces
strikers, and years later a final ruling of the NLRB or a court of appeals
finds that they are ULP strikers, the employer must rehire the strikers
and pay back wages and other expenses for the period of the strike.
D. PROTECTIONS AGAINST INTERFERENCE
1) Prohibition of Employer Unfair Labor Practices
The central instrument for protecting the rights to organize, to bargain
collectively and to strike under U.S. law is the prohibition of five unfair
labor practices in Section 8(a) of the National Labor Relations Act. A
ULP violates the law and is subject to the remedies provided by the Act.
Canadian labor law also rests on the prohibition of defined unfair labor
practices. Mexican labor law does not define unfair labor practices as
such. While some prohibitions are stated, Mexican law relies on de-
tailed affirmative declarations of what employers, employees and
unions must do rather than what they must not do, establishing sanc-
tions and remedies for noncompliance.
Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act makes it a ULP to “in-
terfere with, restrain or coerce” employees engaged in concerted activity, in-
cluding union activity. For example, prohibiting employees from distrib-
uting prounion literature on their own time and in nonwork areas may be
unlawful interference with workers’ organizing rights. Examples of em-
ployer behavior found to be coercive include the following: (1) polling or
interrogating individual employees about their voting intentions in a po-
tential representation election; (2) threatening to withdraw economic ben-
efits during a representation election campaign; (3) attempting to influence
the election of union officials; and (4) placing employees or union organ-
izers engaged in union activity under surveillance.
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Threatening to close a workplace if the workers form a union is also
an example of unlawful coercion. However, courts have allowed em-
ployers to make predictions as to the effects that they believe unioniza-
tion will have.7
Canadian law treats most employer statements which link the job se-
curity of employees to their choice to unionize as unfair labor practices.
Section 8(a)(2) seeks to guarantee the independence of trade unions by
making it an unfair labor practice to dominate or interfere with the for-
mation or administration of a labor organization or to contribute finan-
cial or other support to it. Section 8(a)(2) of the Act bars the creation of
“company unions” controlled by management and used to prevent gen-
uine trade union organizing. Section 8(a)(2) also prevents an employer
from assisting one union among rival unions seeking to represent its em-
ployees. An employer who has been notified of a valid petition for a rep-
resentation election must refrain from recognizing and bargaining with
any rival unions until the outcome of the election has been determined.
While some employers claim that Section 8(a)(2) and its continued
enforcement by the NLRB impede the formation of labor-management
cooperation committees, unionists insist that the clause is necessary to
prevent a resurgence of company unions. Proposals to reform Section
8(a)(2) have been sharply debated in the U.S. Congress in recent years.
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act protects workers’ right to organize and car-
ry on concerted activities by prohibiting discrimination against workers
who engage in lawful union activities. The Act provides for reinstate-
ment and back pay (or other “make-whole” remedies) for workers who
are discharged or otherwise discriminated against for such activity. An
employer will be found to have discriminated if antiunion reasons were
a substantial or motivating factor in its decision. Where an employer
closes a part of its operations with the motive of chilling unionism in the
remainder of its operations or transfers some or all of its operations to
avoid collective bargaining obligations under the Act, the employer
commits an unfair labor practice under Section 8(a)(3).
7 For a fuller treatment of this issue, see Commission for Labor Cooperation, Plant Clos -
ings and Labor Rights (Dallas: Secretariat of the Commission for Labor Cooperation, 1997).
D. PROTECTIONS AGAINST INTERFERENCE 207
Discharging workers for attempting to organize a union is one of the
most common ULPs in the United States and has increased sharply in
recent decades. For example, during the 1950s, reinstatement offers to
remedy discharges of workers in violation of Section 8(a)(3) were found
in less than 5 percent of union elections. By the 1980s, that figure had
risen to 28 percent.8 Moreover, reinstatement offers do not reflect all
ULP discharges, since many workers are offered and accept back pay or
some other compensation without being offered reinstatement, and
some ULP discharges are not reported to the NLRB.
In most Canadian jurisdictions any presence of an antiunion motive
will render a discharge unlawful, and the worker will be reinstated with
back pay. In Mexico, workers can be discharged only for limited and
specific causes, which do not include union activity.
Section 8(a)(4) makes it unlawful to retaliate against a worker for giving
testimony or otherwise availing himself or herself of the protection of
the NLRA.
Section 8(a)(5) makes it unlawful for an employer to refuse to bargain
with a majority collective bargaining representative of its employees. In ad-
dition, the duty to bargain prevents an employer from unilaterally altering
terms and conditions of employment prior to an impasse in collective bar-
gaining. The Act includes prohibitions against other actions by employers
which interfere with the ability of a union to represent its bargaining unit
members (see Obligation to Bargain, in section 2B.3, above).
2) Prohibition of Union Unfair Labor Practices
Section 8(b) of the Act protects workers against certain actions by
unions. Section 8(b)(1) of the Act makes it a ULP for a union to “re-
strain or coerce” employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Sec-
tion 7 of the Act. This protects certain worker rights to refrain from
8 Annualized averages for each decade. See Commission on the Future of Worker
Management Relations, Fact Finding Report (Washington DC: U.S. Department of
Labor and U.S. Department of Commerce, 1994), at page 84.
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union membership and concerted activity or to change union allegiance.
For example, a union may not fine or otherwise penalize a member for
seeking to resign from the union during a strike or for opposing incum-
bent union officials in intraunion politics. Similarly, a union which
makes threats of violence against those supporting a rival union commits
an unfair labor practice. Section 8(b)(2) makes it a ULP in some cir-
cumstances for a union to cause an employer to discriminate against an
employee in violation of Section 8(a)(3). Section 8(b)(4) makes it un-
lawful for a union to require employees covered by a union shop to pay
an “excessive or discriminatory” membership fee.
3) The “Laboratory Conditions” Requirement
In addition to prohibitions on unfair labor practices, the National Labor
Relations Board enforces a requirement of “laboratory conditions” dur-
ing union representation elections. This requirement has been defined as
“conditions as nearly as ideal as possible, to determine uninhibited de-
sires of employees”9 during union representation elections. The Board
will set aside and rerun elections where laboratory conditions are not
met. In practice, the laboratory conditions doctrine prohibits only the
most aggressive forms of campaigning, leaving a wide scope for mislead-
ing and derogatory campaign propaganda. The Board will intervene if a
party uses forged documents to render voters unable to recognize prop-
aganda. It has also intervened when a party engaged in electioneering at
a polling place once the polls had opened, when a party exacerbated
racial tensions through inflammatory racial statements, and when a par-
ty made threats of violence.
4) Civil Rights and Protection
Without civil and political rights there can be no normal exercise of
trade union rights. The U.S. Constitution provides fundamental civil
9 General Shoe Corp., 77 NLRB 124 (1948).
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and political rights to U.S. residents. Like other U.S. residents, unions
and union members have full freedom of assembly, provided that the ex-
ercise of this freedom does not pose a real and present danger of sub-
stantial harm to property or physical safety. Unionists have the freedom
to travel within and outside the country that is granted to all residents
and have the right to attend national and international trade union
meetings with full freedom and independence. Similarly, unions and
employees have the constitutional right to express their views and opin-
ions publicly and to receive or impart information through any media,
like other U.S. residents.
Unions and employees engaged in union activity, like all U.S. resi-
dents, enjoy freedom from search and seizure of their property without
a judicial warrant issued following a determination that reasonable and
probable cause exists to believe that evidence for criminal proceedings
will be found on the premises. Similarly, unionists enjoy constitutional
freedom from arbitrary arrest or detention without a warrant and with-
out charges being brought. Unions and their members are entitled
to police protection from assault, injury, and damage to property and to
full protection of the criminal laws which prohibit inflicting such harms.
3. GOVERNMENT ENFORCEMENT
A. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (NLRB) – STRUCTURE
The principal U.S. government agency that enforces private sector labor
relations laws is the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), often just
called “the Board” in U.S. labor discourse. The NLRB structure actual-
ly contains three independent entities: (1) the five-member Board itself;
(2) the Office of the General Counsel; and (3) the Division of Adminis-
trative Law Judges (ALJs).
The Board employs some 2,000 attorneys, field examiners, and sup-
port staff at its headquarters in Washington, D.C., and 33 regional of-
fices around the country. A regional director heads each regional office
and makes critical decisions in matters that come before the office. Re-
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gional directors and their staff handle representation issues on behalf of
the five-member Board. Regional directors also deal with ULP cases un-
der the supervision of the independent general counsel.
1) The Board
The President of the United States appoints five members to the NLRB.
Each appointment must be confirmed by the U.S. Senate. As a matter of
custom, no more than three members of the Board belong to the same
political party. The Board has two distinct functions: hearing appeals of
decisions by administrative law judges (ALJs), and supervising represen-
tation elections to certify a union’s majority status.
Mexico’s CABs and several Canadian provincial labor boards are tri-
partite in their composition, with representatives of government, labor
and management.
(i) Supervision of Certification Elections in Representation Cases
Through its regional offices, the NLRB oversees secret ballot elections in
workplaces where workers seek to prove majority support for collective
bargaining. Under the authority of the Board, NLRB elections are con-
ducted by regional directors and regional office staff. The Board estab-
lishes the rules for conducting such elections and reviews objections to
the election. Such complaints of unfair campaign and election tactics are
distinct from ULP proceedings (see The “Laboratory Conditions” Re-
quirement, section 2D.3, above.)
(ii) Appeals from ALJ Decisions in ULP Cases
The NLRB sits as an appeals panel that reviews the decisions of admin-
istrative law judges in ULP cases. In this role, the Board is a tribunal re-
viewing the written record of the trial and the written decision of the
ALJ. Decisions of the NLRB are themselves appealable to federal appeals
courts and may eventually be appealed from there to the U.S. Supreme
Court.
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2) Office of the General Counsel
The independent Office of the General Counsel is the main enforce-
ment agency for the right to organize, to bargain collectively and to
strike. The general counsel is appointed by the President of the United
States for a four-year term and must be confirmed by the Senate.
The NLRB’s general counsel is generally considered the most power-
ful single post in the agency structure. The general counsel enforces the
ULP provisions of the law, receiving and investigating all ULP charges
through the regional office staffs. Such charges may be filed by workers,
unions or employers at any of the NLRB’s regional offices. If the gener-
al counsel finds merit in the charge, a complaint will be issued against
the charged party. If the general counsel does not find merit, the charge
is dismissed. The refusal to issue a complaint after receiving an unfair la-
bor practice charge is not reviewable by the Board or by the courts.
In effect, the NLRB Office of the General Counsel is the gatekeeper
for enforcement of federal labor law on industrial relations. If the gener-
al counsel issues a complaint, the resources of the agency (and thereby
the power of the federal government) are then applied to prosecution of
the case before an administrative law judge, before the Board, and in the
courts. The general counsel enforces the Act on behalf of the people of
the United States, not just on behalf of the charging party.
3) Division of Administrative Law Judges
The third branch of the NLRB is the Division of Administrative Law
Judges. ALJs are independent of the five-member Board and of the Of-
fice of the General Counsel. Although they are appointed by the Board,
they receive lifetime appointments and may be removed only for gross
misconduct. They serve as trial judges in ULP cases, presiding over hear-
ings where documentary evidence and testimony of witnesses are pre-
sented by counsel for the Office of the General Counsel and by counsel
for the charging party and the respondent. After a hearing, the ALJ is-
sues findings of fact and rulings of law based on the evidence. The ALJs’
decision is commonly appealed to the Board by the losing party.
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B. NLRB ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES - UNFAIR LABOR
PRACTICE PROCEEDINGS
1) Investigation
ULP processes are initiated by a party’s filing a charge with the Board.
Acting under the authority of the general counsel, the regional director
first conducts an investigation of the alleged violations set out in the
ULP charge. The investigation includes taking sworn statements. It also
allows extensive opportunity for union or employer counsel to submit
position papers and to argue orally on their client’s behalf for the is-
suance of a complaint or for the dismissal of the charge.
2) Complaint or Dismissal
Based on the investigation, the regional director then decides whether it
is reasonable to believe that a ULP may have been committed. The re-
gional office issues a complaint if it finds that the charge is “meritorious”
— if the findings of a preliminary investigation support the facts as al-
leged in the charge and if the facts as alleged would constitute a ULP. If
not, the regional director will recommend that the charging party with-
draw the charge. Charges may be withdrawn without prejudice to the
right of the charging party to refile charges relating to the same matters,
possibly on the basis of new or additional evidence or allegations. If the
charging party refuses to withdraw an unmeritorious charge, the region-
al director will dismiss it. Dismissals can be appealed only to the gener-
al counsel. The regional director often convinces the charging party to
withdraw the charge prior to dismissal. About one-third of all ULP
charges are found to be meritorious after a preliminary investigation. (In
several regional offices of the Board, a large volume of charges involve
individual employee grievances, often by Postal Service employees who
are within NLRB jurisdiction. These charges are generally deferred to ar-
bitration by the regional office and are not listed as meritorious. Thus,
the true rate of meritorious charges is higher than one-third.)
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3) Settlement Efforts
While the Act does not specifically mandate a mediation or conciliation
role for the NLRB in connection with ULPs, regional offices are en-
couraged by the general counsel to seek voluntary compliance through
settlement between the regional director and the charging and charged
parties. There is no provision in the law for arbitration of such matters.
More than 90 percent of all meritorious ULP charges are disposed of
through settlement rather than by litigation. Parties’ reasons for settling
cases are diverse. Their decision to settle is often based on an assessment
of the strength of their case. Settlements might also be driven by the po-
tential costs of litigation, the length of time required to litigate a case,
the economic circumstances of the employees concerned, and the rea-
sonableness of a settlement offer.
4) ALJ Hearing
If the parties do not settle a complaint, the case goes forward to a trial of
the facts before an administrative law judge. The ALJ hears the exami-
nation and cross-examination of witnesses. Three attorneys usually par-
ticipate in ALJ hearings: counsel for the Office of the General Counsel,
counsel for the employee or the union, and counsel for the employer.
The ALJs evaluate witnesses’ credibility, examine documents and
other exhibits for their probative weight, make findings of fact, and draw
conclusions of law. They issue a written decision in the case, deciding
whether the charged party has committed an unfair labor practice. If so,
the ALJ orders a remedy.
5) Appeal to the NLRB
ALJ decisions may be appealed to the Board for a review of the record in
the case. The Board can affirm or reverse, in whole or in part, the ALJ’s
decision. In complex or novel cases, the Board might hear oral argu-
ments by parties to the case.
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6) Non-Self-Enforcement of NLRB Decisions
Decisions of the NLRB are not self-enforcing. A party may choose not
to appeal a Board ruling and, at the same time, not comply with the rul-
ing. The Board must then initiate proceedings for enforcement in a fed-
eral appeals court. The court will then review the Board’s decision based
on the record in the case.
Testing the NLRB’s decision through deliberate noncompliance with
an order is a common practice under U.S. labor law. Many employers
believe that the courts are more sympathetic to property rights and oth-
er employer interests than the Board. Some judicial circuits are consid-
ered more likely than others to reverse the NLRB. An employer upset
with a decision of the NLRB who does business in one of these judicial
circuits will often seek to file an appeal there. Decisions by U.S. circuit
courts of appeal may conflict with each other, resulting in variations in
labor law enforcement in the different judicial circuits until the issue is
resolved by the Supreme Court.
The decisions of Canada’s federal and provincial labor boards are im-
mediately enforceable as judicial orders upon filing of the decision in
the appropriate superior court. Quebec’s Labour Court is a judicial
body whose orders are immediately enforceable. The orders of Mexi-
co’s CABs are judicial orders and immediately enforceable as such.
7) Section 10(j) Injunctions
Section 10(j) of the NLRA permits the general counsel, upon issuing an
unfair labor practice complaint, to seek an injunction from a federal dis-
trict court judge in order to obtain an interim remedy for the complain-
ing party. An injunction is a special court order based on principles of
equity at common law granting immediate remedial action while a case
proceeds through the normal litigation process. In practice, injunctions
have been sought only in extraordinary cases, where the general counsel
believes that irreparable harm might result from the normal delays of lit-
igation. A 1979 memorandum by the general counsel sets out various
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fact situations, divided into 14 categories, in which injunctive relief will
be sought.10
Canada’s federal and provincial labor boards (in Quebec, the Office of
the Labour Commissioner and the Labour Court) are generally more
integrated than the U.S. NLRB in their structure and functioning.
Most boards have labor relations officers or investigation officers who
summarily investigate and attempt to settle cases prior to hearings. If
settlement efforts are unsuccessful, the board holds a single set of hear-
ings and issues a final decision. Most boards will reconsider such deci-
sions only in unusual cases. The board’s decision is generally not ap-
pealable to the courts. Mexico’s Conciliation and Arbitration Boards
are also structured to process cases in a single administrative proceed-
ing, in contrast to the NLRB’s multiplicity of divisions and stages of
treatment.
C. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR (DOL)
The NLRB enforces laws regarding labor-management relations and unfair
labor practices in that context. The U.S. Department of Labor enforces the
Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act’s provisions regarding
rights of individual union members and internal union democracy, as well
as financial reporting and disclosure requirements for unions.
1) Complaint Proceedings
Complaints involving alleged violations of union members’ rights under
the LMRDA and unlawful tactics in union elections may be filed at cer-
tain regional DOL offices and are investigated by regional DOL agents.
If a complaint is found to have merit following an investigation of the al-
leged violation, there is not a further administrative proceeding, as with
the NLRB. Instead, the Department of Labor files a lawsuit in federal
district court to seek appropriate sanctions or remedies.
10 NLRB GEN. Counsel Memo No. 79-77.
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2) Monitoring of Compliance
While enforcement of the LMRDA generally takes place in response to
complaints, DOL regional offices also monitor unions’ compliance with
financial requirements of the law through audits of labor organizations’
financial books and records.
3) Settlement Efforts
As is the case with most labor law enforcement efforts, the Department
of Labor seeks voluntary compliance with LMRDA requirements. There
is no provision for arbitration of such matters. Unresolved complaints
go forward to litigation in federal district courts.
4. RIGHTS OF PRIVATE ACTION
Three avenues for private action are available to workers and unions to
secure statutory rights to organize, to associate freely, to bargain collec-
tively and to strike: the NLRB, the U.S. Department of Labor, and the
federal district courts.
A. ACCESS TO ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS
1) The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
The NLRB is available to private parties (workers, unions, employers)
under two lines of statutory authority. First, private parties may petition
the NLRB under Section 9 of the NLRA for an election to determine
whether a majority of the workers in a bargaining unit desire represen-
tation for the purpose of collective bargaining (thus determining
whether the employer’s duty to bargain arises). Second, private parties
may allege unfair labor practices, thus setting in motion the NLRB
mechanisms for determining ULPs under Section 8 of the NLRA.
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An individual employee who files a charge on his or her own behalf,
without any involvement by a union, typically does not hire a lawyer. If
a complaint is issued on the charge, an attorney representing the Office
of the General Counsel works with the employee in presenting the com-
plaint. When a union is involved, a union attorney often joins the case,
with full rights to subpoena witnesses and documents and to engage in
examination and cross-examination of witnesses. As the charged party
the employer has the full rights of a litigant party, including representa-
tion by counsel and rights of appeal to the Board and to the courts. (For
more detail on NLRB processes, see section 3, above.)
Labor relations laws in Canada and Mexico are also complaint-driven.
Government agencies do not conduct inspections or otherwise monitor
compliance with laws on organizing, collective bargaining and striking.
Rather, they receive and respond to charges and complaints filed by pri-
vate actors in labor affairs.
2) Department of Labor (DOL)
Unions and individual union members have access to certain regional
offices of the Department of Labor, where they may file complaints al-
leging violation of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act.
Generally, only the DOL is empowered to file a lawsuit regarding inter-
nal union election procedures. (For more information on DOL process-
es, see section 3, above.)
B. ACCESS TO COURTS
As a general proposition, private parties do not have access to courts to
directly enforce rights to organize, bargain collectively or strike. Instead,
the NLRB is empowered to bring action in courts to vindicate private
rights when administrative proceedings have not resolved the matter.
A specific exception to this rule is found in Section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act . Section 301 of the LMRA creates a private
right of action in federal district court for an alleged violation of a col-
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lective bargaining agreement. A Section 301 suit can be preferable to a
ULP charge because the remedies of a federal district court order — in-
cluding financial damages — are self-enforcing.
An individual represented by a union may also sue his or her union in
federal court for breach of the duty of fair representation.
5. PROCEDURAL GUARANTEES AND REMEDIES 
TO ENSURE ENFORCEMENT
A. DUE PROCESS
1) Procedural Protections
Regional directors of the NLRB are required to carefully investigate any
objective evidence that is offered by a charging party in support of unfair
labor practice charges. If the regional director decides to dismiss the
charges, the NLRB will send a dismissal letter to the parties. The letter
will include a summary report setting forth the reasons for dismissing the
charges, unless the charging party requests that the report be excluded.
If an unfair labor practice complaint or a dispute concerning repre-
sentation under the NLRA is not settled by agreement of the parties, a
hearing is held. Constitutional and statutory rules of due process apply
to hearings under the NLRA.
Parties have the right to present evidence and make submissions relevant
to their case and to know and respond to the case of other parties. Hearings
are open to the public. Parties may be represented by counsel, obtain com-
pulsory process for production of witnesses and documents, examine and
cross-examine witnesses under oath, and rely on rules of evidence. Section
8(a)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act makes it an unfair labor practice
for an employer to discriminate against an employee because he or she has
filed charges or given testimony in an NLRB proceeding.
In a ULP case, notice of ULP charges must be given to the charged
party, and the general counsel has the burden of proving an unfair labor
practice.
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An order may be issued only on the basis of the record of evidence ad-
duced at the hearing. Transcripts of proceedings and other records in the
case are publicly available. The decision must include findings and con-
clusions along with the reasons or bases for them on all material issues of
fact or law presented in the record.
In most Canadian jurisdictions, the burden of proof in an unfair labor
practice case involving discrimination for union activity generally rests
with the employer, who must prove that it had no antiunion animus in
acting as it did. In Mexico, the law is similarly protective. The burden
of proof always falls on the employer. The employer must prove that its
motive for discharging a worker falls within the statutory definitions of
just cause. Under the FLL, any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of
the worker.
2) Independence and Impartiality of Decision Makers
Members of the NLRB are appointed by the President of the United
States on the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate for renewable five-
year terms. The five-year term endures even if the presidency changes.
Board members may be removed by the President only upon notice and
following a hearing, and only for neglect of duty or malfeasance in of-
fice. ALJs are appointed by the Board and receive lifetime appointments.
ALJs may be removed only for gross misconduct and may be subject to
discipline or reduction in pay by the NLRB only for just cause after the
opportunity for a hearing before a tribunal independent of the Board.
The general counsel is appointed by the President on the advice and
consent of the Senate for a term of four years.
Board members and ALJs must be free of bias. They must not hold
any personal interest by which they would stand to gain or lose by a de-
cision and must not prejudge the facts of a case nor show personal bias
or clear favoritism towards a party. Detailed regulations prohibit and re-
quire disclosure of real or apparent conflicts of interest on the part of
Board members, the general counsel, and Board employees.11 A party
11 49 C.F.R. Sec. 29.
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may, at any time following the designation of an ALJ to hear a case and
before the filing of the ALJ’s decision, request that the ALJ withdraw on
grounds of personal bias. If the ALJ does not disqualify himself or herself
and withdraw from the proceeding, the ALJ must state this ruling and
the grounds for it on the record. A court may later overturn any NLRB
order based upon ALJ findings made in a hearing rendered unfair by the
ALJ’s bias.
Adjudicators and NLRB employees may not receive any ex parte
communications from any person or entity outside of the NLRB or
from the general counsel concerning the merits of any pending repre-
sentation or ULP case. Ex parte communications are oral or written
communications not on the public record with respect to which reason-
able prior notice to all parties is not given.
B. APPEALS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
The five-member NLRB acts as an appeals tribunal in ULP cases (see
section 3, Government Enforcement, above). Parties may appeal the
ALJ’s decision to the Board, which reviews the record and may affirm or
reverse, in whole or in part, the ALJ’s ruling. Decisions of the NLRB are
appealable to federal appeals courts and may be appealed from there to
the U.S. Supreme Court by a writ for certiorari.
Decisions by a regional director refusing to issue a complaint or to
settle a case with the charged party may be appealed only to the general
counsel. The general counsel’s refusal to issue a complaint or to overturn
a settlement is not reviewable, either by the NLRB or by the courts.
Decisions by Canada’s labor boards are generally final and may not be
appealed to the courts. However, they may be subject to judicial review
on constitutional or administrative law grounds. These grounds are
quite restricted, and the courts have often stated that they should exer-
cise restraint when asked to review the decisions of labor relations
boards. Decisions of Mexico’s CABs are usually final and are subject to
judicial review only on an action for amparo. Such action may be based
only upon certain limited grounds, the most important of which are error
of law, breach of due process, and exceeding legally authorized power.
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C. SANCTIONS AND REMEDIES
U.S. labor law is remedial, not punitive. It does not provide for civil or
criminal sanctions or penalties in ULP cases. An employer or union that
commits an unfair labor practice is generally ordered to “cease and de-
sist” from unlawful conduct and post for 60 days a notice in the work-
place or the union office promising not to repeat the conduct. Steps
must also be taken to restore the status quo ante, such as reinstatement
and back pay for workers discharged for organizing or a return to the
bargaining table in refusal-to-bargain cases. In back pay awards for
workers, the amount of any interim earnings obtained by the worker is
deducted from the back pay paid by the employer.
The NLRB has fashioned other remedies specific to particular types
of legal violation. For example, in cases of flagrant employer violations
during union organizing campaigns, the Board has ordered employers to
grant the union access to company bulletin boards, to give the nonem-
ployee union organizers reasonable access to employees in nonworking
areas on nonworking time, or to give the union equal time and facilities
to respond to company messages to employees concerning union repre-
sentation (see also The Gissel Doctrine, in section 2B.2, above).
With respect to internal union affairs, the Labor Management Report -
ing and Disclosure Act is remedial, like the NLRA, not punitive. In cases
of improper election procedures, generally a court will order a new in-
ternal union election to be supervised by the Department of Labor.
After all appeals are exhausted, any “final order” under the NLRA as
amended or the LMRDA is enforceable under the police power of the
United States government. Failure to comply with the order amounts to
contempt of court. Responsible individuals could then be incarcerated
until compliance is fulfilled, or their assets may be seized to satisfy a
monetary order, such as back pay to workers.
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6. PUBLICATION MEASURES
A. PUBLICATION OF LAWS, REGULATIONS, PROCEDURES
AND ADMINISTRATIVE RULINGS
Labor laws, administrative regulations and internal agency rules and
procedures of the NLRB and the Department of Labor are published
and available to the public at government offices, public libraries and
law libraries. Similarly, decisions by administrative law judges, the
NLRB and the courts are all promptly published and available to
the public. Statutes, regulations, rules, procedures and decisions are al-
so generally available through online electronic sources. Several private
publishing firms also produce these materials for sale and subscription.
B. NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY FOR COMMENT
Proposed changes in labor laws are published in advance and are avail-
able to the public upon request. Legislative committees of the U.S.
House and Senate hold public hearings on proposed legislation to hear
the views of interested parties. Most trade unions and management or-
ganizations maintain legislative offices to monitor proposed changes in
the law, to meet with legislators on such bills, and to arrange for oral or
written testimony at public hearings on the legislation.
7. PUBLIC INFORMATION AND AWARENESS
A. AVAILABILITY OF PUBLIC INFORMATION
The NLRB ensures that public information is available concerning the
right to organize, to bargain collectively and to strike. The Board pub-
lishes and makes available free publications, usually nontechnical
brochures and other descriptive information, at all regional offices or up-
on written or telephoned request from any person.
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In addition, the NLRB publishes a comprehensive annual report.
The report provides an overview of the enforcement activities of the
Board during the year, including summaries and analysis, organized by
topic, of key Board or court decisions under the NLRA. It also provides
detailed statistical data on the number and types of cases handled by the
Board, the ways in which cases were concluded, and the median time
which elapsed at each stage of the Board’s proceedings. The report also
places much of this data in historical perspective.
In the field, each NLRB regional office assigns attorneys or agents to
act as “officer of the day” to handle telephone calls and to personally in-
terview workers seeking advice about their rights under the Act.
B. PUBLIC EDUCATION
Like all U.S. federal agencies, the NLRB maintains a public affairs office
to respond to inquiries from the public and to provide detailed infor-
mation to the press, trade unions, businesses, universities, and non-
governmental organizations. The NLRB sponsors or participates in
dozens of seminars, conferences, workshops, training sessions, and oth-
er events throughout the United States each year to share information
with the public and with interested parties. The Department of Labor
maintains similar functions through its various agencies.
C. PRIVATE INFORMATION SOURCES
Information is also available from private publishing enterprises that
specialize in reporting on government legal and regulatory affairs, in-
cluding industrial relations issues. The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.,
Commerce Clearing House, Inc., West Publishing Co., and other pri-
vate publishers provide extensive materials that are subscribed to by la-
bor law practitioners. These materials are also available in law libraries
and many general public libraries.
The AFL-CIO and its affiliates, as well as independent unions, pub-
lish newspapers and reports with information on matters of organizing,
bargaining and strikes from a trade union perspective. The U.S. Cham-
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ber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, the Labor
Policy Association, and other employer organizations similarly produce
publications on these issues.
D. NAALC COOPERATIVE ACTIVITIES
The U.S. National Administrative Office, in collaboration with the
NAOs of Mexico and Canada, has undertaken an extensive program of
cooperative activities on industrial relations principles of the NAALC.
Members and staff of the NLRB and DOL have participated in a num-
ber of these activities. Information on such programs can be obtained
from the U.S. NAO.
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Appendix 4A
AN OVERVIEW OF THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT
BASIC LABOR POLICY
The Railway Labor Act (RLA) is the key statute which governs labor re-
lations in the railroad and airline industries in the United States, enact-
ed in 1926. The central purpose of the RLA is to settle labor disputes so
that they do not result in work stoppages which impair railroad and air-
line transportation. The RLA was to a significant extent the product of
negotiated compromise and agreement between labor and management
in the railway industry.
COVERAGE OF ACT
The RLA applies to rail and air common carriers and any entity owned
or controlled by or under common control with such a carrier which
performs transportation-related activities. Employees at the level of
“subordinate official” and below are covered. Included within the scope
of the term “subordinate official” are employees whose level of supervi-
sory authority would render them “supervisors” under the NLRA and
thus exclude them from the definition of covered employee under that
statute. There are approximately 590,000 covered employees in the air-
line industry and 230,000 in the railroad industry. Approximately 65 to
70 percent of the airline employees covered by the RLA and 80 to 85
percent of those in the railroad industry are unionized.
ACQUISITION OF BARGAINING RIGHTS
Like the NLRA, the RLA enables unions to acquire collective bargaining
rights either through voluntary recognition or through certification by a
government agency as the majority representative of a group of employ-
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ees. Under the RLA the National Mediation Board (NMB) makes certi-
fication determinations.
The certification process is invoked by requesting the investigation of
a representation dispute by the NMB. The NMB has the duty and ex-
clusive power to investigate such disputes. Only a labor organization or
an employee may raise a representation dispute with the NMB. The
RLA, unlike the NLRA, does not give employers standing in represen-
tation disputes.
Under the RLA the group or unit of employees represented by a
union in collective bargaining is referred to as a “craft or class.” A craft or
class must be system wide, that is, it must include all members of that
group working for the carrier at all locations. The showing of interest
necessary to raise a representation dispute is calculated on the basis of the
number of employees in the craft or class. An application for certification
must be accompanied by authorization cards signed by at least 35 per-
cent of the employees in an unrepresented craft or class or a majority of
a craft or class that is already represented by another union. (By contrast,
under the NLRA a bargaining unit need only be appropriate for repre-
sentation. It can take many forms and more often than not is confined to
a single location, even if the employer is national in scope. Generally, the
total showing of interest necessary to raise a representation dispute under
the NLRA is smaller, only 30 percent of the initiating group.)
When the showing of interest requirement has been satisfied, the
NMB generally holds elections to determine the outcome of representa-
tion disputes. Unlike elections under the NLRA, the vast majority of
elections under the RLA are conducted by mail ballot. In standard
NMB elections, a majority of the eligible voters must cast valid ballots in
favor of union representation in order for the NMB to issue a certifica-
tion, in contrast to NLRB elections, in which only a majority of those
actually voting is required for the union to win.
There are other differences between the two Acts in their handling of
representation elections. Under the NLRA, a party is barred from raising
a question concerning representation during the first three years a collec-
tive bargaining agreement is in effect. The NMB utilizes a two-year certi-
fication bar and a one-year dismissal bar. Also, while unions are provided
with a list of employee addresses during an NLRA election, unions gener-
ally are not entitled to such a list during an initial election under the RLA.
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During an RLA election the NMB requires that “laboratory condi-
tions” be maintained to allow a free choice by employees without em-
ployer interference. Employer conduct that might be allowed in an
NLRB election will sometimes be deemed to violate the RLA.
UNION MEMBERSHIP AND DUES
The subject of union security is treated differently than under the
NLRA. Section 14(b) of the NLRA permits the application of state laws
barring union security agreements (the so-called “right-to-work” laws).
However, Section 2, Eleventh of the RLA preempts the application of all
such laws and authorizes carriers and labor organizations to include in
their collective bargaining agreements union security arrangements ob-
ligating employees to pay uniformly required dues and fees as a condi-
tion of continued employment. As under the NLRA, actual union
membership is not required. Section 2, Eleventh also authorizes carriers
and unions to agree that the employer can deduct union dues from the
pay of each member of the craft or class represented by the union, pro-
vided that the member has authorized this deduction in writing.
As under the NLRA, employees who are part of a union-represented
craft or class, but who are not members of the union, are not obligated
to pay that part of dues assessments which goes to expenses other than
collective bargaining and grievance handling activity.
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
Duty to Bargain
Section 2, First of the RLA imposes a duty upon a carrier to deal with
the representative of its employees with respect to rates of pay, rules and
working conditions. That section also imposes upon both carriers and
labor organizations the duty to exert every reasonable effort to make and
maintain agreements. Both duties are judicially enforceable. Unlike the
NLRB, the NMB has no direct role in such enforcement.
Collective bargaining is initiated under RLA by one party serving a
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notice upon the other proposing changes to existing rates of pay, rules
and working conditions. The notice may be to establish an initial col-
lective bargaining agreement or to amend an existing agreement.
Collective bargaining agreements in the railroad industry generally do
not expire but instead continue indefinitely, unlike most agreements
made under the NLRA. However, as a device to prevent the overly fre-
quent reopening of agreements, the parties in the railroad industry often
include moratorium clauses in their agreements, insulating them from
negotiations for a specified period. The same result is accomplished in
the airline industry by use of duration clauses, which specify the date up-
on which all or part of the collective agreement may be amended.
Disclosure
Unlike the NLRA, as a general rule the RLA does not impose an obliga-
tion upon a carrier to disclose information to a union representing its
employees in collective bargaining.
Status Quo Obligations
During the process of collective bargaining under the RLA there is a du-
ty to maintain the terms and conditions of employment without change.
Carriers may not change wages, hours or working conditions, and labor
organizations may not strike or use other economic self-help. Some
courts have ruled that carriers may alter wages, hours and working con-
ditions during bargaining for an initial agreement. The status quo obli-
gation is judicially enforceable through injunctive relief and, where ap-
propriate, through make-whole remedies. Unlike the NLRB, the NMB
has no role in enforcing this obligation.
Contents of Agreements
The RLA contains no specific requirements as to the particular content
of collective bargaining agreements, except that an arbitral tribunal must
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be established in airline agreements (see Enforcement of Collective Bar-
gaining Agreements, below). However, such agreements generally must
address rates of pay, rules and working conditions in order to satisfy the
parties’ obligation under the RLA to make and maintain agreements
pertaining to such matters.
Scope of Bargaining
The Supreme Court has stated that the duty to bargain over “rates of
pay, rules and working conditions” in Section 2, First of the RLA should
be interpreted broadly. Some courts have ruled that the distinction be-
tween “mandatory” and “permissive” subjects of bargaining, which ap-
plies under the NLRA, also applies under the RLA. However, there is lit-
tle case law on what might constitute permissive subjects under the
RLA. The Supreme Court has decided that management is under no ob-
ligation to bargain over an employer’s basic decision to go out of busi-
ness, since this decision is a “management prerogative.”
Mediation and Arbitration
Under the RLA, mediation functions are performed by the National
Mediation Board. Either party can request mediation, and there is no
minimum period of negotiation required before a request may be made.
However, the NMB will encourage the parties to continue with direct
negotiations if it believes that the request for mediation was premature.
If the parties are unable to agree and terminate bargaining, a 10-day
waiting period begins, during which time either party may request me-
diation, or the NMB may directly proffer and initiate mediation. If nei-
ther happens within the 10-day waiting period, the parties become free
to engage in economic self-help, including strike or lockout action.
The NMB has a wide discretion over when it may proffer interest ar-
bitration and thus release the parties from mediation. Mediation gener-
ally continues longer than it does when conducted by the Federal Medi-
ation and Conciliation Service in a dispute under the NLRA.
If interest arbitration is accepted by both parties, it is conducted pur-
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suant to sections 7, 8 and 9 of the RLA. If either party rejects the proffer
of arbitration, a 30-day cooling-off period begins during which the
NMB continues mediation in the public interest.
The parties remain under an obligation to maintain the status quo u n t i l
the cooling-off period expires. During this period the President of the Unit-
ed States may create an Emergency Board under Section 10 of the RLA, if
the NMB believes that the dispute threatens substantially to interrupt in-
terstate commerce to such a degree as to deprive any section of the country
of essential transportation service. If this is done, terms and conditions of
employment must remain unchanged and there may be no strike or lock-
out until 30 days after the Emergency Board has rendered its report to the
President. Thereafter, the status quo is lifted. In some cases Congress has en-
acted special legislation to dispose of the dispute.
Enforcement of Collective Bargaining Agreements
The RLA distinguishes between what have become known as “major” and
“minor” disputes. A minor dispute is one arising out of grievances or the in-
terpretation or application of existing collective bargaining agreements. A
major dispute is one over the making or amending of a collective bargain-
ing agreement concerning rates of pay, rules or working conditions. Major
disputes are subject to the notice, negotiation and mediation processes pre-
viously discussed in this appendix. Minor disputes are subject to compul-
sory arbitration under the RLA. As a general rule, self-help such as strike or
lockout action is prohibited with respect to minor disputes.
The RLA establishes or provides for the establishment of tribunals,
generally known as “adjustment boards” in the railroad industry, which
are charged with the task of adjudicating minor disputes. Section 3, First
establishes the National Railroad Adjustment Board, which is divided
into four divisions defined by type of railroad work and consisting of
equal numbers of employer and union representatives. Section 3, Sec-
ond empowers carriers and unions to agree to establish system, group or
regional boards of adjustment. In practice these boards are most often
established by contract between an individual carrier and a single union
and they usually consist of a carrier representative, a union representa-
tive and a neutral chair.
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The National Railroad Adjustment Board has no jurisdiction over
the airline industry. However, the RLA requires air carriers and unions
representing their employees to create system, group or regional boards
of adjustment having the same jurisdiction and power as such boards,
under Section 3, Second.
Individual employees have no standing to invoke the creation of ad-
justment boards or, with the exception of the National Railroad Adjust-
ment Board, to bring disputes before established boards except through
labor organizations representing them. The decision of an adjustment
board is essentially final and binding on the parties. It may be enforced
by court action. Courts will generally set adjustment board orders aside
only for failure of the board to comply with the RLA or to conform or
confine itself to matters within its jurisdiction, for fraud or corruption
by a member of the board or, in some court circuits, for failure of due
process. Arbitration decisions by system boards in the airline industry
are equally final and binding.
The powers of the courts may be invoked to ensure the disputants’
compliance with the RLA’s machinery for the settlement of both major
and minor disputes.
Obligations towards Represented Workers
Unions have a duty to fairly represent the workers in a craft or class for
which they have bargaining rights, that is, without arbitrariness, discrimi-
nation or bad faith. The duty is the same under the RLA as it is under the
NLRA. In fact, the duty was first articulated by the courts under the RLA.1 2
RIGHT TO STRIKE
There are significant differences between the NLRA and the RLA as to
how strikes are treated.
232 UNITED STATES: APPENDIX 4A
12 The seminal case was Steele v. Louisville and Nashville Railway Co. 323 U.S. 192
(1944).
Regulation of the Right to Strike
As noted above, under the RLA the mandatory mediation process pre-
ceding a strike is lengthy. It is intended to prevent or lessen the likeli-
hood of a strike. However, once those processes are exhausted, the law
imposes no special restrictions and does not require strike votes. Partial
or intermittent or selective strikes are not prohibited under the RLA as
they are under the NLRA. Of course, strikes must be conducted in a
peaceful and otherwise lawful manner.
Picketing and Other Supportive Action
A union may publicize its dispute with a carrier prior to exhausting the
mediation process, provided that in doing so it does not disrupt the car-
rier’s operations. Once mediation has been completed and the subse-
quent cooling-off period has elapsed, unions may exert a range of sec-
ondary pressures generally not available to their counterparts under the
NLRA. Unions may picket or boycott another carrier in an effort to put
pressure on the primary carrier with which they have a dispute.
Striker Replacements
As under the NLRA, the RLA permits a carrier to replace economic
strikers permanently before the strike ends, and there is no obligation to
terminate permanent replacements after the strike ends. A temporary re-
placement may be displaced before the end of a strike by an economic
striker who offers to return to work unconditionally. Whether a re-
placement is permanent or temporary has been the subject of some liti-
gation and turns upon the facts of each case.
PROTECTIONS AGAINST INTERFERENCE
Like the NLRA, the RLA prohibits certain employer actions which in-
terfere with the right of employees to organize, bargain collectively and
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strike. Section 2 of the RLA prohibits carriers from influencing, inter-
fering with or coercing employees in the choice of their representatives;
denying or questioning in any way the right of its employees to join, or-
ganize or assist in organizing the labor union of their choice; interfering
with the organization of its employees; using its funds in maintaining or
assisting or contributing to any labor organization; influencing or coerc-
ing employees in an effort to induce them to join or not to join or re-
main members of any labor organization; or requiring any person seek-
ing employment to sign any contract or agreement promising to join or
not to join a labor organization.
These prohibitions are incorporated into the employment contract of
every employee covered by the RLA and may be enforced by court ac-
tion brought by an employee or a union.
The jurisprudence under these prohibitions covers a range of em-
ployer actions similar to that covered by the NLRB’s unfair labor prac-
tice jurisprudence. However, the courts are divided on the question of
whether disciplining an employee will be unlawful under the RLA if the
employer has any antiunion motivation or, as under the NLRA, only if
that motivation was a substantial or motivating factor behind the em-
ployer’s action. Courts have ordered reinstatement, back pay, restored
benefits, and similar compensatory measures to remedy employer viola-
tions of the law. The lower courts are divided on the question of whether
punitive damages can be awarded in such cases.
The National Mediation Board regulates conduct during representa-
tion investigations by requiring that “laboratory conditions” be main-
tained. The NMB has remedied violations of laboratory conditions pri-
marily by ordering that elections be rerun and that employers post NMB
notices stating the basic grounds for rerunning the elections. In serious
cases the NMB may order that the rerun election be decided on the ba-
sis of the majority of ballots cast rather than by majority of the entire
craft or class. The board has also reserved the power to order certification
on the basis of union authorization cards in egregious cases. The prohi-
bition on violating laboratory conditions applies both to employers and
to unions, although the NMB has never set aside an election because a
union acting alone tainted laboratory conditions.
As under the NLRA, the duty to bargain established by the RLA con-
tains an implied prohibition on seeking to bypass a union which has ac-
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quired bargaining rights by dealing directly either with individual em-
ployees or with another organization. Unlike the NLRA, the RLA does
not expressly protect concerted activities, and thus protection for union
activity must be found under one of the prohibitions or doctrines de-
scribed above.
SUCCESSOR EMPLOYERS
The NMB’s certification of a union as representative extends to the car-
rier’s “successors and assigns.” However, where a carrier is purchased
by, merged into, consolidated with, or has its assets acquired by another
carrier, the status of a union certified as majority collective bargaining
representative for a craft or class may still come into question. In the
event of a dispute over such matters, an affected union or employee may
petition the NMB to resolve the dispute. If the NMB decides that the
parties to the corporate transaction have created a new “single carrier,” it
will take different actions depending on the sizes of the merging crafts
o r classes. If the merger involves a large class merging with a much small-
er class, it will extend the certification of the larger class’s union to the
smaller, while extinguishing the smaller group’s certification. In cases
where the merging crafts are of comparable size, the NMB will order an
election. The NMB makes “single carrier” determinations on the basis
of such factors as whether the previously separate carrier systems are held
out to the public as a single carrier, whether management and labor
relations operations have been combined, and whether there is a com-
bined workforce. Union certifications may be extinguished only by
order of the NMB following an investigation.
The NMB has issued merger procedures for both airlines and rail-
roads under which it will decide whether a single carrier exists, whether
unions’ certifications will survive or be extinguished, and what the craft
or class will be in the new single carrier. The effect of carrier restructur-
ing upon existing collective bargaining agreements will depend upon the
terms of those agreements and is not a matter over which the NMB will
exercise jurisdiction directly. Such jurisdiction lies primarily with the
courts and arbitration tribunals.
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FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION WITHIN UNIONS
The internal union democracy and accountability requirements of the
Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act apply equally to unions
under the RLA and NLRA.
TERMINATION OF BARGAINING RIGHTS
The question of how and under what circumstances bargaining rights
may be terminated is treated differently under the RLA than it is under
the NLRA. Under the RLA, there are no formal decertification proce-
dures as such. In order to accomplish decertification, an individual or la-
bor organization must file a petition for certification as the representa-
tive of the craft or class of employees in question. The NMB requires
that an application for a represented craft or class be supported by au-
thorization cards from a majority of the craft or class before holding a
representation vote. If a majority of eligible employees fails to cast valid
ballots in the election, a previously issued certification covering the craft
or class effectively will be cancelled by the NMB. If the individual seek-
ing decertification is successful in the election, he or she may renounce
bargaining rights after one year, in which event the craft or class is effec-
tively decertified.
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES AND RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT
The Railway Labor Act empowers the National Mediation Board to in-
vestigate and issue orders with respect to disputes over union represen-
tation. Like NLRB orders, NMB orders are not self-enforcing and must
be enforced by court order. However, NMB actions are not subject to
appeal and may be reviewed by courts only on very narrow grounds.
Rights under the RLA which are not subject to NMB representation
dispute investigation or adjustment board adjudication are enforced di-
rectly by court action.
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